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Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: 
Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging 
Lisa L. Casey∗
The politicians’ rhetoric seemed promising enough. With corporate 
scandals making front page headlines and defrauded investors facing 
hundreds of billions of dollars in losses, legislators vowed to “help 
defrauded investors to recoup their losses.”1 The Bush Administration 
similarly promised “to put the bad guys in prison and take away their 
money.”2 Seeking to calm the traumatized stock markets and anticipating 
voter outrage, the election-year Congress expedited, and President Bush 
signed into law, new antifraud legislation. This legislation, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, attempts to strengthen the authority of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and to deter future wrongdoing by 
corporate executives and accountants through a variety of new 
regulations.3 However, in their lawmaking efforts, federal legislators 
largely ignored questions about whether and how injured investors would 
get any money back. 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B. Stanford University, J.D. 
Stanford Law School. I have benefited greatly from discussions with, and comments from, Jack 
Coffee, Jim Cox, Nicole Garnett, Bill Kelley, John Nagle, Mike Perino, Jay Tidmarsh, and Julian 
Velasco, as well as insights from federal district court judges Hon. Lewis D. Babcock and Hon. 
Milton Shadur. I also received helpful research assistance from Patti Ogden, Dwight King, Warren 
Rees, Mark Kundmueller, Justin Krizmanich, and Diane Hellwig. Finally, I could not have 
completed this paper without incredible support from Brian, Meg, and Kevin Casey. 
 1. See, e.g., Accountability Issues: Lessons Learned from Enron’s Fall: Hearing Before the 
S. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy) (“Congress can do 
more to make sure that our laws help deter corporate fraud and we should help defrauded investors 
to recoup their losses. In fact, by forcing through special exemptions for securities fraud, accountants 
and others made Congress a contributor to the Wild West mentality that came to be reflected in 
Enron’s hidden partnerships. The time has come for Congress to re-think and reform our laws in the 
other direction . . . .”), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:84416.pdf. 
 2. Paula Dwyer, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide, BUS. WK., Oct. 14, 2002, at 44 
(quoting Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson). 
 3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, signed by President Bush on July 30, 2002, includes 
reforms of accounting, securities fraud, and corporate governance laws aimed at deterring deceptive 
conduct by public corporations, their management, and their professional advisors. Pub. L. No. 107-
204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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Now, with fresh reforms in the statute books, public attention has 
turned from Capitol Hill to the courts, where federal judges face the 
largest number of investor class actions ever filed.4 The plaintiffs’ bar 
has invaded, seeking hundreds of billions of dollars on behalf of 
shareholders of some of this country’s largest publicly traded 
corporations—Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, 
Time Warner, Motorola, and HealthSouth. The list grew longer each 
month in 2002 and early 2003.5 Plaintiffs’ lawyers filed a record 261 
class action fraud complaints last year, including claims against seven of 
the thirty companies comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average and 
against one out of every eight corporate constituents of the Standard & 
Poor’s 500 index.6 With an unprecedented number of large-cap 
companies restating their financial results7 and spawning new 
investigations by the bigger-budget SEC,8 more “megasecurities 
litigation”9 has flooded the federal courts than ever before. 
 4. Markets Securities Fraud Suits Hit Record in 2002, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at C4. 
 5. The recent proliferation of megacases is exemplified by the fact that the well-publicized 
Enron securities class action, a case involving $60 billion in losses, represented only the seventh 
largest securities fraud lawsuit filed in 2001. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
CASE FILINGS—2001: A YEAR IN REVIEW 6 (2002), http:// 
securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/yir_Filings.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). Cornerstone Research 
calculates “maximum dollar loss” as the dollar value decrease in the market capitalization of the 
defendant issuer from the trading day on which the issuer’s market capitalization reached its 
maximum during the class period to the trading day immediately following the end of the class 
period. Id. at 2. Another study completed by Woodruff-Sawyer in 2002 found that the number of 
securities fraud suits against companies with market capitalizations above $10 billion has more than 
tripled since 1995. WOODRUFF-SAWYER & CO., A STUDY OF SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION 13 (2002). 
 6. Adrian Lewthwaite, Lawsuits Increasingly Target Directors, INSURANCEDAY.COM ¶ 3, at 
http://www.insuranceday.com (Jan. 29, 2003). One recent study determined that the likelihood of a 
public company being sued for securities fraud increased approximately 40% from 1995 to 2002. 
ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: WILL 
ENRON AND SARBANES-OXLEY CHANGE THE TIDES? 4 (2003), available at 
http://www.nera.com/wwt/publications/6143.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
 7. The number of public companies restating their prior year’s financial statements rose 
from 233 in 2000 to 270 in 2001 to 330 in 2002. HURON CONSULTING GROUP, AN ANALYSIS OF 
RESTATEMENT MATTERS: RULE, ERRORS, ETHICS, FOR THE FIVE YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 
2002, at 3 (2003), available at http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/ 
uploadedFiles/Huron_RestatementStudy2002.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). The General 
Accounting Office has reported that the average size by market capitalization of a restating company 
rose from $500 million in 1997 to $2 billion in 2002. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Financial 
Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining 
Challenges, GAO-03-138, at 4 (Oct. 4, 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d03138.pdf. 
 8. During the first nine months of fiscal year 2003, the SEC filed 443 enforcement actions, 
suspended 11 companies from trading, and froze the assets of 30 companies. SEC’s Donaldson 
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Decisions made by the judges overseeing this maelstrom of lawsuits 
not only will attract continued attention from the media, but these cases 
also likely will alter the jurisprudence of securities law enforcement for 
years to come, generating fodder for legal academics. As in the past, 
most scholars will focus their work on the deterrence impact of private 
litigation.10 At the end of the day, however, we also should inquire about 
the results actually achieved for the victims of the fraud. How much 
money will shareholders injured by deceptive accounting and 
management practices receive as compensation for their losses? Will 
these class actions merely transfer wealth from corporate wrongdoers 
and their insurers to opportunistic plaintiffs’ lawyers? 
Certainly the lawsuits hold the promise of enormous potential profits 
for class counsel. As a general matter, the larger the company sued (as 
measured by market capitalization), the larger the losses suffered by the 
putative class, and the larger the potential settlement fund.11 In 2002, 
more than half of all securities class actions generated attorneys’ fees of 
25% or more of the settlement funds amassed.12 Assuming that a 
megacase settles for $100 million, plaintiffs’ counsel could expect to 
receive $25 million for their litigation services. In fact, a number of the 
pending megacases likely will settle for well over $100 million. Eight 
megasecurities class actions recently settled for more than $200 million 
Claims Success for Antifraud Task Force, NAT’L J. CONG. DAILY, July 22, 2003. Congress raised the 
SEC’s budget to $716 million in fiscal year 2003 from $437.9 million in fiscal year 2002. Securities 
and Exchange Commission: Accountants, Economists Easier to Hire, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 2003, at C2. 
 9. No single definition of “megacase” exists. However, as used in this Article, 
“megasettlements” refer to settlements of securities class actions in excess of $100 million. 
 10. See, e.g., James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical 
Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private 
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) 
[hereinafter Understanding the Plaintiff’s Att’y]. 
 11. One study of securities class action settlements determined that, generally, “the size of 
the average settlement grows with the size of the market cap.” Further, “[t]he settlement value of 
shareholder class actions is driven in large part by the loss in shareholder value (market 
capitalization). Since the passage of the Reform Act, there is a trend of increasing losses in 
shareholder values, which results in higher settlement values.” WOODRUFF-SAWYER & CO., supra 
note 5, at 14, 33; see also BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 9 (“Investor losses, an estimate of what 
investors lost over a class period relative to an investment in the S&P, are the single most powerful 
determinant of settlements . . . .”). 
 12. Nicholas Varchaver, Should You Sue? Guess What: You Already Have, FORTUNE, Dec. 3, 
2002, at 129. 
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each.13 From these settlement funds, plaintiffs’ counsel applied for 
awards of “mega attorneys’ fees,” receiving as much as 20% of the funds 
recovered through settlement.14 One insurance industry analyst recently 
estimated that thirty-six of the one thousand securities class actions 
currently on file in the federal courts will settle for more than $500 
million each.15 If class counsel receives court-ordered fee awards of just 
10% of such settlement funds, critics of private enforcement certainly 
will have new ammunition in their war against the plaintiffs’ securities 
bar. 
The substantial financial incentive motivating plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
file investor lawsuits—and counsel’s actual behavior in response to those 
incentives—sparks the debate and ignites the rhetoric in discussions 
about the social benefits of securities class actions.16 Although private 
enforcement of the securities laws depends on critical investments by 
entrepreneurial attorneys,17 every dollar awarded by the courts to the 
attorneys as return on these investments is a dollar not available for 
 13. See STANFORD LAW SCHOOL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, at 
http://securities.stanford.edu (last modified Nov. 17, 2003). These settlements include: the Cendant 
litigation ($3.525 billion, including $3.185 billion in the common equity settlement and $340 million 
in the Prides settlement); the Lucent Technologies litigation ($563 million); the Bank of America 
securities litigation ($490 million); two separate private class actions settled by Waste Management 
($457 million and $220 million); the Rite Aid litigation (settlements totaled more than $334 million); 
the Oxford Health Plans litigation ($300 million total from all defendants); and the 3Com litigation 
($259 million). 
 14. These mega attorneys’ fees include the awards in In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities 
Litigation, 146 F. Supp. 2d 706, 734–36 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (awarding class attorneys 25% of settlement 
fund and accepting expert testimony that fee awards of 25–30% for settlements of $100–200 million 
“still seems fairly standard” (citation omitted)), In re BankAmerica Corp. Securities Litigation, 228 
F. Supp. 2d 1061 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (awarding class attorneys 18% of $490 million settlement fund—
approximately $86 million), In re 3Com Securities Litigation, No. C-97-21083 EAI, slip op. (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 9, 2001) (awarding class attorneys 18% of $259 million fund—approximately $46.6 
million), and In re Waste Management, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 97-C7709, 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16566, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 1999) (awarding class attorneys 20% of $220 million 
fund—approximately $44 million). 
 15. Lewthwaite, supra note 6, ¶ 23. 
 16. “[C]ondemnation of the securities class action has typically been trained directly on the 
peculiar incentives at work on the plaintiffs’ attorney.” William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional 
Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 397 (2001). See generally Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: 
Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 50 (1996) (“Another cynical belief 
[about class actions] is that many class actions serve only to confer benefits on class counsel.”). 
 17. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987) [hereinafter 
Entrepreneurial Litigation]; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s 
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
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injured investors.18 The most persistent objection to securities class 
actions is that their prosecution does much for the lawyers but little for 
defrauded investors19 or the public interest.20 Class action lawyers stand 
accused of “abusing” the legal system for their personal gain at the 
expense of the investors they represent. Corporate defendants, reform-
minded legislators, and the business press have vilified the securities 
class action bar as “greedy,” “extortionist” “bounty hunters.”21 By 
reporting on the multimillion-dollar fee awards obtained by some 
notorious members of the plaintiffs’ bar, the popular media have further 
inflamed the public’s offense.22 “[T]here is a perception among a 
 18. Of course, under the so-called “American rule,” parties in civil litigation must pay their 
own legal fees unless otherwise provided by statute. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 
421 U.S. 240, 247–50 (1975); see also infra note 54. 
 19. See generally DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS 
ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 434–37 (2002) (analyzing 
attorneys’ fees and payouts to class members in study of class action lawsuits from 1995–96) 
[hereinafter CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS]. 
 20. Congress has also expressed concern that plaintiffs’ attorneys pursue claims with little or 
no merit, or without regard for their merit, leading to overdeterrence and less disclosure of forward-
looking information to investors. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (1995), reprinted in 
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730–31 [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT]. The impact of abusive 
securities litigation on defendants’ disclosure of material information to investors is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 21. E.g., 141 CONG. REC. S9173 (daily ed. June 27, 1995); see also, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 
S17,957 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“Taken together, Mr. 
President, [the PSLRA] should ensure that defrauded investors are not cheated a second time by a 
few unscrupulous lawyers who skim their exorbitant fees right off the top of any settlement.”); 141 
CONG. REC. S8894 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“[S]ettlement 
sounds good for entrepreneurial attorneys, but it does little to benefit companies, investors or even 
the plaintiffs on whose behalf the suit was brought.”). 
 22. C.J. Edward R. Becker, Report: Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Class 
Counsel, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 689, 693 n.13 (2001) [hereinafter Task Force 2001 Report].  
There often is substantial publicity of successful class actions, and the focus of the 
publicity will naturally be on the amount of the recovery if it is large. Large recoveries 
get public attention, and large recoveries often result in substantial attorneys’ fees that 
also attract attention. When class actions are dismissed, the publicity is often sparse or 
nonexistent, and the fact that class lawyers are 
 
uncompensated is often not understood. Motions to dismiss on the pleadings are not big 
news, although they are common in a number of class action scenarios.  
Id. Examples of news stories reporting on fees awarded to lawyers in securities class actions include: 
Kurt Eichenwald, Millions for Us, Pennies for You, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993, § 3, at 1; Peter 
Elkind, The King of Pain Is Hurting, FORTUNE, Sept. 4, 2000, at 190; Peter Thal Larsen, New Life 
for the US Lawyers Who Help Shareholders Sue: Corporate Scandal and Falling Stock Markets 
Have Boosted Class Action Litigation, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 28, 2002, at 26. See also 
Dominic Rushe, America’s $20bn Pied Piper of Class Actions, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), May 5, 
2002, Business, at 10 (“There’s a whole industry out there saying securities litigation is all 
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significant part of the nonlawyer population and even among lawyers and 
judges that the risk premium is too high in class action cases and that 
class action plaintiffs’ lawyers are overcompensated for the work that 
they do.”23
In 1995, seemingly persuaded that class counsel enrich themselves at 
the expense of injured investors,24 Congress passed the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).25 Among other objectives, federal 
legislators sought to protect absent class members from “manipulation by 
class action lawyers” and “lawyer-driven lawsuits” by “giving control of 
the litigation to lead plaintiffs with substantial holdings of the securities 
of the issuer.”26 The PSLRA empowered lead plaintiffs to select and 
retain counsel for the class, subject to court approval. Congress 
apparently assumed that the lead plaintiffs’ relatively larger economic 
interest in the outcome of the lawsuit and, presumably, greater 
sophistication would forestall awards of windfall fees to class counsel 
and increase the compensation received by the class. To help ensure this 
result, Congress prohibited judges from awarding to lead counsel total 
fees and expenses exceeding “a reasonable percentage of the amount of 
any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class.”27
However, even after nearly eight years of practice under the PSLRA, 
it is not clear that the fee regulations have impacted the economic 
incentives motivating private enforcers. A number of presiding judges 
have reduced requested fee awards, but such decisions are unpredictable, 
frivolous.” (quoting John Coffee)). Many of these articles focus attention on the law firm of Milberg 
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach and one of its named partners, Bill Lerach, dubbed “the lawyer 
corporate America loves to hate” and “the king of the shareholder class-action suit.” Elkind, supra, 
at 190. For further discussion, see also In a Class of His Own: How Melvyn Weiss, A Class Action 
Lawyer, Finds Crimes That Pay, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2002, at 56 (“[A] lawyer could now seek out 
an injustice and then troll for clients who could give his firm access to the court—plus a big slice of 
any settlement.”). 
 23. Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 692. 
 24. Congressional hearings preceding enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 included testimony recounting various examples of alleged self-dealing and other 
abusive practices by the plaintiffs’ bar. See infra Part I.A. 
 25. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 to 78u-5 (2000)). 
 26. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 31–32. Congress also sought to reform the law to 
thwart three other abusive practices by plaintiffs’ lawyers: (1) “the routine filing of [meritless] 
lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer’s 
stock price”; (2) “the targeting of deep pocket defendants . . . without regard to their actual 
culpability”; and (3) using discovery “to impose costs so burdensome” that defendants choose to 
settle. Id. at 31. However, these three abuses primarily harm defendants. This Article instead focuses 
on reforms targeted to benefit absent class members. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2000). 
CAS-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004 12:29:28 PM 
1239] Reforming Securities Class Actions 
 1245 
 
and no published empirical studies have compared the attorneys’ fees 
awarded by courts prior to reform with fees awarded by courts after 
reform. In the meantime, some commentators have advocated for more 
active intervention by the courts. With the number and size of securities 
fraud lawsuits ballooning, commentators are appealing to the courts to 
protect absent class members.28 Noting that presiding judges are the self-
proclaimed “fiduciaries,” “agents,” or “guardians” of absent class 
members, scholars have proposed various mechanisms by which district 
judges may fulfill their duties to scrutinize (and cut) the lawyers’ fee 
requests. Appellate courts, too, have begun to admonish the lower courts 
that they themselves must intervene more actively in class actions to 
protect absent class members, especially in compensating class 
counsel.29
These entreaties to presiding judges raise important and previously 
unexamined questions about the proper exercise of judicial authority 
under the PSLRA’s statutory regime. Can judges make securities class 
actions more “virtuous”30 by assuming for themselves fiduciary 
obligations to absent class members? This Article argues that they 
cannot. Judges cannot perform fiduciary duties on behalf of absent class 
members and still fulfill their responsibilities as impartial arbiters of the 
parties’ disputes. Furthermore, Congress recognized that the judiciary 
cannot efficiently and effectively police opportunistic behavior by the 
plaintiffs’ bar. The PSLRA assigns that monitoring responsibility to the 
lead plaintiffs for the class, persons whose interests are more closely 
aligned with the interests of absent class members. 
As the new wave of megacases moves through the judicial system, it 
is timely to probe the judiciary’s role in reforming securities class 
actions. Part I of this Article summarizes the perceived attorney 
 28. See, e.g., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 19, at 485–86 (“[I]t is judges who hold 
the key to improving the balance of good and ill consequences of damage class actions.”); James D. 
Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 524 (1997) (advocating 
for judges to “become more active in their reviews” of settlement proposals and fee applications); 
Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees 
and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2175–77, 2190–95 
(2000) (urging increased judicial regulation of class counsel by, among other things, requiring 
counsel to disclose fee information and agreements and by employing public attorneys to assist 
judges in evaluating the fairness of proposed settlements); see also William C. Rand, The Role of the 
Judge as Protector in Class Action Settlements, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24, 2002, at 4 (arguing that when a 
class action settles, the judge becomes a fiduciary for absent class members). 
 29. See infra Part III.B. 
 30. Cox, supra note 28, at 523 (referring to the judiciary as “[v]irtue’s [s]lumbering 
[g]uardian”). 
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opportunism that has inspired judges to appoint themselves as fiduciaries 
for injured investors. This section describes the need for private 
enforcement of the securities laws, the economics of the traditional 
private attorney general model, and the potential for abuse by the 
plaintiffs’ bar. Part I also reviews the agency cost theory that explains 
counsel’s incentives to act against the interests of the putative class in 
prosecuting shareholder lawsuits. Part II discusses the courts’ authority 
to award attorneys’ fees under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the traditional methods and heuristics used by judges to 
determine reasonable fees at the conclusion of the litigation. After 
examining the vexing obstacles that have long plagued effective ex post 
judicial regulation of attorneys’ compensation, Part III considers 
Congress’s efforts to reform securities class actions. The PSLRA’s 
empowered lead plaintiff model specifies duties for judges presiding in 
these cases. Part III describes the responsibilities of the bench as 
articulated in the statute before analyzing how the courts have reacted to 
congressional reforms. Specifically, this section reviews post-PSLRA 
cases in which courts have reduced class counsel’s requested fees at the 
conclusion of the litigation, selected and retained lead counsel 
themselves, or appointed the lead plaintiff based upon the fee negotiated 
with counsel. These decisions illustrate that confusion persists. Courts 
cannot seem to agree on the proper approach to calculate reasonable fees, 
much less how to apply a particular methodology when they decide how 
much to pay the lawyers at the conclusion of the case. The lack of 
predictability associated with ex post judicial regulation of attorney 
compensation skews the incentives of the private attorney general and 
undermines the effectiveness of the private enforcement regime. Yet, 
judges who have attempted to avoid these inefficiencies by intervening 
on behalf of the putative class at the inception of the litigation have 
infringed on the lead plaintiffs’ rights, as granted by Congress, to select 
and retain lead counsel. 
Part IV evaluates the extra-statutory justification for greater judicial 
activism in this area—the widely accepted but uncritical claim that 
judges must represent the interests of absent class members as 
fiduciaries. For both normative and pragmatic reasons, I contend that the 
courts cannot become default fiduciaries for absent class members. The 
notion that judges owe fiduciary duties to absent class members conflicts 
with the classical model of the judicial role, violates the current statutory 
scheme, and causes injury to prudential values. Rather than assuming 
fiduciary obligations themselves (performing as fiduciary judges), the 
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courts instead should focus their efforts on judging fiduciaries (lead 
plaintiffs and lead counsel) more effectively. In Part V, I explain that 
presiding judges can reduce agency costs in securities class actions most 
efficiently and effectively by allowing—in fact, by ordering—lead 
plaintiffs to negotiate fee agreements with lead counsel at the inception 
of the case and approving the negotiated fee arrangements as reasonable, 
absent extraordinary circumstances. 
I. EVALUATING THE TRADITIONAL PRIVATE  
ATTORNEY GENERAL MODEL 
A. The “Need” for Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws 
The argument supporting private enforcement of the securities laws 
is well recognized, though not unassailable. It begins with the 
assertion—recently publicized in connection with the uncovering of 
major corporate misdeeds at Enron, WorldCom, and elsewhere—that the 
government lacks sufficient resources to prosecute many violations of 
the antifraud provisions of the relevant federal statutes.31 The SEC, as 
the federal agency principally charged with responsibility for securities 
law enforcement, has suffered from persistent underfunding for many 
years.32 In fact, more than a decade ago, then–SEC Chairman Richard 
Breeden told federal lawmakers that budgetary limitations meant that 
private class actions must “perform a critical role in preserving the 
 31. See, e.g., Mike France, Don’t Kill All the Trial Lawyers, BUS. WK., Aug. 26, 2002, at 156 
(“At a time when regulators are a step behind public anger and self-policing is a joke, the attorneys 
who make a living suing Corporate America have become one of the most powerful forces 
compelling executives to behave.”); Pitt Says SEC Needs More Bodies to Fight Fraud, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 18, 2002, at C3. 
 32. See, e.g., Noelle Knox and Matt Krantz, SEC Funding a Drop in the Bucket, USA 
TODAY, July 18, 2002, at 2B (reporting that David Ruder, former SEC chairman, has determined 
that the agency has been underfunded since at least 1980); Stephen Labaton, SEC Is Suffering 
Nonbenign Neglect, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2002, at B1 (“Although both Republican and Democratic 
chairmen forged a series of policy initiatives on behalf of investors, the agency’s vital infrastructure 
has been sorely neglected, starved of adequate money and manpower by politicians. That hobbled its 
ability to keep up with the markets at the worst possible moment—just as ordinary Americans 
plowed huge amounts of their savings into the markets.”); see also U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, 
SEC Operations: Increased Workload Creates Challenges, GAO-02-302, at 11–14 (Mar. 5, 2002) 
[hereinafter SEC Operations] (documenting restrictions on SEC staff resources and explaining the 
resulting constraints on SEC enforcement actions), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02302.pdf . 
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integrity of our securities markets.”33 A few years later, Breeden’s 
successor, Arthur Levitt, declared that private lawsuits, rather than 
government actions, had become “the primary vehicle for compensating 
defrauded investors.”34 Unless law enforcement efforts are privatized, 
victims of fraud will go uncompensated for their injuries,35 wrongdoers 
will go unpunished and undeterred (or at least underpunished and 
underdeterred), and, consequently, the U.S. economy will suffer as 
investors lose confidence in the integrity of the capital markets. When it 
enacted the PSLRA, Congress lauded private securities litigation as “an 
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their 
losses without having to rely upon government action.”36 The Supreme 
Court, too, has recognized that private enforcement of the securities laws 
must supplement government regulatory efforts for the benefit of 
defrauded investors and the capital markets generally.37 The benefits of 
private enforcement—the private attorney general model—derive from 
the reality that the government simply cannot pursue many persons who 
violate federal antifraud proscriptions.38 “The SEC is overwhelmed” and 
 33. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearing on S.1533 Before the Subcomm. on 
Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 15–16 (1992) (testimony of 
then–SEC Chairman Richard C. Breeden). 
 34. Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. 
of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (prepared statement of then–SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt) (“[P]rivate actions . . . provide a ‘necessary supplement’ to the 
Commission’s own enforcement activities by serving to deter securities law violations. Private 
actions are crucial to the integrity of our disclosure system because they provide a direct incentive 
for issuers and other market participants to meet their obligations under the securities laws.” 
(footnote omitted)), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/ 
1995/spch025.txt (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
 35. HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22-6 (3d ed. 
1992) (“Private enforcement is necessary to afford relief to those investors injured by violations of 
the securities laws. The SEC and the judiciary have recognized that the class action may be the only 
meaningful and viable method by which securities investors may remedy their claims.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 36. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 31. 
 37. “Private enforcement . . . provides a necessary supplement” to public enforcement. J.I. 
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); see also Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. 
Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (“[T]he securities markets have grown dramatically in size and 
complexity, while Commission enforcement resources have declined.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-
355, at 6 (1983))); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (sanctioning the 
need to aggregate relatively small individual claims in a classwide lawsuit in order that aggrieved 
persons may redress injuries unremedied by public actions). 
 38. See SEC Operations, supra note 32, at 11 (reporting that the agency’s “ability to fulfill its 
mission has become increasingly strained” due to, among other things, “imbalances between [the] 
SEC’s workload . . . and [its] staff resources”). 
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“nothing would be done except for class-action lawyers.”39 Furthermore, 
the government faces numerous legal and practical obstacles in 
compensating injured investors itself.40
In truth, we simply cannot know whether the compensation and 
deterrence benefits of securities class actions justify the costs of such 
litigation because the benefits and costs are difficult to measure.41 
According to Congress, however, the social benefits of private securities 
litigation do outweigh the costs. Lawmakers concluded in 1995 that class 
actions are socially beneficial, both for compensating victims of 
securities fraud and for deterring future wrongdoing by corporate actors, 
thereby promoting confidence in the nation’s securities markets.42 
Private securities litigation “promote[s] public and global confidence in 
our capital markets and help[s] to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that 
corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers, and others properly 
perform their jobs.”43 Congress has affirmed that enforcement of the 
securities antifraud laws should not be left exclusively to government 
prosecutors. 
B. The Economics of Private Enforcement 
Although Congress sanctioned enforcement of the securities laws by 
victims of fraud, many diversified investors who lose money in the 
securities markets do not have enough damages at stake to seek out 
 39. Fred O. Williams, Adelphia Faces 22 Shareholder Lawsuits, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 28, 2002, 
at B13 (quoting securities attorney Harvey Greenfield). 
 40. From 1995 to 2001, the SEC collected only 14% of the $3.1 billion ordered disgorged 
from securities law violators. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, SEC Enforcement: More Actions Needed 
to Improve Oversight of Disgorgement Collections, GAO-02-771, at 3 (July 12, 2002), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02771.pdf. The SEC not only lacks sufficient resources to collect 
disgorgement and money penalties owed by wrongdoers, but mechanisms and funding to create and 
administer plans to distribute collected funds to defrauded investors. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, REP. 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002 at 1–2 (2003). 
 41. Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action 
and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 205 (2001) (reporting results 
of ten case studies of resolved consumer and mass tort class actions and concluding that 
“[d]etermining whether the benefits of Rule 23 damage class actions outweigh their costs—even in 
only ten lawsuits—turned out to be enormously difficult”). Indeed, for any particular lawsuit, it is 
difficult to determine whether class counsel have achieved the optimal outcome for the class 
members. Information concerning the merits of the allegations, likelihood of success on the claims, 
and amount of damages is not readily available for analysis, and the actual cost of prosecuting the 
lawsuit is information well guarded by plaintiffs’ counsel. 
 42. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 31–32 . 
 43. Id. at 31. 
CAS-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004 12:29:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
1250 
 
counsel to investigate potential fraud claims44 against the company and 
its officers, directors, and advisors.45 The class action, as a procedural 
device, enables the economic prosecution of private securities fraud 
claims by aggregating the losses of thousands of similarly situated 
investors, thereby conserving litigation costs and attracting the interest of 
plaintiffs’ counsel willing to represent a large number of injured 
investors on a contingent fee basis.46 The attorney for the plaintiff class 
serves as a “private attorney general,” an enforcer of legal claims 
otherwise unprosecuted by the government.47
Drawn to such cases by the large aggregate value of securities fraud 
claims against public companies and the prospect of collecting huge 
damages,48 lawyers for the proposed class must invest significant time 
and assets at the beginning of the case. Plaintiffs’ counsel must recognize 
the claims, investigate their merits, decide whom to sue and where, and 
file the complaint as a putative class action after selecting one or more 
injured investors who will sue and serve as putative lead plaintiff(s) and 
class representative(s). Plaintiffs’ counsel—and not the named plaintiffs 
or absent class members—then assumes the true risk that the court will 
 44. The prototypical class action complaint alleges that the defendant issuer, through its 
senior management and/or advisors, misrepresented or fraudulently failed to disclose material 
information about the company to the market in order to inflate the price of the company’s securities 
artificially. When truthful information about the company is revealed to the market, the price of the 
securities corrects to its “proper” level, damaging investors who traded in the interim. 
 45. Scholars have challenged this presumption in recent years. See infra Part III. 
 46. Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 
347–48 (1998) (“Contingent fees are the nearly universal form of compensation for class counsel. 
Indeed, in most class action litigation no other form of compensation would be practical.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 47. The phrase “private attorney general” denotes “someone who is understood to be suing 
on behalf of the public, but doing so on his own initiative, with no accountability to the government 
or the electorate.” Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 179, (tracing the history of the private attorney general model). 
 48. Defendants’ potential liability runs to all persons who traded at a price affected by the 
alleged fraud, and these investors may receive in damages the difference between the purchase or 
sale price, as appropriate, and the mean trading price of the security during a 90-day period 
beginning on the date on which the market received the corrected information. See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 21D(e)(1)–(3); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000). Since thousands of investors and 
millions of shares typically are at issue, the dollar amounts in dispute may total hundreds of millions 
if not billions of dollars. Thus, the average damages award in securities class actions greatly exceeds 
the average damages award in other federal class action litigation. Thomas E. Willging et al., An 
Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 90 
(1996). 
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dismiss the claims or refuse to certify the class.49 Absent class members 
effectively relinquish authority over their claims to plaintiffs’ counsel.50 
Insofar as the attorneys command “nearly plenary control over all 
important decisions in the lawsuit,”51 the potential for self-dealing by the 
lawyers at the expense of the class is evident. 
Further, because plaintiffs’ counsel is paid a contingent fee, the 
return to absent class members is reduced by the amount of the fee 
awarded from the common fund. Hence, there is a conflict of interest 
endemic to class action litigation, indeed, to all contingent fee litigation. 
In contrast to other contingent fee lawyers, however, class attorneys 
typically do not contract ex ante for compensation.52 Rather, they 
prosecute the lawsuit with the expectation that they will recover their 
fees and costs at the conclusion of the litigation if they achieve a 
successful outcome.53 Assuming the attorney creates a fund benefiting 
the investor class, either through settlement or judgment on the merits, 
she may recover her fees and expenses from that pool of money under 
the equitable “common fund” doctrine.54 Courts determine the amount of 
any award to class counsel ex post. 
 49. Patricia M. Hynes, Plaintiffs’ Class Action Attorneys Earn What They Get, 2 J. INST. FOR 
STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 243, 244–46 (1999). Class counsel stands to lose its entire investment of time 
as well as its investment of money for out-of-pocket expenses if the court dismisses the lawsuit on 
the pleadings, refuses to certify the case as a class action, or enters summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants. Assuming the lawsuit survives these challenges, it is likely that the case will settle 
and counsel will receive an award of fees and expenses. See infra notes 58 and 74. That award likely 
includes a risk premium on counsel’s investment of time and reimbursement of most, if not all, out-
of-pocket costs advanced by the law firm. 
 50. In this regard, the representation model in class actions flies in the face of “[a] 
fundamental premise of American adjudicative structures . . . that clients, not their counsel, define 
litigation objectives.” Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 
1183 (1982). Judge Richard Posner has described class action litigation as a “fundamental departure 
from the traditional pattern in Anglo-American litigation” insofar as “lawyers for the class, rather 
than the clients, have all the initiative and are close to being the real parties in interest.” Mars Steel 
Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 678 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 51. Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 3. 
 52. The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility require that attorneys agree to contingent 
fees in writing prior to inception of the case. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (1983). 
The PSLRA has encouraged some ex ante contracting, subject to judicial review at the end of the 
case, as discussed in Part III. 
 53. Alexander, supra note 46, at 348. 
 54. The common-fund doctrine is a recognized exception to the “American rule” under which 
both parties bear their own legal fees and expenses regardless of the outcome of the litigation. See 
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478–81 (1980); see also Court Awarded Attorney Fees: 
Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 241 (1985) [hereinafter Task Force 1985 
Report]. Derived from the doctrine of unjust enrichment, the common-fund doctrine provides that a 
plaintiff who sues as a representative of other persons and recovers a fund for the benefit of others 
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C. Overpaying Class Counsel: The Indictment 
Class action critics have long claimed that too much of the money 
recovered on behalf of investors goes to the lawyers, and that class 
counsel most certainly receive excessive awards of attorneys’ fees from 
the courts. Despite the pervasive notion that attorneys receive windfalls 
from securities class actions,55 empirical evidence that lawyers serve 
their own interests at the expense of absent class members is difficult to 
develop. The evidence of self-dealing by class counsel is largely 
anecdotal56 and circumstantial. For example, critics typically compare 
the amount of fees awarded by the courts to the lawyers for the class with 
the amount of money or other consideration received by each class 
member.57 During the previous decade, plaintiffs’ lawyers in securities 
class actions typically received 30% of multimillion-dollar compensation 
funds.58 The average award to class counsel in securities fraud cases was 
may apply to the court to receive extracontractual reimbursement of her legal costs. Id. Class actions 
generating a pool of monies from which class members and class counsel receive compensation 
sometimes are denominated “common fund class actions.” See, e.g., Task Force 2001 Report, supra 
note 22, at 692. 
 55. For an interesting analysis of how the public perceives plaintiffs’ lawyers who represent 
clients on a contingent fee basis, see Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The 
Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457 (1998). 
 56. As Arthur Miller, a proponent of class actions, opined,  
It seems to me that facile invocations of a cliché or epithet like “windfall” are becoming a 
substitute for (or reflect an unwillingness to come to grips with) responding to more 
challenging questions. “Windfall” to whom? By what standards is that to be judged? 
Aren’t there countervailing values and policies? In a subjective, human process aren’t 
some outlier cases (including cases in which class counsel are significantly 
undercompensated) inevitable?  
Arthur R. Miller, Written Statement Submitted to the Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class 
Counsel 11 (June 1, 2001) [hereinafter Miller Statement], at http://www.ca3.uscourts. 
gov/classcounsel/Witness% 20Statements/arthurrmiller.pdf. 
 57. Hensler, supra note 41, at 203 (“Critics often use [another] benchmark to assess plaintiff 
class action attorney fees: the amount the attorneys are awarded, compared to the amount class 
members receive. Because class counsel are paid for what they accomplish for the class as a whole, 
their fee awards will almost certainly be greater than any individual class member’s award . . . .”). 
 58. Between January 1991 and May 1999, some 733 federal securities class actions settled 
for total payments of $6.1 billion. Of that amount, $1.837 billion, approximately 30%, went to 
lawyers for the plaintiff classes. See TODD S. FOSTER ET AL., NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
ASSOCIATES, RECENT TRENDS VI: TRENDS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION AND THE IMPACTS OF PSLRA 
7 (1999) [hereinafter TRENDS VI]. Other prereform studies of settled shareholder class actions found 
that attorneys received average fee awards of approximately 28% and 29% of funds recovered. See 
Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 740 (1993) (average attorneys’ fees in 
federal securities class actions between July 1991 and June 1992 were 28% of settlements, and were 
29% of funds recovered in securities class actions settled between July 1992 and June 1993). 
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$2.5 million compared to an average gross settlement of $8.3 million.59 
Class members recover, on average, just a fraction of the total damages 
claimed in these lawsuits.60 During the congressional hearings that 
preceded passage of the PSLRA in 1995, lawmakers heard testimony that 
shareholders in class actions received just 14 cents for every dollar lost, 
while the lawyers received, on average, a third of the amount recovered. 
Because judges seldom deviated from benchmark awards of 25% to 33% 
of the common fund61—much less refused counsel’s fee requests—
legislators might well have agreed that the courts awarded excessive fees 
in securities class actions before reform.62
Investors apparently have not fared better since enactment of the 
PSLRA. One recent study indicates that class members recover, on 
average, just 5.1% of their estimated damages.63 Other researchers have 
reported that the average securities class action settlement recovered 3% 
to 7% of potential investment losses (measured by market drop) between 
1988 and 1999.64 Statistics like these support the impression that lawyers 
are the only big winners in securities class actions; the lawyers make 
 59. TRENDS VI, supra note 58, at 7. 
 60. Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Litigation: The 
Role of Institutional Investors, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 155, 157 (citing a 1996 
study by National Economic Research Associates reporting that the ratio of settlement funds to 
plaintiffs’ claimed damages did not exceed 14% on average). The charge that class actions benefit 
lawyers for the class rather than class members themselves is not unique to securities class actions 
and, in fact, has generated debate since the early 1970s. For a historical perspective of the 
controversy, see CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 19, at 15–47. See also Herbert M. Kritzer, 
Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739 (2002). 
 61. Joseph A. Grundfest, Attorneys Fees in Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation: A 
Proposal for Addressing a Problem That Has No Perfect Solution 6 (June 1, 2001) [hereinafter 
Grundfest Proposal] (testimony presented before the Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class 
Counsel), at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/Witness% 
20Statements/grundfest2.pdf; see also, e.g., In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 
1995) (benchmark attorneys’ fee award of 25% of recovery is reasonable, with adjustments of up to 
33% depending on the complexity of the case, risk involved, and nonmonetary benefits achieved). 
 62. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of 
Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 53, 94. 
 63. Steve Seidenberg, Little Guys Look at Very Long Odds, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 4, 2002, at A1 
(citing study conducted by Cornerstone Research in 2002 covering all 303 securities class action 
settlements filed after enactment of the PSLRA through December 2001, defining damages as the 
decrease in share value that occurred after the fraud was discovered, adjusted by changes in a 
general market index over that period). 
 64. Id. (citing report by the Law and Economic Consulting Group Inc., for the year 2000 that 
analyzed 1,203 federal and 92 state case filings from 1988 to 1999). 
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millions of dollars while the individual class members each receive only 
negligible monetary recoveries.65
The charge that class actions benefit lawyers for the class rather than 
class members themselves is not unique to securities class actions and, in 
fact, has generated debate since the early 1970s. Not only do fee-heavy 
class action settlements harm the interests of particular shareholder 
classes, but, to the extent courts compensate class attorneys in greater 
amounts than fully informed clients would have agreed to pay counsel 
prior to authorizing the filing of the complaint, judges also inadvertently 
distort the incentives for private attorneys general to prosecute only 
meritorious cases.66
These criticisms of private enforcement have not gone unnoticed by 
members of the High Court. Justice O’Connor has commented publicly 
that class actions “have made more overnight millionaires [of lawyers] 
than almost any other businesses”; and, noting “the perverse incentives 
and the untoward consequences” created by class actions, Justice 
O’Connor criticized the plaintiffs’ bar for becoming “business partners 
of plaintiffs in seeking large-dollar recoveries rather than act[ing] as 
objective servants of the law.”67 Justice O’Connor’s remarks reflect the 
concern that fees awarded to class counsel not only constitute a windfall 
but actually encourage the prosecution of groundless securities fraud 
complaints that never should have been filed.68
Of course, champions of the private enforcement model—
particularly the small number of firms that dominate the plaintiffs’ 
securities bar69—dispute these charges. They contend that advocates of 
reform have created a false impression that courts overcompensate 
 65. See, e.g., Elkind, supra note 22, at 190. Elkind quotes Joseph Grundfest, describing class 
actions as a means to transfer wealth: “The plaintiffs [sic] lawyers are getting a cut of the money that 
flows from our left pocket [current shareholders] to our right pocket [former shareholders] . . . .” Id. 
 66.  In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160, 169 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Enforcement of the federal securities laws should be encouraged in order to carry 
out the statutory purpose of protecting investors and assuring compliance.”). 
 67. Dennis Kelly, Senate Is Close to Introducing Class-Action Reform Bill, BESTWIRE, July 
10, 2001 (quoting J. O’Connor speaking before a Minnesota women lawyers group), at 
http://www3.ambest.com/frames/frameserver.asp?site=news&tab=1&AltSrc=14&refnum=43034. 
 68. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (“[A] plaintiff 
[initiating a class action under Rule 10b-5] with a largely groundless claim [may] simply take up the 
time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the 
settlement value . . . .”). 
 69. For a discussion of some of the most active firms, see Laural L. Hooper & Marie Leary, 
Auctioning the Role of Class Counsel in Class Action Cases: A Descriptive Study, 209 F.R.D. 519, 
593 (2001). 
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plaintiffs’ counsel and that the lawyers are the only persons who actually 
benefit from private litigation.70 They justify class counsel’s objectively 
large tax on investors’ litigation proceeds by pointing not only to the 
aggregate value of the benefits pocketed by investors who otherwise 
would receive no compensation for their injuries, but also to the high 
level of risk undertaken by lawyers prosecuting such suits71 and the 
incalculable benefits obtained for the economy as a whole.72 “[M]any 
large fee awards that critics pejoratively characterize as ‘windfalls’ are . . 
. appropriate compensation for counsel whose skill, hard work, 
creativity, and willingness to expend resources and take significant risks 
(generally without any guarantee of a return on their investment) have 
resulted in a significant benefit for the class.”73 Unless the plaintiffs’ bar 
receives adequate financial returns, lawyers will not undertake the risks 
of representing defrauded investors. Shareholders will receive less 
compensation for their injuries, and fraud will become more rampant 
because fewer lawyers will participate in private securities enforcement. 
 70. “Defendants attempt to quietly settle class actions that pose the most risk, then attack less 
clear-cut cases in the media.” Amy J. Longo, Class Action: A Blessing or a Blight on Civil Justice, 
ABA LITIG. NEWS, May 2001, at 3 (quoting plaintiffs’ lawyer Alan Schulman); see also David J. 
Bershad et al., A Dissenting Introduction to SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: ABUSES AND REMEDIES 
20–26 (Edward J. Yodowitz et al. eds., 1994); WILLIAM S. LERACH, ‘THE CHICKENS HAVE COME 
HOME TO ROOST’: HOW WALL STREET, THE BIG ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND CORPORATE INTERESTS 
CHLOROFORMED CONGRESS AND COST AMERICA’S INVESTORS TRILLIONS 3 (2002) (“Demand for 
passage of the PSLRA was greased by millions of dollars of lobbying fees and political contributions 
from corporate and financial interests. This tsunami of special-interest money was flavored by 
anecdotal tales of woe by high-tech corporate executives who were paraded by the handlers before 
Congressional committees to whine about how frivolous class action suits by avaricious lawyers 
resulted in ‘blackmail’ settlements . . . .”), at http://www.enronfraud.com/pdf/chickens.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2003). 
 71. “[M]ost nonlawyers are unaware of many of the risks faced by lawyers who take on and 
assume responsibility for class actions.” Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 693 n.13; see 
also Longo, supra note 70, at 4 (“The public focuses on the great successes and assumes all class 
actions are like that, but the vast majority of the cases are much closer to the margin. . . . What is 
important is the ratio of attorneys’ fees to the recovery. Courts routinely supervise these cases to 
ensure that they are proportional.” (quoting plaintiffs’ lawyer Elizabeth Cabraser)); Hynes, supra 
note 49, at 244–46 (arguing that class actions impose greater risks on plaintiffs’ counsel due to the 
need for attorneys to devote a substantial fraction of their firms’ resources to a single case for an 
extended period of time and the inability to diversify to reduce this risk). 
 72. Fisch, supra note 62, at 56 (“Lawyer-driven litigation is not inherently undesirable. The 
willingness of plaintiffs’ lawyers to investigate potential causes of action, mobilize the plaintiff 
class, and bear the costs and risks associated with the suit leads to an increase in enforcement and 
provides a valuable contribution to the deterrence of corporate misconduct.”); see also Longo, supra 
note 70, at 4 (“Class actions make for a better society because they ensure that people deal fairly and 
honestly with each other in the marketplace.” (quoting plaintiffs’ lawyer Michael B. Hyman)). 
 73. Miller Statement, supra note 56, at 18 n.12.  
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In response to these arguments, private enforcement detractors 
counter that plaintiffs’ lawyers actually do not face an appreciable risk of 
nonrecovery in securities class actions because “virtually all cases are 
settled.”74 More accurately, unless dismissed by the court on the 
pleadings, most class action securities claims settle prior to trial.75 
Recent empirical work indicates that 83% of all resolved securities fraud 
cases have settled.76 The larger the potential damages are, the larger the 
settlement is, irrespective of the merits of plaintiffs’ claims or the efforts 
of plaintiffs’ counsel. Between 1990 and 2001, megasettlements on pre-
Reform Act cases represented 21% of the total dollars paid out. 
Excluding the resolution of one “off-the-chart” case,77 the share of post-
reform megasettlements—those between $100 million and $500 
million—rose to 43% of the total.78 Critics of class actions cite these 
studies to support their contention that plaintiffs’ counsel will receive 
fees in many of the cases they choose to file (sometimes significant fees) 
and do not bear substantial risk in prosecuting securities claims. 
Whether anyone other than the lawyers benefits from private class 
action litigation, and indeed, whether the private enforcement regime 
actually serves as an efficient and effective adjunct to regulatory 
enforcement of the securities laws, are questions that have confounded 
policymakers79 and academics80 alike. The answers depend, in part, on 
 74. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 578 (1991); see also, e.g., In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. 
Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 47 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that “[a]n overwhelming percentage of 
securities class actions are settled” and citing studies showing that 87.6% of securities class actions 
filed between April 1988 and September 1996 “ended in settlement”); Elliott J. Weiss & John S. 
Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency 
Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2064 (1995) (reporting that “virtually all class 
actions not dismissed on motion are settled”). 
 75. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 74, at 2064. 
 76. WOODRUFF-SAWYER & CO., A STUDY OF SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 25 
(2002); see also Alexander, supra note 74, at 497 (studying a sample of settlements in class actions 
filed against technology companies following initial public offerings and determining that most 
cases settled for 25% of potential damages). 
 77. The Cendant litigations settled in 2000 for $3.525 billion. See supra note 13. 
 78. Phyllis Plitch, Shareholder Suits Ebb, But Mega-Settlements on the Rise, DOW JONES 
NEWS SERVICE, June 13, 2002, http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2002/ 
20020613_Headline01_Plitch.htm. 
 79. As Senator Christopher Dodd expressed,  
[A]fter a long hearing . . . we found no agreement on whether there is in fact a problem, 
the extent of the problem, or the solution to the problem. In my experience with this 
[Senate Subcommittee on Securities], I’ve never encountered an issue where there is such 
disagreement over the basic facts. 
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one’s evaluation of the social benefits of private securities 
enforcement.81 Maximizing the loss returns to individual defrauded 
investors is one objective of securities class actions but not the only 
objective. Other goals recognized by Congress include deterrence of 
future wrongdoing and confidence in the capital markets.82 To be sure, 
the objectives of individual class members should not conflict with these 
broader social objectives, but thoughtful commentators recognize that 
“[t]here is often a tension between these two masters. Approaches that 
provide the most effective deterrence of future fraud may not necessarily 
provide the largest loss recovery.”83 Even if the litigation outcome does 
not maximize class members’ individual returns, the private attorney 
general model would sanction the result if the outcome maximizes 
welfare to society. 
Nonetheless, the social benefits of private enforcement cannot justify 
receipt by plaintiffs’ counsel of excess attorneys’ fees. If plaintiffs’ 
counsel can extract excessive attorneys’ fee awards from the gross 
settlement proceeds of shareholder suits, the compensation benefits of 
private enforcement cannot be realized.84 In addition, the ability to 
recover windfall attorneys’ fees compromises the deterrence benefits of 
securities class actions. Motivated by the potential receipt of excess 
returns on their investments, the plaintiffs’ bar may file questionable 
fraud claims against corporations, their management, and their 
Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 280 (1993). 
 80. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1995); Joel 
Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying 
Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority,” 108 
HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994). 
 81. Developments in the Law: The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1831 
(2000). In awarding fees, courts also should optimize social benefits of class action litigation, 
including deterrence and tort insurance. Id. The private attorney general model presupposes that 
potential defendants will abstain from securities fraud in order to avoid the costs (both monetary and 
reputational) of defending a class action lawsuit for large damages; presumably, they would not fear 
individual or group litigation with much smaller exposure for damages. Deterring fraud is efficient 
and increases social welfare if potential defendants are not overdeterred and if the rules of law are 
themselves efficient. The efficiency of the federal antifraud rules and the efficiency of private class 
action litigation as a tool for enforcing compliance with those laws are important subjects for inquiry 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 82. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 31. 
 83. Johnson, supra note 60, at 155 (providing examples of settlement structures that pay less 
to investors but arguably have greater deterrence value). 
 84. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 31–32 (Congress heard some evidence that 
securities class actions settle without regards to the merits of the claims asserted in the lawsuit.). 
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professional advisors.85 Overcompensation of class counsel encourages 
the filing of more lawsuits, even if the evidence of fraud is weak. The 
filing of numerous lawsuits of questionable merit leads to management 
overdeterrence; that is, management becomes so concerned with 
avoiding liability for fraud that corporations fail to disclose information 
wanted by investors, resulting in social welfare losses. That is why 
reconciling the tension between the system-wide objectives of the private 
enforcement regime and the self-interested objectives of the private 
enforcers requires careful attention to the lawyers’ economic incentives. 
Agency theory describes those economic incentives, explains the 
potential for counsel to profit at the expense of absent class members, 
and provides the explanation for legal rules designed to safeguard against 
opportunism by entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
D. Agency Theory and Securities Class Actions 
Agency theory posits that the nature of the private enforcement 
model itself, coupled with counsel’s sizable financial incentives, tempts 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to engage in opportunistic behavior. Such temptations 
are so powerful that class counsel cannot be deterred by fiduciary 
obligations or ethical proscriptions from acting in their own economic 
self-interest.86 Because, in general, neither individual investors nor their 
court-appointed representatives have the economic incentive, much less 
the ability, to monitor counsel effectively, and because attorney-initiated 
bonding and ex ante compensation contracts will not reduce substantially 
the costs of opportunism, legal rules—including regulations providing 
 85. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH & STANFORD LAW SCHOOL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
CLEARINGHOUSE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASES FILED AND DEFENDANT MARKET 
CAP LOSSES SURGE IN 2001 (Mar. 15, 2002), available at http:// 
securities.stanford.edu/scac_press/20020315_CR_SCAC.pdf. 
 86. This is not to say that private attorneys general never seek to advance ideological or 
professional objectives by prosecuting securities class action lawsuits. However, these lawyers are 
economic actors who, assuming they are rational, will not risk their time and capital on such 
litigation unless they believe they will achieve a reasonable profit from their investments. Further, 
although legal rules impose fiduciary responsibilities on attorneys, agency theory supposes that class 
counsel will make litigation investments to maximize their own economic return, even if the 
economic return to the class is not maximized thereby. As John Coffee, author of the largest body of 
work describing the motivations and behavior of economically self-interested plaintiffs’ lawyers, has 
argued, “Convenient and comforting as it is to view the attorney only through th[e] nostalgic lens of 
fiduciary analysis, a fixation on this mode of analysis is likely to blind us to the real issues relating to 
the incentives and misincentives that the law today creates for the plaintiff’s attorney.” 
Understanding the Plaintiff’s Att’y, supra note 10, at 726–27. 
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for judicial oversight of class counsel’s compensation—have evolved to 
protect absent class members. 
1. The principal-agent dilemma 
In general concept, agency theory examines relationships in which 
one party, the principal, delegates work to another party, the agent. 
Whether the parties are owner and manager, trustor and trustee, employer 
and employee, or client and attorney, the theory recognizes that the 
interests or objectives of the principal may conflict with those of the 
agent and that it is difficult or costly for the principal to verify the 
agent’s activities.87 Among other possibilities, the self-interested agent 
may not have performed the work as agreed (the moral hazard / hidden 
action problem), or may have misrepresented the work or her skills or 
abilities to perform the work (the adverse selection / hidden information 
problem), or both. The agent’s opportunistic behavior—that is, conduct 
providing value to the agent at the expense of the principal—harms the 
principal. However, the principal cannot determine readily what the 
agent actually did and cannot judge accurately whether the agent’s 
failure to achieve the principal’s preferred outcome has occurred as a 
result of some deviant behavior on the part of the agent, such as shirking 
or setting excessive compensation. In order to reduce the costs of the 
agent’s opportunism, the principal may employ various monitoring 
devices, bonding mechanisms (such as agents guaranteeing fidelity to the 
principal), and ex ante incentive compensation structures. However, 
these tools may not reduce significantly the agency costs endemic to 
securities class actions. 
2. Agency costs in class action litigation 
A generation of academics has written on the high agency costs 
endemic to small-claim, large-scale class action litigation.88 Importantly, 
this literature derives from the application of agency theory to the 
classical attorney-client relationship a model in which the individual 
 87. Michael C. Jensen & William J. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, J. FIN. ECON., October, 1976, at 305, 308 (defining agency 
relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent”). 
 88. One of the most often-cited articles is Understanding the Plaintiff’s Att’y, supra note 10, 
at 714–20. 
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client acts as the primary decision-maker.89 Recognizing the potential for 
conflict between the self-interested lawyer and her client, the classical 
form is premised on two normative canons: (1) the client controls the 
attorney, and (2) the attorney has a duty to advance the client’s interests 
to the maximum extent permitted by law and the rules of ethics 
governing the attorney as a professional. Implicit in the assertion that 
class actions are characterized by high agency costs is the assumption 
that such lawsuits primarily serve as a means for claimants to achieve 
individual ends; that is, a mechanism to increase the welfare of 
individual class members. Viewed through this normative lens, class 
counsel should conduct the litigation in the interest of the class members, 
which is to maximize their return. Maximizing returns to class members 
is a unifying objective and provides a simple and direct rule—a value-
maximizing decision rule—under which class counsel should make 
decisions. 
Agency theory posits that class counsel may disregard the value-
maximizing decision rule in order to advance their own economic self-
interests.90 Attorneys may attempt to maximize their fees at the expense 
of injured investors, acquiring assets that otherwise would have gone to 
class members. Hypothetically, counsel could maximize her fee by 
engaging in any of a number of opportunistic behaviors. For example, 
counsel might shirk, failing to expend the effort that she would have 
exerted if the absent class members were monitoring her actively. 
Counsel also might exchange a high fee award for a low class recovery 
in settlement negotiations; defendants will agree to such a settlement if 
their expected liability at trial exceeds their total payments to settle the 
 89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1983) (“A lawyer shall abide by a 
client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation” subject to narrow exceptions in Rule 
1.2(c), (d), and (e). For example, “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to accept an 
offer of settlement of a matter.”). 
 90. Accepting this theory, the Third Circuit recently explained, 
[A] rational, self-interested client seeks to maximize net recovery; he or she wants the 
representation to terminate when his or her gross recovery minus his or her counsel’s fee 
is largest. In contrast, at least in theory and often in practice, a rational, self-interested 
lawyer looks to maximize his or her net fee, and thus wants the representation to end at 
the moment where the difference between his or her fees and costs . . . is greatest. These 
two points rarely converge. As a result, there is often a conflict between the economic 
interests of clients and their lawyers, and this fact creates reason to fear that class counsel 
will be highly imperfect agents for the class. 
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 254–55 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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claims.91 Counsel might overstate the value of the settlement relative to 
the value of the class members’ claims, including overstating the value of 
nonpecuniary relief or understating the probability of success at trial or 
both. Or counsel might exaggerate her prosecution efforts, creatively 
accounting for her time or engaging in unnecessary activities in order to 
inflate her fee. 
 
a. Class members are unlikely to monitor. Even if nonparticipating 
investors are aware of their claims, the vast majority of absent class 
members have little economic incentive to participate actively in the case 
or monitor counsel’s conduct. They are a large and diffuse group, usually 
dispersed geographically. Because they own a comparatively small claim 
in relation to the total potential gains of the lawsuit (and, perhaps, a 
diversified portfolio of other securities), absent class members are 
rationally apathetic. They will not monitor the litigation or the 
representatives prosecuting it because their individual gains from 
effective monitoring are too small relative to the policing costs. Further, 
monitoring is prohibitively expensive because nonparticipating class 
members have no routine interactions with the attorneys managing the 
lawsuit and cannot directly observe, except at a high cost, the activities 
of counsel. “[T]he client, as principal, is neither well-situated nor 
adequately motivated to closely monitor and control the attorney, his 
agent. Shareholders with well-diversified portfolios or small holdings 
lack the incentive and information to police settlements—the costs of 
policing typically outweigh any pro rata benefits to the shareholder.”92 
 91. In practice, most negotiated resolutions of securities class actions follow a similar pattern. 
The settling defendants, while denying all wrongdoing, agree to pay to the class some amount of 
money and/or securities, often funded with the proceeds of directors’ and officers’ liability 
insurance, into a fund from which class members may make claims and class counsel will receive 
compensation and reimbursement of costs. The settling defendants also agree to fund the costs of 
notifying the class and administering the settlement fund. In exchange, the class representatives, on 
behalf of the class, release the settling defendants from any and all liability relating to the claims 
made in the complaint, and the parties stipulate to a court order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint with 
prejudice. Following negotiation and documentation of the terms of their agreement, class counsel 
joins with the defendants to present to the court for approval a proposed settlement that includes a 
suggested fee award to class counsel. One commentator has described securities class action 
settlements as “large-scale business transactions that commodify res judicata” insofar as defendants 
agree to purchase the class members’ legal right to sue through plaintiffs’ attorneys who engage in 
“primarily business-oriented” rather than “legal activities.” William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional 
Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 372, 375 (2001). 
 92. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1309 (3d Cir. 1993); see also In re Oracle Sec. 
Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639, 645 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“The central and long recognized problem in class 
litigation arises from the inability of the persons whose rights are at stake to monitor the faithfulness 
CAS-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004 12:29:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
1262 
 
Collective action and free-rider problems render unlikely the possibility 
of sharing these high monitoring costs among an organization of class 
members. 
Even if absent class members had the economic incentive to monitor 
the litigation, they lack the necessary information to do so.93 
Nonparticipating class members may have no awareness of their claims, 
much less knowledge that counsel filed suit on their behalf, until they 
receive individual notice that the litigants have agreed to settle.94 The 
attorney-client relationship generally is created by legal rules rather than 
actual contracts. Class counsel usually does not know the absent class 
members and does not regard them as individual clients.95 Indeed, it is 
not clear, as a matter of doctrine or theory, who the plaintiffs’ lawyer 
actually represents in class action litigation.96 What is clear is that, in 
traditional class action practice, the attorney is the real party in interest in 
the lawsuit97 and controls the complex litigation,98 deciding whether to 
of their self-appointed champion and the dubious ability of the court effectively to do so on behalf of 
the class.”); see generally Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 17, at 883–89; Susan P. Koniak & 
George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1122–30 (1996). 
 93. The counselor-client relationship, like other professional relationships, is characterized 
by informational asymmetry. Legal services are “credence goods”—goods or services provided by 
experts who strongly influence (if not decide) the buyers’ needs for the goods or services. Many 
buyers of legal services cannot efficiently evaluate the quantity of the service they should purchase, 
much less whether the seller actually supplied the service promised or the quality of the service 
provided. Economists thus theorize that sellers of credence goods may defraud buyers by charging 
for services that the buyer does not need, by charging for services that the seller did not perform, or 
by providing inferior quality services. See Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, 
28 RAND J. ECON. 107, 111 (1997). The credence goods problem is amplified when clients purchase 
litigation services and is amplified even further in class action litigation. 
 94. The PSLRA attempted to address this problem by providing for early notice of the 
lawsuit. See infra note 135. However, this notice is by publication only. 
 95. This mentality became public in 1993 when Forbes magazine quoted William Lerach, 
perhaps the most prominent member of the plaintiffs’ securities bar, as saying, “I have the greatest 
practice of law in the world. . . . I have no clients.” William P. Barrett, I Have No Clients, FORBES, 
Oct. 11, 1993, at 52. 
 96. Some scholars have argued that class counsel represents individual class members, while 
others theorize that the class, as an entity, is the client. Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action 
Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 370, 380–85 (2000) [hereinafter Class Action Accountability], with David L. Shapiro, Class 
Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 938–40 (1998). Class action 
jurisprudence could support either conclusion. Id. 
 97. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 908 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other 
grounds, 500 U.S. 90 (1991) (“Securities actions, like many suits under Rule 23, are lawyers’ 
vehicles.”). 
 98. See Class Action Accountability, supra note 96, at 418 (“[T]he attorney is not simply an 
agent of the client. Rather, the attorney is also the creditor and joint venturer who is effectively 
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settle the case and for how much and for what fee, without consulting the 
class in advance of these decisions. For this reason, Rule 23(e) requires 
that courts approve the parties’ settlement agreement,99 thereby 
providing, in theory, “a substitute for individual assent [by absent class 
members] to the contract’s terms.”100 In fact, scrutinizing class counsel’s 
determination to settle makes little economic sense for the investor 
unless such monitoring could lead that investor to uncover information 
affecting her decision to opt out of the class and proceed against the 
defendants in a separate lawsuit. If class members would and could opt 
out of any settlement that gave them a net recovery that was materially 
less than the value of their claims, attorneys for the class would be 
motivated to maximize the class members’ net recovery. However, even 
members of investor classes who suspect attorney opportunism do not 
necessarily opt out of poor settlements. Assuming a suspicious class 
member would have declined to bring the claims in the first place (due to 
the relatively greater cost of prosecuting a lawsuit compared to the 
prospects of limited individual recovery), opting out of the class is 
irrational; any recovery through the class action is better than no 
recovery at all. Further, if the court has certified the class before 
settlement, class members cannot opt out of an insufficient settlement. 
Although amendments to Rule 23 are forthcoming, the current law does 
not provide an additional opt-out right for class members who deem the 
negotiated settlement inadequate.101 Objection is the only avenue of 
financing their common undertaking and has much more at stake then [sic] any individual class 
member.”); see also Understanding the Plaintiff’s Att’y, supra note 10, at 726 (“[T]he plaintiff’s 
attorney is different from other attorneys, both in terms of the extent of the conflict and the potential 
for opportunism.”). 
 99. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the 
approval of the court . . . .”). 
 100. Susan P. Koniak, The Lawlessness in Our Courts, 28 STETSON L. REV. 283, 294 (1998). 
Judges rarely reject a settlement negotiated by class counsel and the defendants, even where the 
court receives objections from absent class members. In most cases, the courts make no inquiries 
into the details of the settlement negotiations. Nor do courts typically require that the parties file a 
final report documenting the total amount of money paid out from the settlement fund to class 
members, class counsel, and others involved in the administration of the settlement. When 
confronted with objections, courts sometimes recite the unobjectionable tenet that class counsel 
“possess, in a very real sense, fiduciary obligations to those [absent class members] not before the 
court.” Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973); see also Pettway v. Am. 
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1176 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that class counsel have the duty to 
report conflicts of interest between the named plaintiffs and the rest of the class so that the court may 
consider intervention on behalf of absent class members). 
 101. Proposed Rule 23(e)(3), approved by the Supreme Court in March 2003, would permit 
district judges to order a second opt-out opportunity for members of the certified class at the time of 
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dissent. In other words, absent members of a certified class cannot vote 
with their feet. If they do not agree with the recommended settlement or 
fee application, they only can voice their objections to the court. 
Class members also have little incentive to exercise their right to 
object. They face small stakes along with information and free-rider 
problems.102 Courts often reject motions by objectors’ counsel to recover 
their attorneys’ fees and costs.103 In addition, courts have imposed 
various legal barriers to objectors’ challenges.104 Thus, even those 
investors who suspect that counsel has breached the value-maximizing 
decision rule may, rationally, do nothing.105
 b. Named plaintiffs may choose not to monitor. Rather than absent 
class members monitoring, the named plaintiffs may monitor counsel to 
reduce agency costs in securities class actions. Named plaintiffs who 
serve as class representatives act as fiduciaries for absent class 
members.106 However, at least prior to the PSLRA, the named plaintiffs 
settlement if the opt-out period expired before public announcement of the settlement. Assuming no 
intervention by Congress, this proposed rule and other amendments to Rule 23 will become effective 
on December 1, 2003. See Supreme Court Approves Class Action Rule Changes, ANDREWS CLASS 
ACTION LITIG. REPORTER, Apr. 2003, at 24. 
 102. Class members often must opt out at the end of the notice period, and they must make 
objections at that time. Some commentators have argued that this timing is unfair because “the opt-
out decision comes prior to the point where class members have a fair opportunity to evaluate the 
arguments on both sides of the settlement.” Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the 
Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 490 n.109 (1996). 
 103. Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or 
Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 154–55 & n.150 (2001) (compiling case citations). For an 
explanation of how objectors may be “bribed” under the current law, see Class Action 
Accountability, supra note 96, at 422–23. 
 104. Among these legal barriers, district courts may (1) require objectors to submit their 
objections in writing before the moving parties file their briefs supporting the fairness of the 
proposed settlement, (2) deny the objectors the opportunity to add new objections after reviewing the 
proponents’ submissions, (3) deny the objectors any discovery, or (4) prohibit the objectors from 
discovering the substance of the settlement negotiations. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 92, at 1109–
10. 
 105. The Federal Judicial Center’s 1994–1995 study of class actions in four federal district 
courts found that “[t]he percentage of cases in which there was no objection [to the proposed 
settlement] ranged from 42% to 64% in the four districts,” and “[c]lass members, or other interested 
parties, did not object to fees very often.” Willging, supra note 48, at 140, 164. 
 106. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949) (describing the 
class representative as a volunteer who assumes a position of fiduciary nature); see also In re Oxford 
Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“A class representative, once 
designated by court, is a fiduciary for the absent class members.”); Kline v. Wolf, 88 F.R.D. 696, 
700 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that a class representative serves as fiduciary to advance and protect 
interests of those whom he purports to represent), aff’d, 702 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1983). For further 
discussion, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1270 
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selected by class counsel to serve as class representatives often lacked 
both the motivation and the ability to fulfill their fiduciary duties to 
monitor the lawyers. As courts have long recognized,107 “the named 
plaintiff is largely a figurehead who plays little or no part in the initiation 
and prosecution of the class claim.”108 Before Congress enacted the 
PSLRA, district courts routinely certified classes represented by persons 
with nominal investments, and defendants seldom challenged the 
adequacy of such representatives based upon potential intraclass 
conflicts.109
Further, although prereform class action jurisprudence pays lip 
service to “the duty of the class representative to ensure that absent 
members’ interests are adequately protected,”110 district courts certified 
the named plaintiffs as adequate class representatives even when they 
demonstrated lack of understanding of their claims and lack of ability or 
interest in overseeing the prosecution of those claims.111 Presiding 
judges rarely imposed on named plaintiffs any specific responsibilities or 
duties to participate actively;112 the courts apparently recognized that, 
with much smaller stakes in the litigation than plaintiffs’ lawyers (and 
with the prospect of receiving repeated bonus payments from those 
(1995) (“The plaintiff in a class suit . . . undertake[s] to act for others in prosecution, and possibly 
settlement, of claims owned by the absentees. Thus, the class representatives do not speak only for 
themselves but also are fiduciaries who speak for others, with the constraints that a fiduciary 
obligation imposes on their freedom of decision.”). 
 107. “Experience teaches that it is counsel for the class representative and not the named 
parties, who direct and manage these actions. Every experienced federal judge knows that any 
statements to the contrary [are] sheer sophistry.” Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 
832 n.9 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 108. Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in 
Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 179 (1990). 
 109. William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 406–
07 (2001) (“Only occasionally have defendants attempted to defeat securities certification on 
intraclass conflict grounds. . . . [D]ifferences in the amount of damages among plaintiffs, in the size 
and manner of their purchases, or in the nature of the purchaser, render certification 
inappropriate. . . . [Yet] few securities class actions consider such intraclass disputes, and most of 
those that do dismiss them as not preclusive of certification.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 110. Nat’l Ass’n of Reg’l Med. Programs, Inc. v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340, 346 (D.C. Cir. 
1976); see also Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 726–27 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 111. Morris v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 694, 698 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Fickinger v. C.I. 
Planning Corp., 103 F.R.D. 529, 533 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1984); see also Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) 
Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 927 (1998). 
 112. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 103, at 163 (arguing that “the law nowhere defines the 
responsibilities of class representatives to absent class members or in relation to class counsel”). 
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lawyers prereform),113 class representatives were unlikely to monitor class 
counsel or even consult with the lawyers.114 “[C]lass representatives often 
are recruited by class counsel, play no client role whatsoever, and—when 
deposed . . . —commonly show no understanding of their litigation.”115 
Simply put, class representatives appointed prior to securities litigation 
reform seldom reviewed class counsel’s time records, expenses, or work 
product, much less objected to class counsel’s fee application at the 
conclusion of the litigation. In any event, courts generally balked when 
appointed class representatives attempted to exercise meaningful control 
over key litigation decisions, such as the decision to settle class 
claims.116
 c. Bonding mechanisms fail to reduce opportunism. Bonding, another 
theoretical mechanism for reducing agency costs, is not effective in 
securities class actions. Bonding describes methods by which agents 
provide assurances that they will act faithfully even in the absence of 
monitoring by their principals. In the classical model of attorney-client 
relations, lawyers, like other professionals, invest in their reputation as a 
bonding mechanism in order to reduce, although not eliminate, agency 
costs. The threat of losing future business deters opportunistic behavior, 
and the possibility of attracting future business encourages behavior that 
promotes the client’s interests. However, bonding is problematic for 
 113. Making monitoring even more unlikely, some plaintiffs’ lawyers prior to 1996 used 
“professional plaintiffs”—persons who purchased a small number of shares in many public 
companies—to file multiple lawsuits in exchange for bonus payments. See CONFERENCE REPORT, 
supra note 20, at 32–33 (“[M]any of the ‘world’s unluckiest investors’ repeatedly appear as lead 
plaintiffs in securities class action lawsuits.”). With passage of the PSLRA, Congress constrained the 
use of professional plaintiffs by limiting persons (other than institutional investors) from serving as 
lead plaintiff more than five times in three years. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(vi), 78u-
4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2000). The statute also barred bonus payments to named plaintiffs. See id. §§ 77z-
1(a)(4), 78u-4(a)(4) (2000). However, investors still may receive reimbursement of the reasonable 
costs and expenses they incur as a direct result of serving as lead plaintiff. Id. 
 114. See Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 20 (“No rational plaintiff would take on the role of 
litigation monitor because she would incur all the costs of doing so but would realize only her pro 
rata share of the benefits.”). 
 115. Cooper, supra note 111, at 927. 
 116. See, e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(affirming district court’s denial of motion to remove class counsel and district court’s approval of 
settlement negotiated by counsel over objections by four of five named class representatives); 
Laskey v. Int’l Union, 638 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981) (upholding settlement over named plaintiffs’ 
objections); Kincade v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding settlement 
despite plaintiffs’ objections); see also Class Action Accountability, supra note 96, at 406–09 
(describing the Third Circuit’s decision to approve settlement over objections by three of four named 
class representatives in Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
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litigators because litigation outcomes are not easily correlated to the 
quality of the lawyers’ efforts. Furthermore, in the context of most class 
actions involving small claims but large stakes, reputational bonding is 
even more unlikely to affect agency costs117 for two primary reasons. 
First, class members do not select counsel; rather, counsel initiates the 
litigation after finding one or more class members to represent the class. 
Counsel, then, typically has no need to develop or maintain her 
reputation in order to attract business from absent class members.118 
Second, the potential for a multimillion-dollar fee award may cause class 
counsel to risk (or “cash in”) her reputation in exchange for profits now. 
The larger the potential fee, the greater the risk of this “last period 
problem.”119 Megacases would pose the greatest temptation for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.120
 
 
 d. Contracting with class counsel may reduce agency costs.  
  (1) Benefits and limitations of contingent fee compensation. 
Although agency theory suggests that class members and class 
representatives will not monitor class counsel effectively and cannot 
reduce agency costs through bonding by class counsel, the theory also 
posits that certain compensation structures may deter the lawyers from 
behaving opportunistically. Contingent fees represent one such 
compensation structure with the potential to reduce agency costs.121 By 
 117. Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 20–22. 
 118. John C. Coffee Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 
625, 629 (1987) (noting that class counsel needs to impress the court, not the absent class members). 
 119. The last period problem describes why agents facing the last period of their employment 
may behave more opportunistically, assuming greater risks that the principal will learn of the 
wrongful behavior in exchange for greater rewards in the short term. 
 120. On the other hand, if the fee award is extraordinarily high, counsel’s concern for her 
reputation may motivate her to reduce her percentage share of the recovery. See Daniel J. Capra et 
al., The Tobacco Litigation and Attorneys’ Fees, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2827, 2845 (1999) 
(recounting decision of plaintiffs’ firm to forgo its contractual right to receive $1.5 billion fee award 
in the tobacco litigation). 
 121. The economics of contingency fees has spawned a large literature and continuing 
empirical study. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee 
Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1997). For a general discussion of how the parties in 
ordinary litigation may design contingent fee agreements to reduce agency costs, see Bruce L. Hay, 
Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1996). 
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deferring compensation to counsel until the class realizes a positive gain 
at the conclusion of the case, contingency fees give class counsel a direct 
interest in the outcome of the litigation, thus aligning counsel’s interests 
with the interests of the class.122 Of course, a contingent fee lawyer 
anticipates that she will receive a compensation premium for assuming 
the risk that her clients will lose and, as a result, that she will be paid 
nothing for her services.123 As Justice Blackmun once explained, 
“[L]awyers charge a premium when their entire fee is contingent on 
winning. . . . The premium added for contingency compensates for the 
risk of nonpayment if the suit does not succeed . . . .”124 Although 
contingent fee structures require payment of premium fees for successful 
outcomes, to the extent that contingency fee arrangements effectively 
link counsel’s compensation to the fate of the class’s claims, the 
principal may reduce his monitoring costs. 
Some of the problems associated with contingent fees are unique to 
class actions, but others are not. Whether a contingent fee is reasonable 
or excessive in any context depends largely on the risk of nonrecovery 
borne by counsel. However, lawyers often possess superior information 
about the likelihood of successful prosecution. Unsophisticated clients 
may not know enough about the risks associated with the litigation to 
make informed decisions about the terms of representation. Furthermore, 
counsel must make upfront investments of both time and capital (for 
litigation expenses) in order to prosecute the claims. These investments 
made by counsel—in prefiling investigations, drafting the complaint, 
responding to motions filed by defendants, engaging in discovery, and 
the like—affect the return to the client and, presumably, would increase 
client welfare. Nonetheless, insofar as counsel owns only a portion of the 
return from the litigation, she does not obtain the full benefit from 
investments she makes in the litigation. For this reason, contingent fees 
 122. According to Judge Frank Easterbrook, 
The contingent fee uses private incentives rather than careful monitoring to align the 
interests of lawyer and client. The lawyer gains only to the extent his client gains. This 
interest-alignment device is not perfect. . . . But [an] imperfect alignment of interest is 
better than a conflict of interests, which hourly fees may create. 
Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 123. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.9, at 567–68 (4th ed. 1992) 
(noting the established practice in private legal markets of rewarding attorneys for taking the risk of 
nonpayment by paying premiums over normal hourly rates for successful outcomes in contingency 
cases). 
 124. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council, 483 U.S. 711, 735–36 (1987) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
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create incentives for lawyers to prefer settlements to trials. A settlement 
ensures that the lawyer will receive at least some attorneys’ fees; if 
counsel tries the case and loses, she will forfeit both the opportunity cost 
of her time (and her colleagues’ time) spent on the case as well as the 
amount of out-of-pocket expenses she has advanced to her client. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel may face even greater incentives to settle class 
action litigation. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[W]ith an 
already enormous fee within counsel’s grasp, zeal for the client may 
relax sooner [in negotiating a class action settlement] than it would in a 
case brought on behalf of one claimant.”125 Class actions typically are 
more factually and legally complex than bipolar cases, and prosecution 
of such claims requires greater investments of time and greater outlays 
for pretrial expenses. Presumably, class counsel will take on the 
increased exposure in exchange for the correspondingly greater potential 
returns from such an action. In theory, however, class counsel is also 
more risk averse than the typical class member who owns a diversified 
portfolio of securities.126 The more time and money invested by counsel, 
the more risk averse counsel will become, resulting in a greater 
likelihood that counsel’s comparative risk aversion will harm the 
interests of the class. The extent of the conflict—counsel’s incentive to 
settle the class claims in violation of the value-maximizing decision rule 
in order to recover counsel’s fees and costs—also will depend on the size 
of the potential fee and the fee award methodology employed by courts 
in the jurisdiction where the lawsuit is pending.127
This conflict of interest between counsel and class becomes most 
troubling when, as almost always occurs, defendants offer to settle the 
lawsuit for some fraction of the total potential recovery. Because the time 
and effort necessary to obtain a greater return for the class generally may 
yield a reduced (hourly) return to class counsel, counsel may recommend 
the “cheap settlement” in contravention of the value-maximizing 
decision rule.128 “Even if a substantially higher recovery might be 
obtained through litigation, the return on counsel’s investment might be 
 125. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 & n.30 (1999). 
 126. Class Action Accountability, supra note 96, at 390–92 (explaining why plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, being comparatively more risk averse than class members, will accept settlement offers 
that informed class members would reject). 
 127. Courts determine attorneys’ fees in class actions using a lodestar (hourly) approach or a 
percentage-of-recovery approach. For further discussion, see infra Part II and accompanying notes. 
 128. Class Action Accountability, supra note 96, at 390–92; see also Bruce L. Hay, 
Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479, 485–87 
(1997). 
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lower than that provided by the settlement, especially if lost opportunity 
costs are taken into account.”129 Insofar as class counsel’s risk 
preference deviates from the risk preference of the class, and insofar as 
class members do not monitor class counsel, the attorneys will not invest 
in the litigation in a way or to the extent that is most beneficial to class 
members.130 In the most extreme case, there is danger that lawyers for 
the class will collude with defendants and agree to accept an early and 
cheap (so-called “sweetheart” or “sell out”) settlement in exchange for a 
larger award of attorneys’ fees.131
To be sure, agency costs also infect settlements of bipolar litigation 
negotiated by plaintiffs’ lawyers under the classical representation 
model. Clients often cannot evaluate the legitimacy of their lawyers’ 
assessment of litigation risk or second-guess their lawyers’ settlement 
recommendations. Nor can clients costlessly determine whether their 
counsel has adopted an effective negotiation strategy and is bargaining 
zealously on their behalf. Yet, the danger of lawyer opportunism is more 
compelling in class action litigation because plaintiffs’ counsel typically 
does not confer with any of her “clients” during the course of the 
settlement negotiations.132 Rather, counsel makes the decision to 
compromise the claims and negotiates the settlement price with the 
defendants in “a black box,” providing little or no opportunity for client 
participation or monitoring.133 Left unmonitored by clients, counsel may 
bargain harder for its own compensation than for money for the class. 
Ironically, the PSLRA may have exacerbated the temptation for 
plaintiffs’ counsel to settle too cheaply because the risks confronted by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers specializing in securities litigation may have increased 
as a result of congressional reform. Attorneys prosecuting securities class 
 129. H.R. REP. NO. 104-50, at 18 (1995) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. 
 130. Class Action Accountability, supra note 96, at 390–91; Hay, supra note 129, at 485–86. 
 131. See Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 17, at 883 (defining sweetheart settlements as 
agreements “in which the plaintiff’s attorney trades a high fee award for a low recovery”). The risk 
that class counsel will recommend an inadequate settlement in violation of the value-maximizing 
decision rule exists regardless of whether the court adopts a lodestar or percentage-of-recovery 
approach, as described at length by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. in The Unfaithful Champion: The 
Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 35–48 
[hereinafter Unfaithful Champion]. However, as described in Part II, infra, most scholars agree that 
the contingent percentage-of-recovery method is more efficient than the lodestar method in reducing 
agency costs. 
 132. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 6 (1995) (“The lawyers can decide when to sue and when to settle, 
based largely on their own financial interests, not the interests of their purported clients.”). 
 133. See Hazard, supra note 106, at 1272 (arguing that settlement decisions of “ineffectual or 
self-interested” class attorneys do not receive sufficient scrutiny). 
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actions post-PSLRA must invest more time and capital to investigate 
claims, draft complaints, and provide early notice of the lawsuits,134 but 
they face greater uncertainty regarding whether  
their pleadings will survive defendants’ inevitable motions to  
dismiss,135 and the lawsuits have become more protracted.136 Moreover, 
the lawyers have no assurance that they will receive the appointment as 
lead counsel even if they invest substantial resources prefiling and draft a 
well-pleaded complaint.137
How might members of the plaintiffs’ bar react to the increased risk 
in securities class actions post-PSLRA? They may decide to select their 
cases more carefully, limiting their risk exposure by pursuing only cases 
with a high probability of recovery,138 such as lawsuits against solvent 
 134. The PSLRA established new, more stringent standards for pleading scienter and 
strengthened the requirement that plaintiffs plead the circumstances of fraud with particularity. See 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2000). 
This means that firms need to invest substantially more resources and manpower in 
investigating each case thus raising the cost of filing a case. From an economic 
perspective, this change leads to higher sunk costs because of the need to investigate the 
case and spend money on accountants and investigative agents. 
Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV. 115, 192 (2001). 
In addition, the statute requires that plaintiffs publish in a widely circulated business 
publication a notice to members of the putative class within twenty days of filing the complaint. See 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(A), 78u-4(a)(3)(A) (2000). This early notice must identify the claims 
alleged in the lawsuit and the purported class period and must inform putative class members that 
they may move to serve as lead plaintiff. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(A), 78u-4(a)(3)(A). 
 135. Because the PSLRA also provides for a stay of discovery until after resolution of 
defendants’ motions to dismiss, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b) (2000), plaintiffs’ counsel faces an increased 
likelihood that its complaint will fail to meet the statute’s enhanced pleading requirements. Thomas, 
supra note 135, at 192. According to one study, judges dismissed 24.3% of securities class actions 
on motions by defendants in 2001. Bruce Rubenstein, Congressman Fights to Amend 1995 Reform 
Act: Enron-Andersen Debacle Spurs an Uprising on the Hill, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 2002, at 16 
(citing study by Woodruff-Sawyer & Co. comparing 2001 dismissal rate of 24.3% to 1994 pre-
PSLRA dismissal rate of 8.8%). A 1999 study found that dismissals as a percentage of dispositions 
more than doubled after enactment of the PSLRA, from 12% to 25%. TRENDS VI, supra note 58, at 6 
(attributing the increase to the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards). 
 136. Research trends show, 
The rate of disposition of federal court cases appears to have slowed somewhat in the 
post-PSLRA period . . . . We hypothesize that this downward trend is the result of the 
PSLRA provision that stays discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending, which has, in 
turn, slowed the rate of settlements. 
TRENDS VI, supra note 58, at 6. 
 137. Thomas, supra note 135, at 191. The selection of lead counsel under the PSLRA is 
discussed infra Part III. 
 138. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 528 n.19 (1986) (“[E]xperienced 
lawyers can make a prediction about the success of a representation and can refuse to accept cases 
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defendants involved in well-publicized and government-investigated 
corporate frauds. They may struggle with a greater temptation to settle at 
least some cases in violation of the value-maximizing decision rule, thus 
jeopardizing the return to class members.139 Perhaps they will attempt to 
diversify their risk by filing a larger number of lawsuits.140 Rather than 
spending substantial time and resources on any one case to the benefit of 
class members, counsel instead may choose to prosecute an expanded 
portfolio of actions, making more minimal investments in many more 
actions (recognizing the potential for sanctions141), with the expectation 
that a small number will become “winners” and result in large fee 
awards. This rational strategy reduces the risks for class counsel142 but 
does not maximize the returns for defrauded investors. 
 (2) Difficulties in negotiating compensation ex ante. By 
negotiating contingent fee agreements up front, informed clients may 
direct the performance of counsel and provide incentives designed to 
reduce agency costs. The success of such ex ante compensation contracts 
in reducing agency costs generally hinges on three factors: (1) the 
principal’s ability to assess accurately the risk of opportunism, which is a 
function of the principal’s experience, sophistication, and access to 
information about the agent’s behavior in prior comparable transactions; 
(2) the principal’s capacity to diversify to reduce the risk of agent 
opportunism; and (3) the competitiveness of the market for the agent’s 
that are too risky or settle them quickly at any available figure and thus avoid risking much lawyer 
capital.”). 
 139. However, recent studies indicate that the median settlement value in securities class 
actions has increased as well. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, FEDERAL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
CASES FILED AND DEFENDANT MARKET CAP LOSSES SURGE IN 2001, at 2 (2002) (reporting $5.5 
million median settlement value for cases settled from 1996 through 2001, as compared to $4.0 
million for sample cases pre-PSLRA), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/ 
scac_press/20020315_CR_SCAC.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2003). 
 140. Thomas, supra note 135, at 193 (“The Reform Act may . . . make it more important [for 
plaintiffs’ counsel] to have a diversified portfolio in order to spread the [increased litigation] risks.”). 
Professor Coffee discussed risk-spreading by plaintiffs’ counsel as an explanation for “strike suits” 
in Unfaithful Champion, supra note 132, at 20–23. 
 141. Congress attempted to reduce the number of strike suits by strengthening the potential 
sanctions under FED. R. CIV. P. 11 for filing frivolous complaints. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-
1(c)(3)(A)(ii), 78u-4(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2000). 
 142. See Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1988) (“In the common 
fund context, attorneys whose compensation depends on their winning the case, must make up in 
compensation in the cases they win for the lack of compensation in the cases they lose.”). 
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services.143 Contingency fee agreements can be difficult to tailor because 
of the difficulty in predicting outcomes and in tying outcomes to attorney 
effort.144 This problem becomes more pronounced in litigation involving 
unique issues of great legal and/or factual complexity. 
Class actions pose special challenges for reducing agency costs 
through ex ante compensation agreements insofar as putative class 
counsel cannot bargain with absent class members ex ante. Indeed, 
compensation agreements between counsel and the class could be 
deemed unenforceable for two reasons. First, the “class” cannot contract 
with counsel before counsel files the complaint. The class does not exist 
as a legal entity until the court certifies it, and absent class members are 
not bound in the litigation until they receive notice and have the 
opportunity to opt out of the class. Second, the court ultimately must 
approve the fees and expenses awarded to class counsel, a determination 
made at the conclusion of the case.145 For these reasons, before securities 
reform empowered lead plaintiffs to select and retain counsel,146 many 
agreements between putative class counsel and putative class 
representatives simply provided that the court would set the fees for 
services rendered.147
Having examined the agency theory underlying the need to regulate 
the private attorney general in securities class action litigation—and 
comprehending the limitations of principal monitoring, agent bonding, 
and ex ante contracting for reducing opportunistic behavior by plaintiffs’ 
bar—the next Part describes how the courts traditionally exercised 
oversight by deciding the fees awarded to class counsel. After reviewing 
the classical model and the substantial obstacles to effective judicial 
regulation of plaintiffs’ lawyers, we can understand better Congress’s 
1995 efforts to reform securities class actions by empowering lead 
plaintiffs. 
 143. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decision Making—Some Theoretical 
Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5–16 (1985). 
 144. See Bruce L. Hay, Optimal Contingent Fees in a World of Settlement, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 
259 (1997). 
 145. See discussion infra Part II. 
 146. See discussion infra Part III. 
 147. Nanette L. Stasko, Competitive Bidding in the Courthouse: In re Oracle Securities 
Litigation, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1667, 1672 & n.19 (1994) (reciting typical provision in retainer 
agreement). 
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II. REDUCING AGENCY COSTS THROUGH  
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES 
In its current form, Rule 23 itself does not mandate that the courts 
decide class counsel’s compensation. Federal courts instead award 
attorneys’ fees and costs to class counsel under a still-developing line of 
precedent.148 Prior to securities litigation reform, judges were guided by 
the deceptively simple principle that they should award “reasonable 
attorneys’ fees” to class counsel who create common funds benefiting 
investors. However, almost since the enactment of Rule 23 in 1966, 
judges and academics have debated the meaning of “reasonable.” 
Reasonable in relation to what the lawyers could obtain in a functioning 
market? Reasonable to compensate counsel for work actually performed 
or work forgone? Reasonable in relation to the benefit achieved for the 
class? Reasonable in relation to the risk assumed by counsel in 
prosecuting the case? Reasonable to provide counsel with a return on 
investment such that other private attorneys general are encouraged to 
represent defrauded investors? 
Furthermore, no consensus exists for how judges should determine 
reasonable fees. The only noncontroversial norms established in the 
common-fund jurisprudence are (1) judges should not allow their review 
of fee applications to create “a second major litigation,” and (2) judges 
must set forth clearly the reasons for their awards.149 Although appellate 
panels review fee decisions for abuse of discretion,150 the courts of 
appeals recently have reversed a number of district court awards, 
apparently recognizing the “special responsibility upon appellate courts 
to hear challenges to fee awards by class members whose claims may 
have been reduced or in some way negatively affected in exchange for 
large fee awards.”151 From the inception of the modern class action, trial 
courts have used one of two methods (or both) to calculate reasonable 
attorneys’ fees. The judiciary has despaired of both approaches. 
 148. Although not pertaining to class actions specifically, courts have awarded attorneys’ fees 
under the common-fund doctrine by invoking FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2). 
 149. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). 
 150. Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that 
appellate courts give a “great deal of deference to a district court’s decision to set fees”). 
 151. In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 728 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing district 
court); see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 280–86 (3d Cir. 2001); Rosenbaum v. 
MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439 (10th Cir. 1995); Gunter, 223 F.3d at 190. In nonsecurities class actions, too, the 
courts of appeal recently have reversed lower courts’ fee awards. See, e.g., In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 
F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2001) (antitrust class action).  
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A. Competing Methods for Calculating Reasonable Fees Ex Post 
In the years immediately following the adoption of Rule 23, courts 
awarded attorneys’ fees based on a fixed percentage of the total recovery 
obtained for the class. Few reported decisions initially questioned the 
wisdom of such an approach; courts seem to have analogized to familiar 
contingency fee contracts because the percentage-of-recovery method 
compensates lawyers by awarding them some percentage of the amount 
recovered from defendants through settlement or trial. However, as the 
class action device became used with greater frequency, judges 
increasingly became uncomfortable with the large fee awards generated 
under the percentage-of-recovery approach,152 and some jurists voiced 
concern about the impact of such awards on the public’s perception of 
the bar.153 Thus, beginning in the early 1970s, and for the next two 
decades, most judges refocused their fee analyses on the time and effort 
expended by counsel rather than simply the results obtained for the class. 
Courts accomplished this shift by awarding fees using the lodestar 
method, abandoning (for a time) the percentage-of-recovery method.154 
Under the lodestar approach, judges first calculate a “lodestar fee” by 
fixing a reasonable hourly rate for class counsel and multiplying that rate 
by the amount of hours spent (or reasonably spent) by counsel. In 
determining the reasonable hourly rate, courts typically review the rates 
charged by attorneys of like experience and skill in the community. 
Judges may then adjust the lodestar fee up or down using a “multiplier” 
in consideration of, among other factors, the risk undertaken by counsel 
in litigating the case on a contingency fee basis. 
In 1985, the Third Circuit convened a blue ribbon panel to consider 
the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the two alternative 
approaches for calculating fee awards in common-fund class actions. The 
Task Force criticized the lodestar methodology for creating conflicts of 
interest between counsel and the class by motivating counsel to prolong 
 152. Bennett A. McConaughy, Back to the Future: Use of Percentage Fee Arrangements in 
Common Fund Litigation, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 43, 44–46 (1988) (asserting that percentage 
fees were typical in class actions prior to adoption of the lodestar but created windfalls for class 
counsel relative to the time and effort expended). 
 153. As the Third Circuit explained, “unless time spent and skill displayed [are] used as a 
constant check on applications for fees there is a grave danger that the bar and bench will be brought 
into disrepute.” Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 
161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting Cherner v. Transition Elec. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55, 61 (D. Mass. 
1963)). 
 154. Id. (initiating use of lodestar method). 
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the litigation, engage in unproductive and unnecessary tasks, staff 
litigation activities redundantly, exaggerate the number of hours actually 
worked, and inflate their billing rates.155 For these reasons, among 
others,156 the final report sanctioned the percentage-of-recovery 
approach in order to compensate attorneys according to the size of the 
recovery obtained for the class rather than the hours expended by the 
lawyers. The panel also recognized that awarding fees at the conclusion 
of the litigation would require courts to evaluate class counsel’s efforts in 
hindsight and would eliminate the ability to align the incentives of 
counsel with the interests of the class. Thus, the Task Force further 
recommended that presiding judges establish “at the earliest practicable 
moment” a “percentage fee arrangement agreeable to the Bench and to 
plaintiff’s counsel.”157
B. Using Benchmarks to Simplify Ex Post Decision-making 
Following publication of the Third Circuit Task Force’s advisory 
(but influential) final report in 1985, district courts throughout the 
country increasingly utilized the percentage-of-recovery approach to 
award attorneys’ fees in securities class actions,158 and the federal courts 
of appeals sanctioned, if not mandated, use of that methodology.159 Yet, 
 155. Task Force 1985 Report, supra note 54, at 247–49. 
 156. Among the problems noted in the Report, the Task Force found that the lodestar method 
caused great expenditures of scarce judicial resources and produced inconsistent and unpredictable 
results. Id. at 246–49. 
 157. Id. at 255. The Task Force assumed that the “earliest practicable moment” would occur 
“immediately after the pleadings are closed and before discovery is fully underway.” Id. at 255 n.62. 
Academics endorsed the percentage-of-recovery approach for reducing agency costs by linking 
counsel’s rewards to the results counsel achieved for the class. See Understanding the Plaintiff’s 
Att’y, supra note 10, at 724; Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 59. 
 158. Alexander, supra note 46, at 349 (“Recently, there has been a trend in common fund 
cases away from the lodestar and toward a return to the percentage-of-the-recovery method of 
calculating fees.”); Willging, supra note 48, at 156; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
(THIRD) § 24.122 (1995). 
 159. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Barry, 43 F.3d 474, 487 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding the district court 
abused its discretion by using lodestar/multiplier method rather than percentage-of-recovery); In re 
Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. 
Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572–73 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that district courts may use either method to 
calculate fees, but percentage method is preferred, and courts should simulate “what the market in 
fact pays not for the individual hours but for the ensemble of services rendered in a case of this 
character”). 
Courts of appeals also endorsed the percentage-of-recovery approach in nonsecurities, 
common-fund class actions. See, e.g., In re Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of San Juan Dupont Plaza 
Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d 295, 307 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Fuel Tank 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995); Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 
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with few exceptions, courts failed to adopt the report’s recommendation 
that judges (or their agents) negotiate and establish the percentage fee 
early in the case. Presiding judges seemed to take care to avoid the 
subject of class counsel’s incentives and compensation until the 
conclusion of the litigation, at which time judges could consider various 
factors in setting the percentage, including the risk associated with 
litigating the case, the efforts of counsel, and the result obtained for the 
class.160 However, to avoid speculating ex post about class counsel’s real 
risks of nonrecovery or engaging in time-consuming ex post 
investigations of counsel’s productivity or attempting to determine the 
impact of a proposed fee award on the incentives for the plaintiffs’ bar 
going forward, courts employed a simple heuristic. Specifically, courts 
facing the complexity and uncertainty associated with post hoc review of 
fee applications simplified their decision-making by adopting 
benchmarks to assess the reasonableness of the percentage of the fund 
requested by class counsel.161 In securities class actions, courts came to 
rely on a presumption that class counsel are entitled to an award of 
between 25% and 33% of the amount recovered from the defendants 
through settlement.162 “[D]istrict courts across the nation . . . apparently 
eased into a practice of ‘systematically’ awarding fees in the 25% range, 
‘regardless of type of case, benefits to the class, numbers of hours billed, 
size of fund, size of plaintiff class, or any other relevant factor.’”163 A 
court departing from the benchmark up or down must explain the reasons 
1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Percentage-of-the-fund is the appropriate mechanism in awarding fees in 
common fund [class actions.]”); Camden I Condo. Ass’n v. Dunkel, 946 F.2d 768, 774 (11th Cir. 
1991) (mandating that “[h]enceforth in this circuit, attorneys’ fees awarded from a common fund 
shall be based upon a reasonable percentage of the fund established for the benefit of the class”). 
 160. On rare occasions, a certifying court might require counsel to submit periodic reports 
documenting counsel’s work on behalf of the class. See Fischer Bros. v. Cambridge-Lee Indus., Inc., 
No. 82-4921, 1987 WL 26480, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1987); see also In re Am. Integrity Sec. 
Litig., No. CIV.A.86-7133, 1989 WL 89316, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1989) (entering pretrial orders 
designating the lead counsel and setting forth the monthly process by which counsel would submit 
contemporaneous time records for review by the named plaintiff, who then would submit records to 
the court). 
 161. See, e.g., Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272–73 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(establishing that a 25% benchmark fee is proper in common-fund cases). The Ninth Circuit cited 
with approval Mashburn v. National Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 692 (M.D. Ala. 1988), 
which relied upon a study of fees awarded in the Third Circuit under the Lindy lodestar regime. The 
study was presented by U.S. District Judge Thomas A. Masterson at the 1977 Third Circuit Judicial 
Conference and was cited in the Task Force 1985 Report. 
 162. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 163. Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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for its decision,164 further motivating judicial adherence to the 
benchmark. 
A review of numerous reported decisions fails to reveal the basis for 
the notion that the benchmark fee is reasonable. To be sure, fee awards 
have become more predictable under the benchmark percentage 
approach, and the use of benchmarks conserves judicial resources 
otherwise spent reviewing voluminous fee petitions.165 However, courts 
adopting this heuristic appear simply to “rubber-stamp” class counsel’s 
applications for attorneys’ fees (at least those applications submitted in 
conjunction with motions for approval of settlement166) without regard 
to the quality of the representation, the work performed, or the risk 
assumed by the lawyers.167 In awarding fees using a simple benchmark 
standard, judges seldom refer to the market for class counsel’s 
services168 and make no attempt to test the “reasonableness” of the 
benchmark against a fee recoverable in the market.169 Rather, courts 
simply look to the percentage fee applied by other courts that previously 
engaged in the same endeavor. 
Application of the percentage-of-recovery approach with the use of 
standard benchmarks has produced the most controversial fee awards in 
cases generating megasettlements and in cases settling at an early stage 
of the litigation.170 When the settlement creates a megafund or when 
counsel negotiates a speedy conclusion to the lawsuit, percentage fee 
awards appear to be grossly excessive. Judicial application of a 25% to 
33% benchmark to a common fund of $100 million or more produces an 
 164. See, e.g., Graulty, 886 F.2d at 273 (explaining that a departure from the benchmark 
upward or downward must be accompanied by “a reasonable explanation of why the benchmark is 
unreasonable under the circumstances”). 
 165. Monique Lapointe, Note, Attorney’s Fees in Common Fund Actions, 59 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 843, 866 (1991). 
 166. Macey & Miller, supra note 17, at 48 (“Judges rarely reject fee petitions presented as part 
of a settlement.”). 
 167. Fisch, supra note 62, at 60. 
 168. Prior to the PSLRA, the Seventh Circuit did mandate that district courts use a market-
based approach to setting the percentage fee. In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 
1992) (Posner, J.) (noting that in awarding fees, presiding judges should “determine what the lawyer 
would receive if he were selling his services in the market rather than being paid by court order”). 
 169. But see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 447 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Judges awarding fees must make certain that attorneys are paid the full 
value that their efforts would receive on the open market . . . .”). 
 170. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 109 F.3d 
602, 607 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that a 25% benchmark might be “arbitrary” if the common fund was 
extremely large). 
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eight-figure fee likely to engender criticism.171 Yet, even if the case 
settles for a more modest amount soon after the filing of the complaint, 
the question may be raised: what could the lawyers possibly do to earn 
their 25–33% fee? Compared to the actual hours expended using a 
dollars-per-hour-worked calculation, the fees associated with large 
settlement funds and early resolutions seem disproportionate to the value 
obtained for the class through counsel’s efforts and skills. In these 
circumstances, courts adhering to the benchmark percentage appear to 
overcompensate counsel by awarding a large monetary fee for little work 
rendered, for counsel assuming little risk, or for both.172 Intuitively, “it is 
not ten times as difficult to prepare, and try or settle a ten million dollar 
case as it is to try a one million dollar case.”173 However, when courts do 
balk at awarding the benchmark and instead award a reduced percentage 
fee, those judges also may receive criticism for acting arbitrarily.174
C. Criticisms of Ex Post Judicial Regulation Generally 
Regardless of the methodology adopted, courts and commentators 
alike have recognized that ex post judicial regulation of class counsel’s 
compensation is both costly and likely ineffective in reducing agency 
costs. Commentators have pointed out that judges lack both the 
necessary resources175 and the expertise176 to review fee petitions. In 
 171. The fees awarded to counsel retained by the states to prosecute claims against tobacco 
companies incited a similar uproar. See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, The Great Tobacco Robbery, LEGAL 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at 27. 
 172. Courts have recognized that the size of the fund may impact their ability to properly 
assess class counsel’s fee request. See, e.g., In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 
1291, 1297 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing fees awarded from $687 million settlement fund) (“[I]n 
determining fee awards in class actions, it is especially important that judges not be unduly 
influenced by the monetary size of the settlement. A sizable settlement can reflect a number of 
factors in addition to the prestige, skill and vigor of Class counsel.” (citation omitted)). However, 
some commentators have argued that the percentage applied by the courts should not decrease 
simply because counsel has obtained a larger fund. See, e.g., Reagan W. Silber & Frank E. Goodrich, 
Common Funds and Common Problems: Fee Objections and Class Counsel’s Response, 17 REV. 
LITIG. 525 (1998). 
 173. In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prod. Bus. Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp. 160, 166 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 174. See Martha Pacold, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-Shifting Statutes, 
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1021 (2001) (“In the 1970s, many courts began to view the percentage 
method as problematic because it generated windfalls for attorneys in cases with exceptionally large 
funds. Some courts avoided this problem by reducing the percentage awarded. However, this 
exposed the method to criticism as unprincipled.”). 
 175. Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 778–
79 (1990) (reciting the resource limitations affecting judicial decision making). One important 
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order to make optimal decisions about reasonable attorney compensation, 
courts must acquire accurate information about projected litigation 
outcomes, the lawyers’ investments, their settlement evaluations, the 
history of the negotiations, and the other factors necessary either to value 
the lawyers’ services under the lodestar approach or to set a contingent 
fee under the percentage-of-recovery approach. In addition, some 
important information is within the exclusive province of the lawyers 
themselves. “The critical factors in evaluating a settlement are the timing 
of settlement opportunities and amounts left ‘on the table.’ A court will 
almost never have reliable information on these factors.”177 Class 
counsel certainly will not volunteer to share such closely guarded 
information with the judge. 
Furthermore, particularly when judges evaluate fee applications at 
the conclusion of the litigation, they cannot rely on the parties 
themselves to provide required information. Defendants often have 
agreed to keep silent concerning the pending fee application, having 
consented to a “clear sailing” provision in the settlement documents.178 
Disaffected absent class members lack information and incentives to 
resource is simply time. “[T]he average class action demands considerably more judge time than the 
average civil case.” Willging, supra note 48, at 96 (reporting the results of a sample of cases from a 
then-recent District Court Time Study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center). 
 176. According to one recent paper examining judicial opinions in securities fraud litigation, 
most federal judges have little experience in securities law prior to taking the bench and little interest 
or incentive in developing substantial expertise in the area after confirmation. Stephen M. 
Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does—
Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 103 (2002). Judges 
also lack recent experience in the market necessary to evaluate fee applications. See In re Oracle 
Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 696 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (“To the extent that a judge ever possessed such 
first-hand knowledge [necessary to evaluate fee applications], it rapidly becomes out of date. Judges 
who believe that they have any special expertise on this subject are simply fooling themselves (but 
probably no one else).”). 
 177. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 692 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 
 178. Professor Coffee explained how clear sailing provisions—agreements to remain silent—
disable the reviewing courts: 
If the defendant agrees not to object to the plaintiff’s fee request, there is little prospect 
that the court will engage in an elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of the hours 
expended by the plaintiff’s attorney. Not only does the court have little incentive to 
undertake such an inquiry, but when the defendants agree not to oppose plaintiff’s fee 
request they deprive the court of the only adversary who truly knows if the time was 
reasonably expended. Put simply, it is the adversary and not the court who best 
understands the justifications (or lack thereof) for the work the plaintiff’s attorney has 
done. Denied this information by the de facto settlement agreement, the court is itself a 
relatively poor and undermotivated monitor of the plaintiff attorney’s performance. 
Unfaithful Champion, supra note 131, at 35. 
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challenge the fee application, and they also have insufficient stakes in 
obtaining a reduction of the requested fee to organize or retain separate 
representation. They are rationally apathetic. Thus, when reviewing class 
counsel’s fee petition at the end of the case, “the court is abandoned by 
the adversary  
system . . . . Rarely do the settling defendants . . . offer any counterpoint; 
rarely do members of the class come forward with any response or 
opposition to the fees sought. There are no amici curiae who volunteer 
their advice.”179 Particularly if no class members have objected to the fee 
petition, “[a]ll the dynamics conduce to judicial approval,”180 and the 
judge likely will accept the settlement package presented by former 
adversaries.181
In addition to lacking the information necessary to award reasonable 
compensation to counsel, judges reviewing fee applications at the 
conclusion of the litigation likely suffer from hindsight bias.182 Because 
judges, like other human beings, have difficulty assessing the ex ante 
predictability of outcomes after the fact,183 they cannot evaluate 
impartially the reasonableness of class counsel’s fee requests ex post. 
When the judge learns the outcome of the class action (typically, the 
amount of the settlement negotiated by the parties), that knowledge will 
alter her perception of what risks preceded the settlement, particularly 
the risks faced by class counsel at the inception of the case. For example, 
 179. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
 180. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), 
aff’d en banc by equally divided court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965). 
 181. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 103, at 152–53 & nn.142–45 (reviewing empirical evidence 
supporting the contention that courts are “extremely reluctant to reject proposed class action 
settlements” and usually award “the full fee requested”); Rhode, supra note 50, at 1218–19 
(“Effectively monitoring class counsel’s representation could require more personal innuendo and 
factual investigation than many trial judges are disposed to supply.”). 
 182. Hindsight bias describes the tendency for people to overestimate the predictability of past 
events. Psychologists have determined that when we learn outcomes, we update our beliefs, relying 
on the new beliefs to generate conclusions about what was predictable, without recognizing that 
learning the outcome changed the beliefs. See Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the 
Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (“In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate 
what could have been anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as 
having been inevitable but also to view it as having appeared ‘relatively inevitable’ before it 
happened. People believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much better than was 
actually the case.”). 
 183. For a comprehensive discussion of how hindsight bias affects judges, see Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) 
(arguing that even judges who understand the influence of hindsight bias cannot correct for it). 
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if the lawyers negotiate a settlement before the court decides defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, the judge may perceive that counsel should receive a 
fee lower than counsel has requested, even if the early settlement 
produced a large common fund. In hindsight, it would appear to the court 
that counsel in that case did not face a serious risk of nonrecovery. On 
the other hand, a judge may lean toward awarding higher fees in a case 
where counsel settled only after surviving the defendants’ impassioned 
entreaties for the court to dismiss the complaint and their vigorous 
oppositions to class certification, even if the settlement negotiated 
represents a relatively small recovery of the losses suffered by the class. 
In hindsight, it would appear to the court that counsel exerted great effort 
to obtain the result achieved. Counsel in the second case may receive a 
larger fee as both a percentage of the fund and even in actual numbers, 
yet the outcome secured by the lawyers in the first case clearly benefited 
the class more. For judges reviewing fee applications at the conclusion of 
the litigation, “hindsight alters the perception of the suit’s riskiness, and 
sunk costs make it impossible for the lawyers to walk away if the fee is 
too low.”184
Absent mechanisms to avoid or reduce its influence, hindsight bias 
poses a troublesome problem for judges evaluating fee requests ex post, 
resulting in judicial awards that may diverge significantly from the 
compensation arrangement that the class could have negotiated with 
counsel at the outset of the litigation.185 In any given case, the court may 
overcompensate counsel, thereby harming absent class members, or 
undercompensate counsel, thereby injuring the petitioning lawyers as 
well as diminishing the incentives for attorneys to represent investor 
classes in the future.186 With regard to the latter possibility, Justice 
Scalia recently observed, 
 
It is . . . something quite irrational—to look at the consequences of a 
 184. In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 185. The Seventh Circuit has analogized ex post judicial regulation of attorneys’ fees with “a 
public utilities commission, regulating the fees of counsel after the services have been performed, 
thereby combining the difficulties of rate regulation with the inequities of retrospective rate-setting.” 
Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 325 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 186. In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A 
large segment of the public might be denied a remedy for violations of the securities laws if 
contingent fees awarded by the courts did not fairly compensate counsel for the services provided 
and the risks undertaken.” (citation omitted)); see also In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 693 
n.11 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (“[U]ncertainty about compensation affects not only the litigation at hand, but 
also ‘incentives in future roughly comparable cases.’” (citation omitted)). 
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contingent-fee agreement after the contingencies have been resolved, 
and proclaim those consequences unreasonable because the attorney 
has received too much money for too little work. That is rather like 
declaring the purchase of the winning lottery ticket void  
because of the gross disparity between the $2 ticket price and the 
million-dollar payout.187
Other scholars—some adopting the “view of the lawyer as a 
calculating entrepreneur regulated by calculating judges,”188—have 
questioned the courts’ motivation to scrutinize fee applications 
carefully.189 Although judges have voiced concerns from time to time 
about how the public perceives their fee awards in securities class 
actions,190 some critics have questioned the courts’ sensitivity to public 
concerns about the entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ bar.191 Institutional 
pressures to clear the courts’ dockets also may motivate some jurists to 
approve summarily counsel’s fee request. Judges typically receive fee 
petitions in conjunction with the parties’ motions for settlement approval. 
If the court rejects the class action settlement, a complex and time-
consuming case remains on the judge’s docket. Faced with congested 
dockets, district courts “frequently se[e] little incentive to delve deeply 
into an uncontested matter that is being resolved on terms similar to 
[those] approved in other cases by well-respected jurists.”192 Finally, as 
some judges have admitted candidly, the courts simply do not relish the 
task of deciding attorneys’ compensation.193 No doubt Justice William 
 187. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 811 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 188. John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473, 481 
(1981). 
 189. See, e.g., Koniak & Cohen, supra note 92, at 1122–30 (asserting that judges serve their 
own self-interests by approving settlements in order to clear their dockets); Charles W. Wolfram, 
Mass Torts—Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1228, 1233 (1995) (noting judicial incentives 
toward settlement); Rhode, supra note 50, at 1219 (“Where the pressures to clear dockets are 
substantial, the costs of smoking out conflict may seem prohibitive.”). 
 190. See, e.g., Rothfarb v. Hambrecht, 641 F. Supp. 71, 74 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (“This Court is 
keenly aware of its duty to protect the absent plaintiff class members, and determined to avoid . . . 
even the appearance of having awarded windfall fees . . . .” (citations omitted)); In re Capital 
Underwriters, Inc. Sec. Litig., 519 F. Supp. 92, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (“Excessive fees have a broader 
detrimental effect as well on the continued usefulness of the class action mechanism since such 
awards provoke criticism of the legal profession and class representation in particular.”), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 705 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 191. See Matt Smith, Soft Firm, S.F. WEEKLY, May 29, 2002, at 13 (“[J]udges, attorneys all, 
don’t necessarily share the layman’s view that lawyer profiteering is a form of social malaise.”). 
 192. Grundfest Proposal, supra note 61, at 7. 
 193. Charles Kocoras points out,  
The idea of getting enmeshed in determining how much a client should pay his lawyer is 
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Brennan expressed the opinion of many jurists when he observed that 
disputes about attorneys’ fees are “one of the least socially productive 
types of litigation imaginable.”194 Not surprisingly, then, under these 
decision-making restraints and biases, the express use of benchmarks 
became the prevailing judicial norm for awarding fees to class counsel. 
III. REDUCING AGENCY COSTS BY EMPOWERING LEAD PLAINTIFFS 
Whether empirically valid or not, the popular and theoretically 
supported perception that class counsel receive windfall fees from 
private securities lawsuits enabled proponents of litigation reform to 
garner bipartisan support for legislative action in 1995.195 Both the 
statutory language and the legislative history of the PSLRA make 
manifest Congress’s concern that securities class counsel, if left 
unmonitored, will behave in ways that harm both absent class members 
and the private enforcement system generally.196 Most federal 
lawmakers agreed that the mechanisms and procedures for controlling 
class counsel, including through ex post judicial regulation of attorneys’ 
compensation, had failed to reduce opportunistic behavior by the 
plaintiffs’ securities bar.197 Having determined that abusive securities 
litigation was “lawyer-driven,” Congress attempted to transfer control of 
the lawsuits from the plaintiffs’ bar to the investors whom the bar 
purports to represent. In so doing, lawmakers altered the responsibilities 
of federal benches presiding over securities class actions. 
distasteful and unappetizing. Lawyers’ fee issues, whether arising as part of a contingent 
fee contract or by virtue of statutory or other types of considerations, do not rank high on 
a judge’s menu of things he or she cannot wait to address. 
Charles Kocoras, Contingency Fees—A Judge’s Perch, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 421, 422 (1998). 
 194. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 442 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 195. “Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act seven years ago out of a 
sense that a few select firms were minting money by shaking down innocent companies on behalf of 
imaginary clients.” Greg Mitchell, Let a Thousand Lerachs Bloom, RECORDER, July 19, 2002, at 2. 
 196. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 6–7 (1995) (criticizing plaintiffs’ class action counsel for, among 
other things, “often negotiat[ing] settlement[s] that resulted in huge profits for the law firms with 
only marginal recovery for the shareholders”). 
 197. Fisch, supra note 62, at 94 (“It is also fair to read the adoption of the PSLRA as reflecting 
some degree of congressional skepticism about the ability of the courts effectively to supervise the 
process of selecting class counsel. . . . [J]udicial control over plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, coupled with 
the courts’ reluctance to refuse fee requests or to deviate from traditional benchmarks, has led to 
excessive fee awards.”). 
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A. Congress Adopts the Empowered Lead Plaintiff Model 
The PSLRA includes new class action procedures designed to 
“increase the likelihood that parties with significant holdings in issuers, 
whose interests are more strongly aligned with the class of shareholders, 
will participate in the litigation and exercise control over the selection 
and actions of plaintiff’s counsel.”198 These innovative rules changed the 
way courts appoint class representatives in securities cases.199 The 
PSLRA’s appointment scheme favors investors with the largest financial 
losses—presumably institutional investors—based upon the assumption 
that these investors’ substantial stakes provide them with the economic 
incentive to represent the class voluntarily and diligently.200 As the 
appointed representatives of the class, large investors would be in a 
position to monitor class counsel and, in the words of Weiss and 
Beckerman, “assess whether plaintiffs’ attorneys are acting as faithful 
champions for the plaintiff class.”201
The PSLRA thus mandates that presiding judges appoint as “lead 
plaintiff” the “most adequate plaintiff.” The most adequate plaintiff is the 
person or group of persons whom “the court determines to be most 
capable of adequately representing the interests of class members.”202 
Presumptively, the most adequate plaintiff is the investor seeking to be 
appointed (via motion) who has “the largest financial interest in the relief 
sought by the class [who] . . . otherwise satisfies the requirements of 
Rule 23.”203 By adopting this rule and thus embracing the so-called 
“empowered lead plaintiff model” of class representation, Congress 
intended to “encourage institutional investors to take a more active role 
in securities class action lawsuits” in order to “ultimately benefit 
shareholders and assist courts by improving the quality of 
 198. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 32. 
 199. The genesis of these provisions is the influential work of Professors Weiss and 
Beckerman, whose article is cited in the legislative history. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 74, 
at 2053. 
 200. Weiss and Beckerman asserted that most putative classes in securities cases included 
shareholders whose interests were large enough to create a strong proprietary interest in the 
litigation, and their model assumes that shareholders with more significant interests in the litigation 
could more effectively represent the interests of absent class members because they would have the 
economic incentive to control the lawyers for the class. Id. at 2088–2104. 
 201. Id. at 2095. 
 202. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000). 
 203. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). 
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representation” of absent class members.204 While the statute does not 
give express preference to institutions, the legislative history reflects the 
lawmakers’ prediction that “courts [w]ould be more confident [that] 
settlements negotiated under the supervision of institutional plaintiffs 
were ‘fair and reasonable’ than is the case with settlements negotiated by 
unsupervised plaintiffs’ attorneys.”205 The statute provides that the 
presumption in favor of the person(s) with the largest financial stake may 
be rebutted only “upon proof that . . . the presumptively most adequate 
plaintiff . . . will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class[,]  
or . . . is subject to unique defenses.”206
The PSLRA also mandates that the lead plaintiff will “select and 
retain counsel to represent the class,” subject to court approval.207 Weiss 
and Beckerman had argued that the courts should defer to the lead 
plaintiff’s discretion in negotiating and setting attorneys’ fees,208 and 
they believed that institutions seeking to represent the class would be in a 
position to negotiate fee arrangements with proposed counsel for the 
class prior to the filing of the complaint.209 However, the statute is silent 
as to the criteria or method that the lead plaintiff should employ in 
selecting and retaining counsel. Nor does the law dictate that the lead 
plaintiff must monitor counsel’s efforts and participate in settlement 
decisions. Nonetheless, a handful of district courts have opined on the 
importance of the lead plaintiff negotiating a reasonable fee agreement 
with putative lead counsel.210 The legislative history also indicates that 
 204. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 34. “The Conference Committee seeks to 
increase the likelihood that institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs by requiring courts to 
presume that the member of the purported class with the largest financial stake in the relief sought is 
the ‘most adequate plaintiff.’” Id. 
 205. Id. at 35 (quoting Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 74, at 2105); see also Gluck v. 
CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (“The legislative history of the Reform Act 
is replete with statements of Congress’s desire to put control of [securities] litigation in the hands of 
large, institutional investors.”). 
 206. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). 
 207. Once appointed as lead plaintiff, the most adequate plaintiff “shall, subject to the 
approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(3)(B)(v). 
 208. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 74, at 2105. 
 209. Id. at 2107. The authors also predicted that these fee arrangements might differ 
substantially from the fee structures courts had approved in securities class actions. Id. at 2122–23. 
 210. See In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189 F.R.D. 91, 116 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting the fee should 
be “the result of hard bargaining”); In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 
1033 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“The lead plaintiff owes a fiduciary duty to obtain the highest quality 
representation at the lowest price.”). 
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Congress empowered the lead plaintiff to select class counsel in order to 
foster competitive bidding among law firms for class representation or, at 
the very least, to generate actual fee negotiations between prospective 
class counsel and the lead plaintiff, acting for the benefit of the class.211
The statute does not set forth the standard for judicial review of the 
lead plaintiff’s performance of its duties, whatever those duties might 
be.212 The legislative history notes that lawmakers “expect[ed] that the 
plaintiff will choose counsel rather than, as [wa]s true [previously], 
counsel choosing the plaintiff.”213 Yet the same legislative history also 
advises that Congress intended to preserve “the court’s discretion under 
existing law to approve or disapprove the lead plaintiff’s choice of 
counsel when necessary to protect the interests of the plaintiff class.”214 
And, although lawmakers seem to have intended that the appointed lead 
plaintiff would monitor class counsel, the PSLRA did not disturb the 
several legal rules mandating judicial oversight of securities class actions 
as well. Not only must presiding judges approve the lead plaintiff’s 
selection and retention of lead counsel under the PSLRA, but, per Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,215 district courts still must 
certify the putative class, requiring a determination of, among other 
things, representational adequacy.216 Further, courts still must approve 
 211. Cox, supra note 28, at 516. 
 212. Weiss and Beckerman recognized that institutions might decline to participate as lead 
plaintiffs. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 74, at 2095. However, Congress attempted to reassure 
potential lead plaintiffs that they would not face undue liability as a result of their participation by 
including in the legislative history a statement that “the most adequate plaintiff provision does not 
confer any new fiduciary duty on institutional investors—and the courts should not impose such a 
duty . . . .” CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 34. 
 213. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 35. 
 214. Id. 
 215. The proposed revisions to Rule 23 also are designed to “assur[e] appropriate judicial 
oversight of class action litigation from stem to stern, from certification, to class counsel 
appointment, to settlement approval, and finally to attorney fee awards.” Memorandum from David 
F. Levi, Chair of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. Anthony 
J. Scirica, Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 5 (July 31, 2001), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment 2002/8-01CV.pdf. 
 216. In order to certify a class, the district court must find that the putative class meets four 
threshold requirements found in Rule 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation. In addition, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), the court must find that common questions 
“predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” of the class and that resolution 
of the claims on a classwide basis be “superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). With regard to representational adequacy 
(FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4)), many federal courts have interpreted this requirement to apply not just to 
the named plaintiffs but also to their attorneys. See, e.g., Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 487 (9th 
Cir. 1994). Further, the court may reevaluate the adequacy of the named plaintiffs or class counsel to 
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any settlement of the class’s claims,217 although, in practice, judges 
rarely determine that class counsel agreed to settle a case for less than its 
fair value.218 Finally, district courts retain their authority to award 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to plaintiffs’ counsel and to make 
appropriate orders “for the protection of the members of the class.”219
With this understanding of the reform model adopted by Congress, 
the next section explores the courts’ post-reform regulation of class 
counsel’s compensation. 
B. Awarding Fees Under the Empowered Lead Plaintiff Regime 
Although no comprehensive study has compared fee awards before 
and after the enactment of the PSLRA, it does seem that district courts 
increasingly have recognized the PSLRA’s “mandate . . . for greater 
judicial management”220 of securities class actions targeted at protecting 
absent class members from perceived abuses by the plaintiffs’ bar. Judge 
Jed Rakoff from the Southern District of New York, a frequent venue for 
securities class actions, documented this recognition when he wrote, 
represent the class at the time of settlement if the court previously certified the class. If necessary, 
the court may decertify the class or replace the representatives. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
(THIRD) § 30.16 (1995). 
 217. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). Although Rule 23(e) itself does not describe the procedure, much 
less the criteria, that judges should employ in deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement, 
courts often hold a hearing to consider whether the settlement proposed by class counsel and the 
defendants is fair, adequate, and reasonable. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (“The central question raised by the proposed settlement of a class action is whether the 
compromise is fair, reasonable and adequate.”); 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG 
ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.43 (4th ed. 2002) (listing criteria used in determining whether a judgment is 
“fair, reasonable, and adequate”). Courts tend to assess the substantive fairness of the proposed 
settlement by comparing the amount of the proposed settlement with the estimated amount of the 
aggregate loss incurred by the class, discounted by the likelihood that the plaintiff class would 
prevail at a trial of the merits, and reduced by the costs of litigating the case through trial. Mars Steel 
Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 682–83 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing how to 
calculate settlement value and explaining that “[a] settlement is fair to the plaintiffs in a substantive 
sense . . . if it gives them the expected value of their claim if it went to trial, net of the costs of 
trial”). 
 218. A study of class action settlements in four federal districts found that “[a]pproximately 
90% or more of the proposed settlements were approved without changes.” Willging, supra note 48, 
at 141. Thus, some scholars have argued that judicial oversight of settlements is ineffective in 
reducing agency costs. See, e.g., Class Action Accountability, supra note 96, at 438 (“Although 
many reforms are possible and could succeed, only one is sure to fail: reliance on trial court scrutiny 
of the settlement.”). 
 219. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d). 
 220. William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 418 
n.210 (2001). 
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“[S]ecurities class action litigation continues to be lawyer-driven in 
material respects and the reforms Congress contemplated in the Reform 
Act can be achieved, if at all, only with some help from the courts.”221 
Beyond simply expressing an understanding of Congress’s objectives, 
some presiding judges have attempted to reduce agency costs themselves 
by scrutinizing counsel’s fees ex post with a view toward maximizing 
recovery for the class. A few other courts have attempted to maximize 
class recovery (or at least reduce attorneys’ fees) by selecting lead 
counsel through the use of judicially supervised competitive bidding, and 
at least one judge has selected the lead plaintiff expressly based upon the 
fees negotiated with the putative lead counsel.222 These judicial efforts at 
reducing agency costs call into question the role of judge as independent 
arbiter,223 as discussed further in Part IV. 
1. Scrutinizing requested attorneys’ fees ex post 
Although the legislative history of the PSLRA documents 
Congress’s concern that lawyers “often receive a disproportionate share 
of settlement awards,”224 Congress gave little guidance to district courts 
in determining class counsel’s compensation. Rather than fixing the 
percentage of fees and costs that courts could award to class counsel or 
providing per se quantitative prohibitions, the PSLRA mandates only that 
total attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded to lead counsel “shall not 
exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and 
prejudgment interest actually paid to the class.”225 This “reasonable 
percentage” provision evidences Congress’s intent that district courts 
would determine reasonableness of fees in each case based on the 
amount of money actually recovered by class members.226
 221. In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 222. See infra Part III.B.2–3. 
 223. Indeed, the presiding judges refer to themselves as the “fiduciaries” or “agents” or 
“guardians” of the absent class members in a number of opinions. See infra notes 367–68 and 
accompanying text.  
 224. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 36. 
 225. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2000). 
 226. Id.; see also CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 36 (“The Conference Committee 
limits the award of attorney[s’] fees and costs to counsel for a class . . . to a reasonable percentage of 
the amount of recovery awarded to the class. By not fixing the percentage of fees and costs counsel 
may receive, the Conference Committee intends to give the court flexibility in determining what is 
reasonable on a case-by-case basis.”); 141 CONG. REC. S1085 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (“The bill 
requires that courts tie awards of lawyers’ fees directly to how much is recovered by investors, rather 
than simply how many hours the lawyers billed or how many pages of briefs they filed.”) (statement 
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To date, two federal appellate courts, the Second Circuit and the 
Third Circuit, have reviewed lower courts’ awards of fees and costs 
under the PSLRA. Both circuits expressly rejected the use of benchmarks 
in securities class actions and endorsed the application of flexible criteria 
for determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees. In Goldberger v. 
Integrated Resources, Inc., a case arising from the Michael Milken junk 
bond scandal of the 1980s, the Second Circuit found that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees amounting to 4% of 
the common fund rather than the 25% requested by class counsel.227 In 
its opinion affirming the trial court’s award—an award calculated under 
the lodestar method—the court listed a series of factors for trial courts to 
consider when reviewing the reasonableness of fee requests in securities 
class actions, “including: (1) the time and labor expended by counsel; (2) 
the magnitude and complexities of the litigation; (3) the risk of the 
litigation; (4) the quality of representation; (5) the requested fee in 
relation to the settlement; and (6) public policy considerations.”228 The 
Second Circuit cautioned lower courts that in “scrutin[izing] . . . the 
unique circumstances of each case,” presiding judges must “approach fee 
awards ‘with an eye to moderation’” and give “‘jealous regard to the 
rights of those who are interested in the fund,’” that is, the absent class 
members.229 Further, the court allowed for the use of either the lodestar 
or percentage approaches, but it denounced the broad use of customary 
benchmark percentages of recovery in securities class actions, describing 
the use of such benchmarks as “routine largess” and criticizing the use of 
benchmarks as “an all too tempting substitute for the searching 
assessment that should properly be performed in each case.”230
In Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., the Third Circuit mandated 
the use of a similar set of criteria to that listed in Goldberger, except that 
Gunter also instructed district courts in the Third Circuit (where 
percentage fees are mandated) to review the range of awards in similar 
of Sen. Peter Domenici). Lawmakers also sought to provide more information to absent class 
members about counsel’s potential fee by including in the PSLRA new notice procedures. 141 
CONG. REC. S9212 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (noting that the bill “contains better disclosure of how 
much a shareholder might get under a settlement and how much the lawyers will get so that 
shareholders can challenge excessive lawyers’ fees”) (statement of Sen. Peter Domenici). 
 227. 209 F.3d 43, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 228. Id. at 50 (quoting In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec. Litig., 724 F. 
Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)). 
 229. Id. at 53 (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 995 F.2d 448, 469–70 (2d Cir. 1974)) 
(citations omitted). 
 230. Id. at 51–52. 
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cases.231 Following Gunter, the court of appeals further instructed lower 
courts against the use of benchmarks in In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES 
Litigation.232 That decision made clear that presiding judges “may not 
rely on a formulaic application of the appropriate range in awarding fees 
but must consider the relevant circumstances of the particular case.”233 
The appellate court vacated the district court’s fee award,234 criticizing 
the lower court for failing to specify the method used to set the fees and 
failing to apply the seven factors adopted by the circuit in Gunter for 
awarding fees on a percentage-of-recovery basis in common-fund class 
actions.235
While both the Second Circuit and the Third Circuit have denounced 
the use of benchmarks, neither court announced a rule of decision to 
govern the application of the fee award factors they cited—factors that, 
upon closer inspection, appear somewhat redundant and potentially 
contradict one another. The appellate courts also failed to provide 
meaningful guidance to district judges about the relative importance of 
the factors.236 In fact, review of more than two dozen decisions reducing 
fees after enactment of the PSLRA reveals that, in various ways, 
presiding judges again are attempting to value the legal services provided 
by counsel to the plaintiff class. And although the courts may scrutinize 
fee applications less deferentially after reform, facially applying the same 
 231. 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 232. 243 F.3d 722 (3d Cir. 2001).  
 233. Id. at 736. 
 234. Id. at 743. Although lead counsel applied for a fee representing 10% of the stated value of 
the total amount of rights available for distribution to class members (approximately $34 million), 
plus reimbursement of reasonable expenses, the district court instead approved an award of 5.7% of 
the amount of net value of the settlement rights (after deducting for expenses), or $19.3 million. Id. 
at 725–27. 
 235. Id. at 733–44. The appellate court admonished the district court for failing to consider 
that the case had settled at an early stage of the litigation, that little or no discovery had occurred, 
and that defendants had admitted liability, reducing the complexity and risk involved. Further, the 
district court erred by not considering fee awards in other cases in which the common fund exceeded 
$100 million. Finally, the court of appeals held that the lower court abused its discretion in failing to 
cross-check the reasonableness of the percentage-of-recovery fee against a lodestar calculation with 
a justifiable multiplier. The court of appeals suggested that, on remand, “a lodestar multiplier of 
3 . . . is the appropriate ceiling for a fee award, although a lower multiplier may be applied in the 
District Court’s discretion.” Id. at 742. 
 236. The Third Circuit did opine that in securities class actions, factors relating to the skill and 
efficiency of the attorneys and fee awards in similar cases are of limited use. In re Cendant Corp. 
Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 284 (3d Cir. 2001). The court also noted that those two factors “should receive 
less weight” in a megafund case. Id. (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 
148 F.3d 283, 339 (3d Cir. 1998)) (commenting that the size of the fund created and the number of 
persons benefited is less important in a megacase).  
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methodologies237 and even many of the same award considerations, the 
results are hardly predictable. Courts reducing fees emphasize different 
factors influencing their awards.238 Further, many judges discount the 
risk of nonrecovery with the benefit of hindsight attendant to ex post 
review. Informational deficiencies continue to plague the courts in 
reviewing fee applications, leading to judicial conjectures about 
counsel’s performance, the reasonableness of the hours expended, and 
the value of attorneys’ time. Some judges have developed their own 
extrastatutory public policy rationales for cutting fees, and the courts’ 
opinions provide little assurance that their decisions reflect compensation 
arrangements that injured investors would have negotiated directly with 
class counsel.239 At best, courts review the “market” for class counsel 
compensation by reviewing some sampling of awards made by other 
courts faced with the same task. Of course, precedents “cannot establish 
a valid market rate.”240
In sum, fee awards in securities class actions are, if anything, more 
subjective and less predictable after the PSLRA and the abolishment of 
benchmarks in two circuits. A review of the case law confirms the 
judiciary’s wide discretion to determine reasonable fees, but no guiding 
rules of decision emerge. Judges anchor their decisions with a myriad of 
partially duplicative and conflicting factors utilized to value lawyers’ 
efforts and productivity. These trends increase the risk for private 
attorneys general, who will look to prior fee awards in assessing the 
expected return from future litigation. “[S]hrewd plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
able to weigh the risks and rewards of litigation, but they are much less 
able to gauge in advance the reaction of an individual judge to a fee 
application that is to be given discretionary review in accordance 
 237. Courts continue to express preference for the percentage-of-recovery method over the 
lodestar method. See, e.g., In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1333–36 (S.D. Fla. 
2001); In re Fleet/Norstar Sec. Litig., 935 F. Supp. 99, 108–09 (D.R.I. 1996). 
 238. Of the twenty-seven cases reviewed for this Article, only one failed to provide detailed 
reasons for its decision to reduce the requested attorneys’ fees. In Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy 
Corp., the district court merely stated that the “nature of the litigation,” its resolution “without the 
necessity of trial,” and its value dictated that 18%, rather than the 33% requested, was a reasonable 
award. No. Civ. 95-438, 1999 WL 33266979, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 16, 1999). The Third Circuit 
vacated the decision and remanded the case to the district court for a more thorough analysis. 223 
F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 239. As Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook observed recently in his opinion reversing a 
lower court’s fee award in an antitrust case, “The [S]econd [C]ircuit’s consider-everything approach 
[adopted in Goldberger] . . . lacks a benchmark; a list of factors without a rule of decision is just a 
chopped salad.” In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 719 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 240. John C. Coffee, Jr., The PSLRA and Auctions, N.Y. L.J., May 17, 2001, at 6. 
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with . . . essentially meaningless factors . . . .”241 These are not the only 
unknowns, however, that plaintiffs’ counsel must face. In addition to 
lawyers facing greater uncertainty about their compensation in securities 
class actions, the following developments in the post-reform fee 
jurisprudence also should concern the plaintiffs’ bar.242
 a. Discounting the risk of nonrecovery. In awarding fees to class 
counsel under the common-fund doctrine, courts historically have 
considered risk to be the most important factor in determining whether 
the plaintiffs’ counsel deserved an enhancement above the lodestar 
amount243 or above the benchmark for percentage fees. Recently, 
however, many judges awarding reduced fees have determined that the 
risk borne by the plaintiffs’ lawyers did not justify the amount of 
compensation requested. In fact, in more than half of the cases reviewed, 
the courts found that the risk of nonrecovery was small. 
Courts analyzing the risk of nonpayment have looked to a variety of 
factors to support their conclusions. Judges in five cases stated that the 
high rate of settlement in securities class action litigation generally has 
eliminated much of the risk for plaintiffs’ lawyers. The court in In re 
Quantum Health Resources Inc. Securities Litigation made this point 
most broadly, stating, “[T]here is no inherent risk of attorneys [sic] fee 
non-recovery in securities class action suits.”244 Similarly, in 
Goldberger, the Second Circuit cited a combination of anecdotal 
evidence and a law review article245 for the proposition that there is “no 
appreciable risk of non-recovery in securities class actions.”246 
Subsequent district court opinions within the Second Circuit have 
followed Goldberger in emphasizing this point.247 These courts did not 
 241. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 693 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 
 242. This is not to say that judges have reduced fees in most or even a majority of securities 
class actions. In the Rite Aid megasettlement litigation, for example, the plaintiffs’ counsel received 
25% of the $334 million settlement fund, a paycheck of nearly $83 million. See Shannon P. Duffy, 
Rite Aid Suit Yields $83 Mil. in Fees, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 4, 2003, at 1. In smaller 
securities class actions, judges even have awarded class counsel one-third of the settlement funds. 
See, e.g., Maley v. Del Global Techs. Corp., 186 F. Supp. 2d 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Safety 
Components Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 243. Goldberger v. Integrated Res. Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 54 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 244. 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 245. Alexander, supra note 74, at 578. 
 246. Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 52 (quoting Alexander, supra note 74, at 578) (court’s emphasis 
omitted). 
 247. See, e.g., In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22244676, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2003) (awarding class counsel 20% of settlement fund rather than 25%, as 
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consider the possibility that the PSLRA increased the risk faced by 
plaintiffs’ counsel.248 They failed to cite more recent studies available 
suggesting that the plaintiffs’ securities bar faces a greater likelihood of 
dismissal and protracted litigation.249 Nor did these courts consider that 
the lawyers made their prefiling investments without any assurance that 
they would receive the appointment as lead counsel. 
In addition to the generalized notion that there is little risk in 
prosecuting securities class actions, many courts have listed case-specific 
factors that, according to the courts’ determination, have reduced class 
counsel’s risk of nonrecovery.250 Often, these factors include some sort 
of perceived “piggybacking”—that is, class counsel’s reliance upon the 
efforts of a third party that made the defendant’s liability more evident. 
In several cases, the courts reduced fees based on their perception that 
enforcement actions by the SEC assisted plaintiffs’ counsel or reduced 
the risk of loss.251 The court in In re PaineWebber Ltd. Partnerships 
Litigation,252 for example, found that “piggybacking” justified a 
requested, citing Goldberger and stating, “though this case was brought under the securities laws, it 
better resembles a run-of-the-mill commercial litigation”). 
 248. See, e.g., In re Arakis Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 95 CV 3431 (ARR), 2001 WL 
1590512, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2001); In re Dreyfus Aggressive Growth Mut. Fund Litig., 2001 
WL 709262, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2001) (cutting class counsel’s request for 30% of recovery 
in half, finding that “the merits of this case were promising from the outset” and noting that all but a 
small percentage of securities class actions settle, “guaranteeing counsel payment of fees and 
minimizing the risks associated with contingency fee litigations”); In re Fine Host Corp. Sec. Litig., 
No. MDL 1241, 3:97-CV-2619JCH, 2000 WL 33116538, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 2000).  
 249. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
 250. In one unique case, Walco Investments, Inc. v. Thenen, the court had established at the 
outset that plaintiffs’ attorneys “would receive interim payments at a substantially reduced hourly 
rate with a final enhancement or reduction of fees based on the amount recovered.” 975 F. Supp. 
1468, 1470 (S.D. Fla. 1997). At the conclusion of the litigation, the court cut counsel’s fee request, 
reasoning that because “the attorneys were not paid on a pure contingency fee basis, the incentives . . 
. that justify a percentage fee award were not fully in place.” Id. at 1472. 
 251. Recent empirical studies probably would not change these courts’ perceptions. James 
Cox and Randall Thomas reviewed 248 securities fraud class actions settled between 1990 and 2001 
and found that private suits with parallel SEC actions settle for significantly more than private suits 
without such proceedings, and private cases with parallel SEC actions take substantially less time to 
settle than other private cases. James Cox & Randall Thomas, SEC Enforcement Actions for 
Financial Fraud and Private Litigation: An Empirical Inquiry (May 2003) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author). Another study determined that private class action settlements are significantly 
larger and constitute a higher percentage of estimated damages when “accompanied by” a 
corresponding SEC litigation release or administrative action. LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. 
RYAN, POST-REFORM ACT SECURITIES LAWSUITS: SETTLEMENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 
2002, at 8 (2003), at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/LES%20Through%201202.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2003). 
 252. 999 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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reduction in fees requested. The case concerned PaineWebber’s 
marketing of certain limited partnerships and investment trusts.253 While 
class counsel conducted discovery and began settlement negotiations, the 
SEC also investigated PaineWebber’s limited partnership sales and 
eventually issued an order “finding extensive federal securities law 
violations and imposing sanctions.”254 The court found that the class 
counsel’s risk in litigating the claims “was substantially reduced by 
pressure placed on PaineWebber in the SEC Order.”255
Even concurrent SEC fraud investigations have influenced the courts 
to cut fees to class counsel in both In re Sunbeam Securities Litigation256 
and In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Securities Litigation.257 In the Sunbeam 
litigation, shareholders sued the corporation and its accountant over 
allegedly inflated financial statements.258 The defendant accounting firm, 
Arthur Andersen, agreed to pay $110 million, and class counsel 
requested fees totaling 30% of this fund.259 The court rejected counsel’s 
request that it depart upward from the Eleventh Circuit’s benchmark 
award of 25%, citing, among other reasons, the SEC’s concurrent 
investigation and civil penalties action against the individual 
defendants.260 Similarly, in Bausch & Lomb, the SEC conducted an 
investigation while the private class action litigation was ongoing.261 
Bausch & Lomb agreed to settle the class action at the same time the 
SEC ordered the company to cease committing violations of federal 
securities law. The court awarded a multiplier of 2 rather than the 5.7 
multiplier requested, reasoning that the SEC’s investigation and 
subsequent order substantially reduced the risk of the litigation for class 
counsel.262
Courts offered similar justifications for their decisions to cut fees in 
Goldberger and Quantum. In affirming the district court’s decision in 
Goldberger, the Second Circuit noted that “the scope of defendant’s 
misconduct was unprecedented” and that “a good portion of counsel’s 
 253. Id. at 721. 
 254. Id. at 722. 
 255. Id. at 725. 
 256. 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
 257. 183 F.R.D. 78 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 258. 176 F. Supp. 2d at 1327. 
 259. Id. at 1328–29, 1332. 
 260. Id. at 1336. 
 261. 183 F.R.D. at 87. 
 262. Id. at 87–88. 
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lodestar was based on hours spent scouring the records developed during 
the parallel criminal proceedings [against Milken and Drexel].”263 In 
Quantum, a case alleging accounting fraud, Judge Taylor, in the Central 
District of California, rejected class counsel’s request for 30% of the $10 
million settlement fund.264 The court found that the case was not 
complex, that the violations of the securities laws were apparent, and that 
the risks in prosecuting the case were slight because “the material 
allegations of the complaint were supported by the unequivocal results of 
public investigations conducted by the California State Controller’s 
Office and the California Department of Health Services, as well as 
significant public admissions by Quantum.”265
Judges also have recognized that investigations by the news media 
reduce class counsel’s risk as well. In Bausch & Lomb, for example, the 
court noted that Business Week magazine had published a pair of articles 
detailing the alleged deficiencies in the company’s accounting.266 The 
court determined that, even if class counsel did not directly use 
information from the articles (the articles appeared after the initiation of 
the lawsuits), “their publication certainly must have bolstered counsel’s 
confidence in their chances of success, and strengthened their hand by 
equally diminishing B&L’s own prospects in this litigation.”267 News 
media involvement also influenced the court in In re Arakis Energy 
Corp. Securities Litigation, a case involving misrepresentations 
concerning a plan to finance an oil drilling expedition in Sudan.268 The 
judge found that “substantial news coverage of the Arakis situation in the 
financial press” reduced the risk of litigation for class counsel: “press 
coverage undoubtedly aided counsel in their preparation for settlement 
negotiations, as evidenced by the time spent by counsel reviewing this 
coverage.”269
Just as defendant’s public admissions influenced the court in 
Quantum to cut fees, courts have cited to corroborating evidence in the 
public domain or other case-specific factors that may minimize counsel’s 
risk of nonrecovery. For example, in determining a reasonable range of 
fees in Cendant PRIDES, the Third Circuit noted that “the case was 
 263. Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 264. In re Quantum Health Res., Inc. Sec. Litig., 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 265. Id. at 1259. 
 266. 183 F.R.D. at 87. 
 267. Id. at 87–88. 
 268. 2001 WL 1590512, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2001). 
 269. Id. at *12. 
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relatively simple in terms of proof, in that Cendant had conceded liability 
and no risks pertaining to liability or collection were pertinent.”270 On 
remand of the related litigation, the district court seemingly voiced 
disagreement with the court of appeals, noting several “practical and 
procedural questions [that] made the risk of nonpayment not 
insubstantial” for the Cendant class counsel.271
Other courts also have examined the stage of the litigation at the time 
of settlement in assessing the risk assumed by class counsel. In In re 
Twinlab Corp. Securities Litigation, the judge opined that class counsel 
had overstated the risk in the case because prior to settlement, plaintiffs’ 
complaint had survived defendants’ motions to dismiss several of the 
causes of action.272 So too in In re Dreyfus Aggressive Growth Mutual 
Fund Litigation, the court found that, because the plaintiffs had survived 
a motion to dismiss before settlement, the remaining questions dealt with 
damages rather than liability.273 The judge also decided that the risk that 
counsel might not collect a high premium was not the sort of 
“contingency risk” that courts should consider in awarding fees.274
Often when assessing ex post the prospect of plaintiffs prevailing, 
courts also attempt to assess the novelty and complexity of the action. As 
the judge in Bausch & Lomb explained, “the complexity of the case is 
mostly relevant only insofar as it affects counsel’s degree of risk of 
litigation.”275 In Varljen v. H.J. Meyers & Co., the court decided to 
award class counsel 20% of the fund rather than the 33% fee requested, 
holding that the lower award adequately recognized “the efforts of 
counsel and the risks and complexities of this litigation.”276 The fee 
decision in In re Fidelity/Micron Securities Litigation provides a further 
example.277 Plaintiffs had alleged in that case that the portfolio manager 
for the Fidelity Magellan Fund engaged in market manipulation to 
increase the value of a particular stock in the fund’s portfolio. In 
requesting 30% of the settlement fund, class counsel cited the high risk 
 270. 243 F.3d 722, 735 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 271. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 243 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174 (D.N.J. 2003) (approving lead 
counsel’s request for an award of $55 million in fees as reasonable). 
 272. 187 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85–86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 273. No. 98 CV 4318 HB, 2001 WL 709262, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2001). 
 274. Id. 
 275. 183 F.R.D. 78, 88 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 276. No. 97 Civ. 6742(DLC), 2000 WL 1683656, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000). 
 277. No. Civ. A. 95-12676-RGS, 1998 WL 313735 (D. Mass. June 5, 1998), vacated on other 
grounds, 167 F.3d 735 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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and novel issues involved in the case. However, the judge rejected this 
argument and awarded a reduced fee, finding that the risk was not out of 
the ordinary and that the fraud-on-the-market theory relied upon by class 
counsel had been “thoroughly exposited in the existing case law.”278
 b. Penalizing for early (or late) settlements. Courts awarding reduced 
fees frequently reviewed the amount of work done by class counsel in 
support of their decisions to deny the amount requested. In at least two 
cases, judges focused attention on the total amount of time expended by 
class counsel in prosecuting the litigation, reducing the fee award on the 
grounds that the case settled at an early stage. For example, the judge in 
In re Fine Host Corp. Securities Litigation reasoned that the early 
settlement in that litigation weighed against an award of 33% of a 
common fund.279 The Third Circuit made a similar observation in the 
Cendant PRIDES case: reversing the district court for awarding 
excessive fees, the Third Circuit found that the litigation settled only two 
months after the attorneys filed for class certification.280 Of course, such 
decisions discourage the plaintiffs’ bar from resolving cases early and 
may encourage class counsel to engage in wasteful activities such as 
“confirmatory discovery” in order to justify a large fee award. 
While settling too quickly has resulted in a lower fee award, 
plaintiffs’ counsel also face the risk of a reduced fee if the court 
perceives that they litigated too long. In awarding fees in In re 
Fleet/Norstar Securities Litigation, the court penalized class counsel for 
excessive litigation.281 The guardian ad litem appointed to monitor the 
reasonableness of the fee awards found a “remarkable absence of 
economy and efficiency,” as evidenced by the fee applications.282 Class 
counsel wasted “many, many hours” on a “deficient initial complaint 
[that] had to be amended after dismissal proceedings.”283 The 
applications also provided evidence of “overcharging” and “extensive 
duplication of efforts.”284 Based on these findings, the court awarded 
20% of the fund to plaintiffs’ counsel, rather than the 30% requested. 
 278. Id. at *3. The court also noted that, based on plaintiffs’ own estimate, the settlement 
recovered for class members represented only 20% of their potential damages. Id. 
 279. 2000 WL 33116538, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 2000). 
 280. In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 736 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 281. 935 F. Supp. 99 (D.R.I. 1996). 
 282. Id. at 107. 
 283. Id. at 110. 
 284. Id. 
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Similarly, in In re Baan Co. Securities Litigation, the court awarded 
class counsel 28% of the settlement fund rather than the 32% requested 
because of the “excessive delays and inefficiencies that plagued [the] 
litigation . . . due in large part to counsel’s less than exemplary 
performance.”285 The court specifically noted that plaintiffs’ counsel 
filed their original complaints some five years before they reached a 
settlement accord with the defendants, and that the parties litigated for 
nearly four years before the investor class was certified.  In fact, because 
the court had “perceived . . . significant deficiencies in counsel’s 
performance,” the order certifying the class imposed on class counsel a 
monthly reporting requirement “so that the Court could be assured the 
counsel would faithfully comply with the dictates of the PSLRA.”286     
 285. 2003 WL 22423161, at *6–7 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2003).  
 286. Id. at *7. 
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 c. Reviving the lodestar to reduce fee awards. Although the PSLRA 
mandates that courts award total fees and expenses not exceeding a 
reasonable percentage of the amount recovered for the class, judges 
reducing fees often employed the lodestar method, or, alternatively, 
determined a percentage-of-recovery fee but then “cross-checked” the 
reasonableness of that fee by reviewing a hypothetical lodestar 
calculation.287 Use of the lodestar does not necessarily violate the 
PSLRA,288 but this trend in post-reform fee jurisprudence may harm the 
class by encouraging excessive billing and by delaying resolution of the 
litigation; plaintiffs’ counsel has little motivation to settle the case until 
the lawyers have billed enough hours to justify their anticipated fee 
request. Lodestar cross-checks also impede counsel’s ability to evaluate 
potential lawsuits. The uncertainty created by judges using the lodestar 
method ultimately may reduce the expected value of such lawsuits for 
the plaintiffs’ bar and, as a result, diminish their financial ability and 
willingness to undertake the investments and risks associated with class 
action litigation. 
Most of the courts that have attempted to value the work actually 
performed by counsel determined that the attorneys charged too much 
per hour or had billed an excessive number of hours. The district court’s 
decision in Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.289 so held. Finding 
that the rates charged by class counsel (as much as $495 per hour) were 
unnecessarily high, the court quipped, “Even if the greats of legal history 
were to awaken from the dead and form their own mythical law practice, 
a senior partner at the firm Lincoln, Darrow, Holmes, Marshall, & 
Blackstone would not be worth such an eye-popping hourly rate.”290 In 
addition, the judge determined that counsel substantially inflated the total 
hours expended by recording its time in quarter hours rather than in 
 287. See, e.g., Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000); In re 
BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1065–66 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
 288. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 36 (“The Conference Committee does not intend 
to prohibit use of the lodestar approach as a means of calculating attorney[s’] fees. The [attorneys’ 
fees] provision focuses on the final amount of fees awarded, not the means by which such fees are 
calculated.”); cf. 141 CONG. REC. S17,957 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (“The conference report puts an 
end to this outrageous practice, called the ‘lodestar’ approach, by encouraging courts to award 
attorney’s fees based upon a reasonable percentage of the total amount of the settlement or 
judgment.”) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd). 
 289. 968 F. Supp. 1396 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 290. Id. at 1402 & n.6. 
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tenths.291 The combination of these factors led the court to reduce the 
total award from $3.0 million to $1.2 million.292  
Many other courts have employed an analysis similar to that used in 
Zucker. In calculating the attorneys’ lodestar, the judge in Bausch & 
Lomb found some of the claimed hourly rates to be “extraordinarily 
high.”293 In addition, this judge determined that both the number of 
lawyers who worked on the case and the amount of hours billed were 
excessive.294 Based on these findings, the court reduced the lodestar 
figure by 15%.295 In Feinberg v. Hibernia Corp., the court reduced the 
hourly fees of seventeen individual attorneys and refused to award fees 
for time spent on travel, copying documents, or arguing the issue of 
attorneys’ fees.296 Class counsel in Sunbeam submitted time records 
detailing more than 80,000 hours of work; however, because the class 
settled with only one of the defendants, the court held that the attorneys 
should not receive compensation for the total number of hours worked on 
the case, and counsel’s request for an upward adjustment of the 
benchmark fee was refused.297
Like the court in Sunbeam, many courts that purport to use a 
percentage-of-the-fund methodology also employ a lodestar cross-check. 
In applying the cross-check, the judge in Arakis discovered some 
evidence of excessive billing.298 The court in Lyons v. Scitex Corp. also 
evaluated the attorneys’ proposed lodestar and concluded that the firm 
charged excessive rates.299 An examination of the lodestar in Twinlab 
showed that class counsel based its calculation on rates ranging from 
$340 to $615 per hour for partners and up to $410 per hour for 
associates.300 In addition, the Twinlab court found that many tasks 
performed by partners could have been delegated to less costly associates 
or paralegals.301 In Fidelity/Micron, the attorneys did not provide 
sufficient information for the court to perform an accurate lodestar cross-
 291. Id. at 1403. 
 292. Id. 
 293. 183 F.R.D. 78, 83 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 294. Id. at 84–85. 
 295. Id. at 85. 
 296. 966 F. Supp. 442, 447–48 (E.D. La. 1997). 
 297. 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
 298. 2001 WL 1590512, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2001). 
 299. 987 F. Supp. 271, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 300. In re Twinlab Corp. Sec. Litig., 187 F. Supp. 2d 80, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 301. Id. 
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check, but the judge noted that their representations concerning total 
hours and hourly rates seemed excessive.302 The findings in each of 
these cases supported the courts’ decisions to award lower fees than 
those requested by counsel. Similarly, the court in In re BankAmerica 
Corp. Securities Litigation also used a lodestar cross-check and found 
that the number of hours billed and the rates charged by the lawyers 
“[fell] within the high end of reasonable.”303 Nonetheless, the court 
refused to award the requested 25% fee because “[s]uch an award would 
overcompensate counsel at the expense of the . . . plaintiffs.”304
 d. Comparing fees selectively. In six cases where the courts cut 
requested fees, judges reviewed fee awards in similar class actions to aid 
in their determinations. The Third Circuit endorsed this approach in the 
Cendant PRIDES litigation, holding that the district court had failed to 
properly consider the fees granted in other megafund settlements in 
awarding class counsel 5.7% of a $341 million fund.305 Examining fees 
awarded under the percentage-of-recovery method in a sample of 
seventeen cases settling for more than $100 million, the appellate court 
found that the awards ranged from 2.8% to 36%.306 However, it also 
determined that all of the cases awarding higher percentages involved 
complex issues and required extensive time and effort from the 
attorneys.307 After comparing the sampled cases with the case at hand, a 
comparison fraught with speculative assumptions, the Third Circuit 
concluded that the district court abused its discretion in awarding 5.7% 
of the settlement fund to plaintiffs’ counsel.308
Other courts have reviewed a more limited number of fee precedents. 
In Dreyfus, for example, the trial court noted the emergence of a trend in 
the Second Circuit of “awarding attorneys considerably less than 30% of 
common funds in securities class actions, even where there is 
considerable contingency risk” and then listed three cases rejecting 30% 
awards and two others approving 30% awards based upon unique 
circumstances.309 The court in Arakis examined four cases preceding 
 302. 1998 WL 313735, at *3 (D. Mass. Jun. 5, 1998). 
 303. 228 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
 304. Id. 
 305. In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 742–43 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 306. Id. at 737–38. 
 307. Id. at 738. 
 308. Id. at 741. 
 309. No. 98 CV 4318, 2001 WL 709262, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2001). 
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Goldberger as well as five subsequent decisions. The post-Goldberger 
awards demonstrated to that court a trend within the circuit away from 
the 30% benchmark award.310 Concerned that awarding the requested 
25% fee from a $259 million megasettlement fund might be 
unreasonable, the court in In re 3Com Securities Litigation ordered class 
counsel to produce information about the number of hours worked by 
attorneys and paralegals and their hourly rates. Having calculated that the 
requested benchmark fee represented a multiplier of 9.27, the court 
summarily opined that a 25% fee indeed was “too high under all of the 
circumstances,” but an award of 18%, representing a 6.7 multiplier, was 
somehow “more reasonable” in light of uncited precedent.311
The trial court overseeing the BankAmerica megalitigation studied a 
list of decisions submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel awarding 25% o3r more 
to class counsel. Noting its “fiduciary role in reviewing fee applications,” 
the court instead awarded 18% of the $490 million megasettlement fund 
to plaintiffs’ counsel, net expenses.312 Without elaboration, the court 
simply stated, “Having studied counsel’s list of cases in which the award 
of attorneys’ fees equaled or exceeded the requested 25%, the Court is 
nevertheless convinced that an award of 18% is reasonable considering 
awards in similar cases.”313 The order cited, among other precedents, 
two other 18% fee awards recently ordered314 in the In re MicroStrategy, 
Inc. Securities Litigation315 and 3Com class actions. 
Several other courts have reviewed hourly billing rates in 
determining the reasonableness of class counsel’s fees under a lodestar 
calculation. The use of a lodestar cross-check in Lyons v. Scitex Corp. is 
one example of such an analysis. There, the judge compared class 
counsel’s proposed hourly rates to average figures published by the New 
York State Bar Association and determined that the requested rates were 
excessive.316 Similarly, the court in Bausch & Lomb refused to award 
 310. In re Arakis Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 95 CV 3431 (ARR), 2001 WL 1590512, at *9 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2001). 
 311. In re 3Com Sec. Litig., No. C-97-21083 EAI, slip op. at 6–7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2001). 
 312. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1064 & n.5 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
 313. Id. at 1064 n.5. The court also determined to calculate the amount of attorneys’ fees from 
the common funds available after deductions for all reimbursable litigation costs and expenses, 
thereby increasing the payout to absent class members. Id. at 1067. 
 314. Id. at 1064 n.5. 
 315. 172 F. Supp. 2d 778 (E.D. Va. 2001).  
 316. 987 F. Supp. 271, 279–80 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The quality of representation also seems to 
have influenced this court’s decision. The fraud claims settled for $2.9 million, representing between 
6.4% and 11% of the total losses suffered by the class. Id. at 278. In light of the small percentage of 
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rates as high as $525 per hour after reviewing three other decisions 
denying hourly rates in excess of $500.317
 e. Slashing fees to advance public policy. More than a third of the 
courts cutting fees cited public policy concerns for reducing requested 
awards. Surprisingly, however, only one of these decisions, the opinion 
issued in MicroStrategy, mentioned the policies underlying Congress’s 
enactment of the PSLRA.318 In MicroStrategy, plaintiffs alleged that the 
company and its auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, misrepresented the 
company’s income, causing the company’s stock to trade at an inflated 
price.319 After settling with the company for $98.5 million in notes, 
stocks, and warrants, and with the accountants for $55 million in cash,320 
class counsel applied for a total fee award equal to 27% of the value of 
the two settlement funds.321 Rejecting the request and awarding an 18% 
fee instead,322 the court interpreted the PSLRA to require that class 
counsel receive compensation for time spent in litigation, reward for the 
results achieved, and incentive to pursue similar cases in the future.323
Even without focusing on congressional policy, some courts have 
sought to preserve as much of the settlement as possible for members of 
the class.324 In Goldberger, the Second Circuit instructed lower courts to 
give “jealous regard to the rights” of absent class members.325 Ensuring 
that the class would receive sufficient funds was cited in combination 
with lack of risk in Varljen.326 In its award decision in In re Prudential 
Securities Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litigation, the court made protecting the 
class the sole determining factor in its decision to reduce the class 
counsel’s award.327 The plaintiffs claimed that Prudential Securities 
fraudulently marketed and sold interests in numerous limited 
loss recovered by investors in the litigation, the court decided to award class counsel only 10.4% of 
the fund. Id. at 280. 
 317. In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.R.D. 78, 83–84 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 318. 172 F. Supp. 2d 778, 784–85 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
 319. Id. at 782. 
 320. Id. at 781 nn.2, 3. 
 321. Id. at 788–89. 
 322. Id. at 790. 
 323. Id. at 787–88. 
 324. See id. at 786. 
 325. Goldberger v. Integrated Res. Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 53 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 
 326. 2000 WL 1683656, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000). 
 327. 985 F. Supp. 410, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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partnerships.328 Class counsel obtained a settlement of $22.5 million and 
requested a fee equal to 30% of the fund.329 The court determined that 
the SEC investigation relating to the case actually aided the defendants 
rather than the plaintiffs and that the overall risk of the litigation was 
“extremely high.”330 Nonetheless, the court held that it had a “duty to 
avoid any sense of vicarious generosity” and granted a reduced fee 
amounting to 26% of the settlement.331
Similar considerations played a role in the court’s decision in Arakis, 
where class counsel sought fees and expenses totaling one-third of the 
$24 million settlement fund.332 Noting that members of the plaintiff class 
made claims totaling only $7.2 million, the court held that public policy 
weighed against awarding compensation in an amount greater than that 
actually claimed by the injured parties.333 And in In re American Bank 
Note Holographics, Inc., the court acted to ensure that class counsel did 
not receive a benefit unavailable to absent class members.334 The judge 
approved a settlement providing absent class members with 
approximately $14.9 million in cash and $6 million in various securities, 
but the court recognized the risk associated with the securities 
component of the settlement.335 Reasoning that the class attorneys 
should share the risk of nonpayment borne by class members, the court 
rejected counsel’s request for 30% of the settlement fund and awarded 
25% instead.336
As these decisions demonstrate, ex post judicial regulation of 
attorney compensation after the PSLRA is highly fact-specific and is 
characterized by conflicting norms, especially following the abolishment 
of benchmark fees in two circuits. Fee awards in securities class actions 
are, if anything, less coherent and predictable after reform, even 
somewhat random. 
A few judges have sought to avoid the inefficiencies associated with 
ex post decision-making by setting counsel’s fees at the inception of the 
litigation. The next two sections describe these judicial innovations and 
 328. Id. at 412. 
 329. Id. at 415. 
 330. Id. at 414–16. 
 331. Id. at 417. 
 332. 2001 WL 1590512, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2001). 
 333. Id. at *13. 
 334. 127 F. Supp. 2d 418, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 335. Id. at 421. 
 336. Id. at 432–33. 
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discuss why these courts’ efforts at ex ante fee regulation contravene the 
PSLRA’s empowered lead plaintiff regime. 
2. Selecting class counsel using competitive bidding 
Rather than attempting to reduce agency costs by scrutinizing fees ex 
post, a few judges, most prominently Judge Vaughn Walker of the 
Northern District of California, have attempted to reduce class action 
agency costs by using competitive bidding to select lead counsel for the 
class.337 Judges employing this approach express dissatisfaction with 
both the lodestar and the percentage-of-recovery methods for awarding 
fees; neither approach effectively simulates the market nor ensures that 
class counsel will receive a reasonable fee.338 By soliciting competitive 
bids for the position of lead counsel and then using the winning bid to set 
counsel’s compensation ex ante, judges employing this innovation have 
attempted to appoint as class counsel the lawyers who would best 
represent the interests of the class at the lowest cost.339
Courts adopting so-called auction procedures select class counsel by 
soliciting first-price sealed bids from law firms seeking to represent the 
class. These courts often announce a preference for bids based upon a 
percentage of the recovery provided to the class in the litigation, and they 
require bidding firms to submit information concerning their 
qualifications, experience, malpractice insurance, and the like. After 
reviewing the bids and accompanying disclosures, the courts select the 
winning bid, appoint the winner as lead counsel, and order that counsel’s 
compensation will be determined in accord with its bid. 
 337. See, e.g., In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 141 F. Supp. 2d 951, 952–54 (N.D. Ill. 2001); In re 
Bank One S’holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784–90 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Wenderhold v. 
Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Sherleigh Assocs. v. Windmere-Durable 
Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688, 691–95 (S.D. Fla. 1999). 
 338. See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 692 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (explaining that, 
in the market, clients would “demand in advance of the litigation the following information: how 
much their lawyers will charge . . . and the best price available for those services.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 339. A review of judicial opinions in fourteen bidding cases found that “the most common 
reason judges gave for employing bidding was to foster competition among counsel by replicating 
the private marketplace for legal services.” LAURAL L. HOOPER & MARIE LEARY, AUCTIONING THE 
ROLE OF CLASS COUNSEL IN CLASS ACTION CASES: A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY 15 (2001), at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/auctioning.pdf/$file/auctioning.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 
2003); see also Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 711 (“Judicial auctions were devised in 
part to foster greater loyalty by counsel to the class and to award reasonable fees . . . .”). 
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The several judges who have utilized the auction tool justified its use 
as a method to approximate an efficient market for class counsel.340 As 
Joseph Grundfest has opined, “if [class] counsel fees are set without 
regard to market standards, the possibility arises that fiduciary 
obligations to absent class members are being violated.”341 There is 
some evidence that courts have achieved success in reducing attorneys’ 
fees through the use of judicially supervised competitive bidding.342 
Grundfest observed that, based on an admittedly small sample of cases, 
these lead counsel auctions substantially reduced fee awards from the 
25% to 33% benchmark awards, to the benefit of investor classes.343
Still, most courts and commentators have heaped criticism on the use 
of court-supervised competitive bidding for the selection and 
compensation of class counsel in securities cases. Most prominently, the 
Third Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by 
conducting an auction to select lead counsel in In re Cendant Corp. 
Litigation.344 In that case, the district court initially appointed three 
public pension plans as co-lead plaintiffs. These institutions had selected 
and retained two law firms to represent the class and negotiated a retainer 
agreement providing for a decreasing percentage of recovery. However, 
the district court determined that it would select counsel using a 
competitive bidding (auction) process. According to the Third Circuit, 
the PSLRA prohibits the use of auctions if there is a sufficient showing 
that a properly appointed lead plaintiff selected lead counsel as a result of 
a “good faith selection and negotiation process . . . arrived at via 
meaningful arms-length bargaining.”345 Because the lead plaintiff in that 
case had selected and retained counsel through a sufficiently 
sophisticated and sincere search prior to the court-ordered auction, the 
district court should have appointed as lead counsel the firm selected by 
 340. E.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 341. Grundfest Proposal, supra note 61, at 5. 
 342. Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 720 (“It appears that the percentage of the 
recovery awarded to counsel in the auction cases is often less than that awarded by traditional 
methods.” (citing testimony provided to the Task Force)). 
 343. Grundfest Proposal, supra note 61, at 7–8 (observing that no fee award in an auction case 
has materially exceeded 20% of the gross settlement amount). 
 344. 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). A number of federal district courts also have criticized 
auctions. See, e.g., Osher v. Guess?, Inc., CV 01-00871, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6057, at *15 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 26, 2001) (stating that courts should interfere with lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel 
“only if it is necessary to protect the interests of the class”); In re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 110 
F. Supp. 2d 427, 438 (E.D. Va. 2000) (stating that courts should address the subject of fees awarded 
to counsel at the conclusion of the litigation and not ex ante). 
 345. 264 F.3d at 276. 
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the lead plaintiff.346 The court of appeals vacated the fee award and 
remanded the case to the lower court to dismiss the fee application. In 
evaluating the resubmitted fee application, the Third Circuit instructed 
the district court to “seriously consider[]” the possibility that the 
presumption of reasonableness accorded to ex ante fee agreements was 
rebutted insofar as “this was a simple case in terms of liability with 
respect to Cendant, and the case was settled at a very early stage, after 
little formal discovery.”347
Prompted by its then-pending review of the class counsel auction 
procedure adopted in the Cendant case, the Third Circuit also 
commissioned a Task Force on the Appointment of Counsel in Class 
Actions to “evaluate the emerging practice of several district court judges 
throughout the country of selecting class counsel and setting fees through 
[an] auction process.”348 Academics argued to the Appointment Task 
Force that class counsel auctions violate the letter and spirit of the 
PSLRA because they interfere with the lead plaintiffs’ right to select 
counsel and may discourage institutional investors from seeking the role 
of lead plaintiff as Congress intended. The Appointment Task Force 
agreed, concluding that “the risks and complications associated with a 
judicially-controlled auction counsel against its use except under certain 
limited circumstances.”349
Other commentators have questioned whether auction methodologies 
could produce reasonable fees in any event. For example, Jill Fisch has 
asserted that the class counsel auctions employed by courts to date have 
been fraught with problems in their design and implementation.350 
According to Fisch, even well-structured auctions are unlikely to produce 
reasonable fee awards or result in the appointment of the most qualified 
law firms, and, further, use of auction procedures reduces the 
 346. Id. at 278. Further, because the retainer agreement negotiated by the lead plaintiff 
required lead counsel to obtain the lead plaintiff’s prior approval before submitting a fee application 
for court review, and because there was insufficient evidence that the lead plaintiff gave prior 
approval, the Third Circuit ordered that the district court should refuse to accept any other fee 
application submitted without the lead plaintiff’s prior approval. Id. at 286. 
 347. Id. at 285. 
 348. See Press Release, Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Creation of Task Force (Jan. 30, 2001) 
(on file with author). 
 349. Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 704. 
 350. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class 
Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (2002). 
CAS-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004 12:29:28 PM 
1239] Reforming Securities Class Actions 
 1309 
 
accountability of class counsel and compromises the proper role of the 
court.351
3. Appointing lead plaintiffs based on selection of counsel 
After receiving criticism for using competitive bidding to select lead 
counsel, Judge Walker took a different approach to controlling plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees in In re Copper Mountain Networks Securities 
Litigation.352 In that case, three candidates—two individual 
shareholders, Quinn Barton and William Chenoweth, and a group of five 
individual investors led by David Cavanaugh—competed for the 
appointment of lead plaintiff in the consolidated actions.353 The 
Cavanaugh group collectively had the largest loss of the three contenders 
(in fact, each member of the Cavanaugh group claimed to have lost more 
money than the other two candidates combined), and the group qualified 
as the presumptively most adequate plaintiff.354 However, rather than 
simply appointing the Cavanaugh group as lead plaintiff, Judge Walker 
interviewed the three prospective appointees about their knowledge of 
the case, their negotiations with law firms, and their ability to monitor 
the performance of the lawyers for the putative investor class. 
Chenoweth revealed that he had not retained counsel, and Judge Walker 
disqualified him from further consideration as lead plaintiff.355 The 
Cavanaugh group represented that they had retained the nationally 
known plaintiffs’ firm Milberg Weiss and had entered into a contingent 
fee contract calling for the lawyers to receive an increasing percentage of 
the recovery up to 30%.356 Barton disclosed that he had hired Beattie and 
Osborne, a small New York firm, under a fee agreement that would pay 
between 10% and 15% of the recovery with a cap of $8 million.357 Based 
upon this evidence, Judge Walker determined that “[t]he significant 
differences in potential attorney fees” could not “be rationally explained 
by intangible factors such as the well-recognized brand name in 
securities litigation” of Milberg Weiss.358 The court entered an order 
 351. Id. at 725–26. 
 352. In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (consolidated with In re 
Copper Mountain Networks Sec. Litig.). 
 353. Id. at 479. 
 354. Id. at 487. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 480. 
 357. Id. at 479. 
 358. Id. at 488. 
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finding that the Cavanaugh group was inadequate and appointing Barton 
as lead plaintiff.359
After the Cavanaugh group petitioned for writ of mandamus, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed Judge Walker in In re Cavanaugh.360 On behalf 
of the panel, Judge Alex Kozinski admonished the lower court for 
“engag[ing] in freewheeling comparison of the parties competing for 
lead plaintiff.”361 Articulating its vision of the proper role of the court in 
reducing agency costs, the court of appeals held that the only statutory 
basis for comparing candidates for appointment as lead plaintiff is the 
size of their financial stakes in the case. Once it identifies the 
presumptively most adequate plaintiff, the district court then must 
provide other plaintiffs with the opportunity to rebut the presumption that 
the most adequate plaintiff meets the typicality and adequacy 
requirements under Rule 23(a). However, the court’s further inquiry is 
not normative; it is objective. According to the Ninth Circuit, “[s]o long 
as the plaintiff with the largest losses satisfies the typicality and 
adequacy requirements, he is entitled to lead plaintiff status, even if the 
district court is convinced that some other plaintiff would do a better 
job.”362
Although Judge Kozinski could have ended his opinion at that point, 
he did not. The court went on to instruct that the presumptive lead 
plaintiff’s choice of counsel and fee arrangements have only limited 
relevance in the determination of adequacy under Rule 23(a). “[T]he 
district court has no authority to select for the class what it considers to 
be the best possible lawyer or the lawyer offering the best possible fee” 
arrangement.363 According to the Ninth Circuit, the determination of 
adequacy for lead plaintiffs in securities cases is no different than the 
adequacy determination for the proposed class representative in any 
other class action litigation.364 Judge Kozinski articulated a more 
 359. Id. at 488–89. 
 360. 306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 361. Id. at 732. 
 362. Id.; see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 268 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[O]nce the 
presumption is triggered, the question is not whether another movant might do a better job of 
protecting the interests of the class than the presumptive lead plaintiff; instead, the question is 
whether anyone can prove that the presumptive lead plaintiff will not do a ‘fair[] and adequate[]’ 
job. We . . . stress that the inquiry is not a relative one.”). 
 363. Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 732. 
 364. Id. at 736. Contra Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 483 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that the PSLRA raised the threshold for proof of adequacy), reh’g denied, 279 F.3d 313, 
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circumscribed role for presiding judges in reforming securities class 
actions: “While we share the learned district judge’s concern for 
reducing the cost of securities class actions, and for making plaintiffs 
more responsible, we believe the way to accomplish these purposes is to 
diligently apply the terms of the Reform Act.”365 The PSLRA confers on 
lead plaintiffs the right to select and retain lead counsel. The Cavanaugh 
decision stands for the proposition that the PSLRA thereby delimits the 
courts’ authority to take certain actions to reduce agency costs in 
securities cases. 
Perhaps, however, federal judges possess extrastatutory authority to 
reduce agency costs. Perhaps the courts have a fiduciary obligation to 
protect absent class members from opportunistic lawyers. The next Part 
considers but rejects this possibility. 
IV. JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: JUDGES AS FIDUCIARIES OF 
ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS 
In many of their decisions reducing attorneys’ fees, judges refer to 
themselves as “fiduciaries” (or “agents” or “guardians”) of the absent 
class members.366 Similar language is found in the opinions of courts 
ordering competitive bidding by prospective lead counsel.367 How and 
why did judges become characterized as fiduciaries to absent class 
members? The origin of the fiduciary judge mantra is unclear. However, 
both the 1985 Third Circuit Task Force and a few appellate courts have 
articulated the following rationale for depicting judges as fiduciaries: 
313 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that the lead plaintiff should be capable of understanding and 
controlling the litigation). 
 365. Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 736. 
 366. See, e.g., In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1064 (E.D. Mo. 
2002); In re 3Com Sec. Litig., No. C-97-21083 EAI, slip op. at 5, 10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2001); In re 
Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2001); In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 183 F.R.D. 78, 82 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P’ships Litig., 985 F. 
Supp. 410, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Feinberg v. Hibernia Corp., 966 F. Supp. 442, 446 (E.D. La. 1997); 
In re Quantum Health Res., Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1997). Courts also have 
described judges as “fiduciaries” for absent class members in approving settlements in class actions. 
See, e.g., Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that under 
Rule 23(e), “[the] district court acts as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of 
absent class members”). 
 367. See, e.g., In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 967, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2001); In re 
Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467, 468 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 
688, 691 (N.D. Cal. 1990); cf. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 82–84 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining the rationale for auctioning the role of class counsel in antitrust 
litigation). 
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once class counsel reaches agreement with the defendants to compromise 
the class claims, counsel assumes a position adverse to absent class 
members with respect to how large a fee she should receive from the 
class recovery fund.368 Abandoned by their counsel, no one represents 
the absent class members at this point in the proceeding. In the absence 
of any other representatives safeguarding their interests, the presiding 
judge must become the advocate for absent class members and must 
serve as the “fiduciary” for absentees in reviewing class counsel’s fee 
application.369 In other words, presiding judges become fiduciaries by 
default. As the Ninth Circuit explained: 
[A]t the fee-setting stage, “[p]laintiffs’ counsel, otherwise a fiduciary 
for the class, has become a claimant against the fund created for the 
benefit of the class. It is obligatory, therefore, for the trial court judge 
to act with ‘a jealous regard to the rights of those who are interested in 
the fund’ in determining what a proper fee award is.”370
Other appellate court opinions seem to indicate that the courts’ fiduciary 
status derives from Rule 23 itself. An early decision of the Third Circuit 
provided that “[t]he ultimate responsibility [to those not before the court] 
is committed to the district court in whom, as the guardian of the rights 
of the absentees, is vested broad administrative, as well as adjudicative, 
power.”371 Of course, characterizing any person as a fiduciary only 
begins the analysis.372 Although commentators have used this powerful 
rhetoric,373 the literature does not include any evaluations of the courts’ 
 368. In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994); Task 
Force 1985 Report, supra note 54, at 25. 
 369. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 255 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that the court is 
the agent designated to oversee the relationship for class members because clients have no effective 
means to oversee counsel’s inherent conflicts of interest); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 
691 (N.D. Cal. 1990); see also Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., No. 95C3193, 1999 WL 
172313, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 1999), vacated in part on other grounds, 1999 WL 299898 (N.D. 
Ill. May 3, 1999); Hallet v. Li & Fung, Ltd., No. 95 Civ. 8917, 1998 WL 698354, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 6, 1998); In re Gould Sec. Litig., 727 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“[T]his Court must 
act as ‘fiduciary for the fund’s beneficiaries and must carefully monitor disbursement to the 
attorneys by scrutinizing the fee applications.’” (quoting Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 
250, 253 (7th Cir. 1988))). 
 370. In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(citations omitted). 
 371. Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 372. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943). 
 373. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating 
Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
2119, 2168 (2000) (“Whether by MDL or class action and whether in federal or state court, judges 
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role as fiduciary or the consequences of the courts assuming fiduciary 
duties to absent class members. Review of fiduciary law principles 
makes clear that, as a matter of both law and public policy, courts cannot 
act as fiduciaries. 
A. The Nature of Fiduciary Relationships 
The concept of fiduciary originated in the law of trusts. Literally, the 
term fiduciary means “faithfulness” and denotes a trustee, or one in a 
position of trust.374 As applied in trust law, the fiduciary trustee holds 
title to, but not ownership of, the property of the beneficiary, who can 
claim the benefits of ownership but who lacks legal title. The common 
law imposed on trustees the duty to manage the trust corpus prudently, 
and fiduciary law strictly prohibited the trustees from personally dealing 
in trust property regardless of whether the self-dealing harmed the 
interests of the beneficiary. 
The common law of fiduciary developed as courts applied the 
trustee-beneficiary construct in other contexts where the relation between 
fiduciary and principal was characterized by trust and confidence.375 
Fiduciary responsibilities arise from diverse associations typically 
involving delegation of management power by the owner of assets to 
another person, the fiduciary, and some express or implied commitment 
by the fiduciary to exercise her discretion to promote the interests of the 
beneficiary. Some fiduciary responsibilities arise from the status of the 
trusted person and the trusting person, such as the obligations of trustees 
to beneficiaries, agents to principals, guardians to wards, partners one to 
another, directors to corporations, and lawyers to their clients.376 The 
law does not recognize the relationship of judge to litigant or judge to 
have long-standing fiduciary obligations to absentees to ensure the integrity, fairness, and legitimacy 
of settlements in aggregate litigation.”); Grundfest Proposal, supra note 61, at 5 (“The court, name 
plaintiff, and counsel owe fiduciary obligations to absent class members.”); see also Koniak & 
Cohen, supra note 92, at 1122 (“Ostensibly, the court stands in for the client as a fiduciary to ensure 
that the settlement is fair to the client and does not merely serve the lawyer’s interest.”). 
 374. ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS 
AND RESULTING TRUSTS 1 (1955). 
 375. Because of numerous and diverse applications of fiduciary principles, academics and 
courts have struggled to create a complete unifying theory for fiduciary relationships. J.C. SHEPARD, 
LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 52–88 (1981) (listing and critiquing various descriptive theories, including 
those based upon property, reliance, unequal relationship, contract, unjust enrichment, commercial 
utility, and power and discretion); see also Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary 
Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991). 
 376. VINTER, supra note 375, at 9. 
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underrepresented party as a status-based fiduciary relationship. However, 
the law will recognize certain fiduciary relationships beyond those the 
law has already established based upon particular circumstances. 
Analytically, courts often determine whether a party acted as a fiduciary 
in fact by first identifying analogous status relationships where 
established law already has imposed fiduciary obligations. Then, courts 
decide whether the relationship under review is sufficiently similar to the 
paradigm case to support an extension of fiduciary obligations to that 
relationship.377
Once the courts determine that a relationship is fiduciary in nature, 
the inquiry turns to the obligations of the fiduciary to the beneficiary. 
Judicial opinions variously describe the responsibilities of fiduciaries to 
act in “utmost good faith,”378 or with “undivided and unselfish 
loyalty”379 or with “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”380 
Regardless of the phraseology chosen, fiduciaries cannot act simply in 
their own self-interest. In addition, fiduciary law articulates rules of 
conduct—so-called duties—applying to those persons found to be 
fiduciaries.381 Imposition of duties reduces the beneficiary’s risk that the 
fiduciary will take or otherwise misuse property belonging to the 
beneficiary as well as the risk that the fiduciary will behave carelessly. 
Here, too, courts resort to analogy in order to determine the rules 
applicable to fiduciaries in particular circumstances. Those legal rules 
then govern subsequent determinations as to whether the fiduciary has 
acted wrongly and, if so, what monetary and nonmonetary remedies are 
available to redress that wrongful conduct. For example, the law 
describes corporate directors as fiduciaries of the corporation, imposing 
on them duties of care and loyalty, including the duty to avoid usurping 
corporate opportunities. These duties enable beneficiaries to rely on their 
fiduciaries’ honesty. If a director violates her fiduciary duties, the 
corporation may sue to require her to disgorge all gains arising from her 
wrongful acts. 
 377. See generally id. at 11–12. 
 378. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 379. Id. 
 380. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.). 
 381. In his positivist theory of fiduciary duties, Robert Clark identified four legal attributes of 
fiduciary relationships: (1) affirmative duties to disclose; (2) open-ended duties to act; (3) closed-in 
rights to positional advantages; and (4) moral rhetoric. Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus 
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 71–79 (John W. 
Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). 
CAS-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004 12:29:28 PM 
1239] Reforming Securities Class Actions 
 1315 
 
As the law has evolved, the duties imposed by fiduciary status vary 
depending upon the circumstances of the relationship, including facts 
such as the positions of the trusted party and the trusting party; the ability 
of the trusted party to influence the trusting party; the allocation of 
function, if any, to the trusted party; and the potential for opportunistic 
behavior. Not surprisingly, then, the law subjects trustees to more 
stringent restrictions on their use of trust property than corporate officers 
face in transacting with the corporation.382
B. Why Judges Cannot Serve as Fiduciaries 
The imposition of fiduciary status on judges presiding over securities 
class actions is misplaced. In making awards of attorneys’ fees to class 
counsel under the common-fund doctrine, judges determine the 
allocation of the common fund, a fund consisting of assets belonging 
both to the class and, under equitable principles, to class counsel as 
well.383 Neither the class nor its counsel actually entrusts property to the 
court, nor does the court accept property and consent to serve anyone. 
Judges derive their power to allocate the common fund from their 
judicial office and from the equitable common-fund doctrine. Despite 
their considerable discretion to award attorneys’ fees from the common 
fund, judges who rule on fee applications do not have legal title or even 
actual access to the assets in that fund, and the common-fund doctrine 
does not make absent class members’ assets vulnerable to judges 
themselves. 
More importantly, imposing fiduciary status on the courts is 
inconsistent with the PSLRA’s empowered lead plaintiff model. 
Congress did not legislate reforms requiring judges themselves to act as 
class representatives. Instead, by enacting the lead plaintiff provisions of 
the PSLRA, federal lawmakers adopted a novel mechanism for 
regulating opportunism by class counsel, enabling enhanced oversight by 
financially interested class members who can better internalize the 
interests of the absent class members than can judges. Congress gave to 
the courts very specific statutory responsibilities: to approve the lead 
plaintiff’s selection and retention of lead counsel and to ensure that the 
 382. Id. 
 383. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 536 (1881) (noting that attorneys have claim to 
fees payable out of common fund created through their efforts); see also In re Fine Paper Antitrust 
Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 589 (3d Cir. 1984) (dividing predistribution interest earned on the common 
fund between class counsel and the class in proportion to each party’s interest in the fund). 
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total fees and costs awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel do not exceed a 
reasonable percentage of any damages and prejudgment interest actually 
paid to the class. Nothing in the PSLRA evidences a congressional intent 
that courts fulfill fiduciary responsibilities to absent class members. 
Similarly, nothing in Rule 23 contemplates that the court itself will 
represent the investor class. 
Instead, the PSLRA and Rule 23 require the courts to enforce the 
duties of others deemed to be fiduciaries to absent class members, 
namely, the lead plaintiff and lead counsel. Courts enforce these persons’ 
duties when courts engage in their statutorily mandated review of the 
lead plaintiffs’ selections for lead counsel and the proposed terms of 
retention. At the conclusion of the case, courts again consider whether 
the lead plaintiffs and lead counsel have fulfilled their duties in 
reviewing and approving the terms of any settlement and attorneys’ fees 
and costs requested by plaintiffs’ counsel. Thus, fiduciary jurisprudence 
gives content to the responsibilities of lead plaintiffs vis-à-vis the class, 
including the lead plaintiff’s duty to the class “to obtain the highest 
quality representation at the lowest price.”384 Just as courts do not 
become fiduciaries themselves in cases involving trusts, bankruptcies, 
corporate governance disputes, guardianships over infants or the 
mentally incompetent, or the like, so too in this context the law simply 
calls upon judges to evaluate other fiduciaries’ qualifications, activities, 
and requests for compensation. 
If judges nonetheless attempt to act as fiduciaries, they may defeat 
the objectives of the PSLRA by disempowering lead plaintiffs.385 This 
possibility is not simply theoretical. In Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp.,386 
Judge Walker invoked his purported fiduciary responsibilities to absent 
class members when he disempowered the lead plaintiff from selecting 
and retaining counsel and ordered competitive bidding instead. “As a 
general matter, the lead plaintiff selects lead counsel to represent the 
class subject to the court’s approval. . . . The court, however, is charged 
with ensuring that the class receives quality representation at a fair price 
and cannot, therefore, simply defer to lead plaintiff’s choice of 
counsel.”387 The prospect that a fiduciary judge will select lead counsel 
 384. In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 385. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 696 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (“For a court simply to 
fix a percentage contingent fee without seeking competitive alternatives is thus inconsistent with the 
court’s fiduciary duty to the class.”). 
 386. 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 387. Id. at 587. The lead plaintiff, an individual, 
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herself through a bidding process or will disregard the retention 
agreement negotiated by the lead plaintiff may disable lead plaintiffs 
from obtaining prospectively binding compensation commitments from 
putative lead counsel.388 Also, the greater the likelihood that the court 
will substitute its judgment for that of the lead plaintiff, the fewer the 
number of law firms that will choose to compete for the appointment. 
The lead plaintiff’s ability to bargain for the benefit of the class will 
suffer. The result is a weakening of the incentives for institutional 
investors and others with greater stakes to participate as lead plaintiffs in 
securities class actions.389
Applying fiduciary lexicon to judges presiding over class actions is 
also inconsistent with the mission of the federal bench under our 
adversarial system of justice. Article III judges decide cases or 
controversies on the law and the facts. They do not represent litigants or 
interested parties in litigation. They do not advocate on behalf of any of 
the parties. They are not loyal to any of the parties. The Code of Conduct 
for Judges makes clear the importance of an independent and impartial 
bench.390 “Judges have been schooled to remain independent and aloof . 
. . .”391 Thus, fiduciary judging is contrary to the accepted model of 
appropriate judicial behavior. To use one analogy, courts more typically 
act like umpires, calling balls and strikes, or deciding whether a player is 
almost certainly does not have the expertise and resources of a large institutional investor. 
His ability to select and monitor the conduct of class counsel on behalf of the entire class 
throughout the duration of this litigation is, therefore, inherently less than that of the ideal 
lead plaintiff contemplated by Congress.  
Id. 
 388. Judge Walker justified the need for judges to override the decisions of lead plaintiffs 
when he wrote, “If the court were acting as a private fiduciary, the law would require [the court] to 
obtain the best price the market would yield for the services of the class’s lawyers.” In re Oracle Sec. 
Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 692 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 
 389. Institutional investors have claimed that “the major incentive for [institutional] 
participation [as lead plaintiff] . . . is the opportunity to negotiate a counsel fee for the benefit of the 
class.” Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 754 n.227. 
 390. Canon 1 states that “a judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary.” CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES (2000). Canon 2 provides that “a judge should avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.” Id. Finally, Canon 3 states that “a 
judge should perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently.” Id. The commentary for 
Canon 2 sets forth the test for the appearance of impropriety as “whether the conduct would create in 
reasonable minds . . . a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with 
integrity, impartiality, and competence is impaired.” Id. 
 391. Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 
66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 406 (1987). 
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out or safe.392 The parties play the game in our adversarial system, not 
the judges. The judge as umpire looks over the parties’ shoulders to 
“keep[] the playing field level”393 but does not play the game for them. If 
the judge plays the game for or with the parties, he may become a “blind 
and blundering intruder, acting in spasms as sudden flashes of seeming 
light may lead or mislead him.”394 Given the mindset, not to mention the 
workload, of the federal bench, it is not realistic to expect that most 
district court judges can embrace the responsibility to advocate as 
fiduciaries for absent class members. 
To be sure, the very nature of class action litigation makes absent 
class members vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by class counsel. 
Like other litigants, some, perhaps many, absent class members would 
say that they repose trust and confidence in the integrity and fidelity of 
the courts to police class action settlements for collusion and to award 
counsel a fair fee from the common fund. If polled, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
possibly would say that they, too, repose trust and confidence in the 
court’s ability to compensate them fairly. However, it does not follow 
from the fund claimants’ state of mind that the court assumes fiduciary 
obligations to them.395 Judges exercise legal or equitable discretion 
without presumptively assuming the responsibilities to advocate for and 
act in the best interest of one of the parties affected by their decisions. 
The courts rarely, if ever, express that they intend to act on behalf of a 
litigant, much less that they will act solely in that party’s best interests as 
her fiduciary. Indeed, trust and confidence in the courts are premised 
upon judges acting impartially when making their determinations. In 
order to maintain legitimacy for judicial decisions, the bench must 
remain an independent institution, unrestrained by the responsibility to 
advocate on behalf of a particular party, even if that party otherwise 
becomes underrepresented. Courts using this argot gratuitously undertake 
undefined obligations that absent class members cannot enforce in any 
event. 
 392. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 
1033 (1975). 
 393. Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of 
Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1745 (1992). 
 394. Marvin E. Frankel, supra note 393, at 1042; see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, The 
Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 & n.20, 15 (1978). 
 395. In any event, the law does not require a finding of actual trust before imposing fiduciary 
duties. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1227–28 
(1995). 
CAS-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004 12:29:28 PM 
1239] Reforming Securities Class Actions 
 1319 
 
Even assuming some benefit in placing the fiduciary mantle on 
judges, courts portraying themselves as fiduciaries fail to articulate what 
the status requires in this context, much less what they have done to 
satisfy their fiduciary duties for the benefit of absent class members. The 
invocation of the court-as-fiduciary vernacular does not follow from 
judicial admissions that, unless restrained, judges awarding attorneys’ 
fees to class counsel may pursue their own self-interests at the expense of 
absent class members. Certainly courts describing themselves as 
fiduciaries have not intended to restrain their own discretion. Rather, 
courts seem to use this language to justify their discretion, i.e., to justify 
decisions to award reduced compensation (even absent any objection to 
class counsel’s petition for attorneys’ fees) or to auction the position of 
class counsel to the lowest bidding firm despite the lack of statutory 
authority to do so. If systematically adopted, such decisions, while well-
intentioned, may damage the interests of defrauded shareholders in the 
long run by diminishing the incentives for the private attorney general to 
enforce the securities laws. 
Perhaps characterizing presiding judges as “fiduciaries” performs an 
expressive function when used by appellate courts or their blue-ribbon 
panels. The rhetoric expresses that someone is looking out for the absent 
class members. When used by appellate courts, the language also may 
serve to communicate to the district bench that they should take care 
when engaging in the difficult task of approving settlements and 
awarding fees to class counsel. Further, by articulating to judges that 
they must act to protect the interests of absentees, the bench will review 
fee petitions with a heightened cognizance of the danger of lawyer 
opportunism. Nonetheless, the judge-as-fiduciary metaphor invokes 
images, if not rules, in conflict with the accepted notion of judges as 
unbiased umpires in our adversarial system of justice. In light of these 
prudential concerns, it is preferable for courts to avoid using such 
language in describing the role of district judges overseeing class actions. 
Finally, courts need not assume the responsibilities of fiduciaries 
themselves in order to reduce agency costs in securities class actions. To 
reform securities class actions, the courts must require the lead plaintiffs 
to fulfill their fiduciary duties to the injured plaintiffs that they represent. 
One special competence of the judiciary as an institution lies in its ability 
to enforce fiduciary responsibilities and procedural requirements.396 I 
 396. Nat Stern, The Practicality of Outreach Statutes Enforcing Directors’ Duty of Care, 72 
NEB. L. REV. 905, 920 (1993). 
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turn now to how courts may best judge the true class fiduciaries under 
the model adopted in the PSLRA. 
V. REDUCING AGENCY COSTS BY JUDGING  
FIDUCIARIES MORE EFFECTIVELY 
If embraced by district court judges, the legislatively sanctioned 
mechanism for aligning the incentives of class counsel with those of the 
class—the PSLRA’s empowered lead plaintiff model—will reduce 
agency costs in securities class actions more efficiently and effectively 
than fiduciary judging without threatening the values inherent in the 
umpireal model of adversarial adjudication. 
The PSLRA does not rely upon ex post judicial paternalism to 
protect absent class members from opportunistic class counsel, nor does 
the statute place responsibility on the federal bench to select and retain 
the lawyers. Rather, the statute divides responsibility for monitoring 
class counsel between the lead plaintiff and the court, as evidenced by 
the statute’s lead plaintiff selection rule, lead counsel selection rule, and 
the attorneys’ fee rule. Both the text of the PSLRA and the Conference 
Report397 make clear that presiding judges retain authority to approve 
fees and expenses,398 but it is fair to say that lawmakers recognized that 
ex post judicial review of the lawyers’ fee petition is “an imperfect 
safeguard” at best.399 Therefore, Congress provided the courts with a 
statutory standard for exercising their authority over class counsel 
compensation—the attorneys’ fee provision—as well as new procedures 
for doing so—the empowered lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA. 
A. The Responsibilities of Lead Plaintiffs as Class Fiduciaries 
In order to comply with the statute and fulfill their duties as 
fiduciaries, lead plaintiffs must search for high-quality counsel willing to 
do the work on the terms most favorable to the class. Unlike the 
presiding judge, the most adequate plaintiff (presumably a large and 
sophisticated investor, if not an institutional investor) has a substantial 
interest in the outcome of the lawsuit. Absent any reason to believe that 
the lead plaintiff is atypical or inadequate to represent the class (which 
should have disqualified the lead plaintiff from appointment), it is safe to 
 397. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995). 
 398. Moreover, Congress left undisturbed the courts’ authority to determine adequacy under 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) and to determine the fairness of settlements under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 399. Unfaithful Champion, supra note 132, at 5, 31. 
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assume that the interests of the lead plaintiff in maximizing the recovery 
for the class are aligned with those of the absent class members. Thus, 
the lead plaintiff’s ex ante selection and negotiation with lead counsel 
over the terms of the representation best provide lead counsel with 
incentives designed to reduce agency costs. Because of their incentives, 
as well as their experience, sophistication, and access to information 
about the lawyers’ performance and compensation in prior comparable 
lawsuits, lead plaintiffs are in a better position than the courts to assess 
accurately the risk of opportunism. 
Although the PSLRA initially inspired few institutional investors to 
come forward and volunteer for the role of lead plaintiff,400 that situation 
has changed. In the past several years, as more and more public 
companies have restated their financials, and as the SEC has opened one 
accounting fraud investigation after another of major corporations, 
institutions have become active participants in private enforcement.401 
Most of the institutions volunteering to serve as lead plaintiff are public 
pension funds and union pension plans regulated under the Taft-Hartley 
Act,402 but other institutions have sought appointments as well.403 In 
fact, institutional investors increasingly have competed against each 
other for the role of lead plaintiff in financial fraud megacases like those 
brought against Cendant, Waste Management, Bank of America, Enron, 
 400. SEC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 
ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 
1995, at 2, 4, 55–56 (1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ studies/lreform.txt. 
 401. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8525 (S.D.N.Y. May 
22, 2003) (naming New York State Common Retirement Fund, alleging losses of $306 million, as 
lead plaintiff); In re AOL Time Warner Inc. Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145, at 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2003) (naming Minnesota State Board of Investment, alleging losses of more 
than $249 million, as lead plaintiff); In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 451–58 (S.D. 
Tex. 2002) (naming Regents of the University of California, alleging losses of $144 million, as lead 
plaintiff); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D 144, 147 (D.N.J. 1998) (naming New York City 
Pension Funds, New York State Common Retirement Fund, and California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System, with combined losses of $89 million, as co–lead plaintiffs). 
 402. The Taft-Hartley Act regulates any employee benefit plan funded with employer 
contributions if a union or union representative has authority to administer the plan or manage its 
assets. 29 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). Union pension funds have invested more than $5 trillion in assets by 
recent estimates. Steven Greenhouse, Labor to Press for Changes in Corporate Governance, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 2002, at C7. 
 403. See, e.g., Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 212 
F.R.D. 400 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (appointing investment partnership as co–lead plaintiff); In re 
EquiMed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17976 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2002) (appointing 
investment company as lead plaintiff). 
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and WorldCom.404 Commenting on how the recent financial fraud 
scandals have encouraged institutional activism, Milberg Weiss’ Bill 
Lerach recently wrote,  
Now institutional investors are involved in almost every securities class 
action case. I spend a lot of time with institutional investors. . . . 
Pension funds that would not have considered litigation five years 
ago—not even considered it—today are willing to march into federal or 
state court to assert their rights as shareholders.405
What motivates institutions to seek appointments as lead plaintiff? A 
number of institutions told the Third Circuit Task Force that they wanted 
to control the selection and compensation of class counsel.406 Experience 
demonstrates that institutions applying for the role of lead plaintiff can 
and do negotiate fee agreements with putative lead counsel before 
selecting the attorneys for the class. In the Waste Management 
megalitigation, for example, lead plaintiff Connecticut Retirement Plans 
and Trust funds negotiated a contingent fee agreement with lead counsel 
Goodkind Labaton Rudoff & Sucharow at the outset of the case. The 
pact included a provision capping the attorneys’ fees if the case settled 
after resolution of motions to dismiss but before a decision on motions 
for summary judgment. The court approved the contract fees as 
reasonable and awarded counsel 7.93% of the cash recovered for the 
class in the megasettlement, or $36.225 million of the $457 million 
recovery fund. Acting as lead plaintiff in the megalawsuit arising from 
the Enron debacle, the University of California Board of Regents also 
negotiated a contingent fee contract with lead counsel Milberg Weiss 
calling for a fee below 10% of any recovery407—again, substantially 
lower than the 25% benchmark previously utilized by many courts.408
 404. See, e.g., Edward Iwata, Law Firms Tussle over Enron Case, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 
2002, at 1B. 
 405. LERACH, supra note 70, at 17. 
 406. Task Force 2001 Report, supra note 22, at 761–62 & n.258; see also Fisch, supra note 
351, at 709 (reporting results of interviews with approximately a half-dozen counsel of public 
pension plans that have volunteered most frequently to serve as lead plaintiffs). 
 407. Jeffrey Toobin, The Man Chasing Enron: Why America’s C.E.O.’s Hate Bill Lerach, 
NEW YORKER, Sept. 9, 2002, at 86, 92. Under the fee agreement, plaintiffs’ lawyers would accept 
8% of the first billion dollars in recovery, 9% of the second billion, and 10% of any recovery over $2 
billion. Id.; see also Maureen Milford, UC Takes Charge of Enron Suit, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 4, 2002, at 
A15, A18. 
 408. Acting outside the spotlight, some institutions not serving as lead plaintiffs also have 
persuaded class counsel to reduce their fee requests without filing formal objections. Keith L. 
Johnson & Douglas M. Hagerman, The Elephant in Your General Counsel’s Office: Managing 
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To the extent public and union pension plans have assumed the role 
of lead plaintiff in a number of lawsuits, they have become repeat players 
rather than one-shot purchasers of class counsel services and can 
negotiate superior fee agreements with better information. Presumably, 
qualifying lead plaintiffs also are more sophisticated, “cost-conscious” 
purchasers of legal services than other investors. Many institutions 
serving as lead plaintiffs employ in-house attorneys and even outside law 
firms to investigate and evaluate potential claims in advance of 
interviewing putative lead counsel. In any event, applicants for lead 
counsel under the PSLRA must negotiate the terms of their retention 
with potential clients who are motivated by their greater losses to 
participate in the litigation. Lead plaintiff candidates (ideally, 
institutional investors) will bargain over fees and, perhaps, even send the 
engagement out for competitive bidding. In scrutinizing fee proposals, 
these injured investors can consider the likelihood that the lawsuit will 
generate a megafund or will settle early, the probability that the case will 
survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the settlements and fee 
awards in like litigation. They also can assess the quality of service 
variations among potential counsel, evaluating which law firm proposal 
likely would maximize the net recovery for the class. Based upon good 
faith judgments about these and other similar factors, lead plaintiffs will 
select lead counsel and negotiate her retention accordingly. Perhaps lead 
plaintiffs and counsel will agree to more than one contingency fee, 
depending on the stage of the litigation or a particular litigation event 
(e.g., settlement, trial, appeal). Perhaps they will design a fee structure 
involving differing percentages, capped amounts, or some combination 
for each contingency. By bargaining at the inception of the litigation, “in 
the shadow of the litigation’s uncertainty,” lead plaintiffs and candidates 
for the position of lead counsel can assess intelligently “the costs and 
benefits of particular systems and risk multipliers.”409
Losses to Legal Fees in Shareholder Class Actions, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, March/April 
2001, at 8 (citing various examples). In addition, public pension funds have assembled data used to 
evaluate fee applications in securities class actions. Id. Institutional Shareholder Services, a provider 
of proxy voting and corporate governance services to institutional investors, has established a 
proprietary database for tracking securities class actions from initial filing to payment of claims. See 
Governance Matters—Institutional Shareholder Services, at 
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/analytics/scas/index.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
 409. In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 718–19 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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B. Judging the Lead Plaintiffs and Their Proposed Lawyers 
The lead plaintiff cannot meet her fiduciary duty to maximize the 
recovery for the class unless she has bargained with the attorneys in good 
faith, employing independent decision-making. For this reason, courts 
should order appointees to access the market and negotiate the terms of a 
fee agreement with prospective lead counsel ex ante.410 After negotiating 
the terms of retention in the usual marketplace manner, the lead plaintiff 
then should submit the proposal in camera for the court’s approval. 
Before approving the lead plaintiff’s selection and retention agreement, 
the presiding judge should require the lead plaintiff to make sworn 
representations to the court sufficient to satisfy the court that the lead 
plaintiff negotiated counsel’s compensation in “an open and 
appropriately arm’s length manner” and that the retention agreement 
“include[s] all of the features normally contained in comparable 
arrangements that are negotiated directly between counsel and client.”411 
Putative lead counsel, too, should be ordered to disclose its qualifications 
to serve as lead counsel and the existence and extent of any conflicting 
interests.412
Assuming these procedural prerequisites are met, the court should 
presume the reasonableness of the proposed agreement413 and simply 
retain the ultimate authority to revise the fee if later extraordinary 
 410. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 276 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he proposed counsel 
fees [should] be the result of hard-bargaining.” (quoting In re Nice Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206, 
223 (D.N.J. 1999))). 
 411. Task Force 1985 Report, supra note 54, at 256; see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 
F.3d 201, 276 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ultimate inquiry is always whether the lead plaintiff’s choices 
were the result of a good faith selection and negotiation process and were arrived at via meaningful 
arm’s length bargaining.”). Grundfest has proposed a series of five appropriate questions for a 
presiding judge to ask lead plaintiffs before approving their selection and retention of lead counsel. 
Grundfest Proposal, supra note 61, at 10–11. 
 412. Where the court has appointed a public pension plan or Taft-Hartley plan as lead 
plaintiff, the court must not overlook the danger that potential class counsel may have exchanged 
political contributions for the right to represent the class. See Kevin McCoy, Campaign 
Contributions or Conflicts of Interest?, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2001, at 1B. If the law firm selected 
by the lead plaintiff has contributed to the campaign of any elected official with responsibilities for 
administering the fund or who could influence the selection of lead counsel, the court should 
exercise its discretion to disapprove the law firm as lead counsel. 
 413. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[U]nder the PSLRA, 
courts should accord a presumption of reasonableness to any fee request submitted pursuant to a 
retainer agreement that was entered into between a properly-selected lead plaintiff and a properly-
selected lead counsel.”). The possibility that class counsel will under-invest in the litigation exists 
regardless of the method used to calculate the fee because no fee arrangement can perfectly align the 
interests of class counsel and the class in all circumstances. 
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circumstances warrant. This retention of authority is consistent with the 
courts’ statutory obligation to determine that total attorneys’ fees and 
expenses awarded do not exceed a reasonable percentage of any damages 
and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class,414 a finding the court 
cannot make without a determination of what monies the class will 
receive from settlement or, more rarely, by litigated judgment. 
However, courts should not interfere with an arms-length negotiated 
fee except when presented with proof of fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability—the same extraordinary circumstances recognized for 
voiding agreements under contract law. As the Third Circuit recognized 
in In re Cendant Corp. Litigation, the appointed lead plaintiff is in the 
best position to determine the fee for lead counsel at the inception of the 
litigation.415 Courts should not second-guess the lead plaintiff at the 
conclusion of the case without evidence of some wrongdoing or conflict; 
judges cannot assess fairly the reasonableness of contingent fees after the 
outcome of the lawsuit and the hours of work expended on that outcome 
become known definitively. Furthermore, the advantages of the 
empowered lead plaintiff model will be undermined if, at the end of the 
litigation, counsel may not receive the full fee negotiated with the lead 
plaintiff or, alternatively, if counsel may renegotiate the terms of the 
retainer upward with the court. 416
The court’s role, then, is not to be the fiduciary, but to judge the 
fiduciary—to assess whether the lead plaintiff has fulfilled its fiduciary 
duties to the absent class members and to enforce those duties. In 
approving the selection and retention of lead counsel, the presiding judge 
must satisfy herself that the appointed lead plaintiff has fulfilled its 
fiduciary obligations. Effective judicial oversight actually will empower 
the lead plaintiff to control agency costs by enhancing its bargaining 
power vis-à-vis potential class counsel. Unlike court-supervised 
competitive bidding and similar interventions by presiding judges,417 the 
“judging fiduciaries” approach reconciles the tension between the courts’ 
authority and the authority of empowered lead plaintiffs under the 
PSLRA. 
 414. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2000). 
 415. 264 F.3d 201, 282 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 416. Task Force 1985 Report, supra note 54, at 258. 
 417. The lead plaintiff selection procedure struck down in In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726 
(N.D. Cal. 2002), is an example of such an intervention. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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C. Judging Fiduciaries Reduces Agency Costs and Judicial Errors 
By requiring the lead plaintiff to negotiate the terms of retention with 
lead counsel at the inception of the litigation, the court will have 
evidence of the market value of the attorneys’ services. Assuming 
competition in the market for legal services, market pricing should 
provide representation to the class at the lowest possible price that will 
award class counsel with a reasonable profit.418 The market will produce 
a fee and other terms of retention that are presumptively reasonable. 
Courts can dispense with ex post market proxies such as lodestar 
calculations and lodestar cross-checks, thereby avoiding time-consuming 
investigations to determine the amount of actual work performed by class 
counsel and the customary hourly rates in a particular community. 
Utilizing the actual compensation contract entered into by class 
counsel also reduces the risk of judicial error. The court can avoid 
subjective analyses biased by hindsight. No longer will the court have to 
speculate about risk or counsel’s skill. Assuming a successful 
prosecution, plaintiffs’ attorneys will receive the compensation explicitly 
agreed to by the lead plaintiff and approved by the court at the inception 
of the litigation. If the market for lead counsel services is competitive, 
lead counsel can be more certain about what compensation they will 
obtain if they successfully prosecute the lawsuit. Class counsel 
prosecuting similar claims for damages and facing similar risks will not 
receive widely differing fee awards. By according a presumption of 
reasonableness to the lead plaintiff’s ex ante negotiated terms of 
retention, more attorneys may enter the market to represent shareholder 
classes, and more institutions may apply for lead plaintiff positions. Only 
by safeguarding the lead plaintiff’s statutory authority to select and retain 
lead counsel will the courts fulfill the legislative scheme. 
Finally, the “judging fiduciaries” model will enhance the legitimacy 
of the private enforcement regime. Judicial utilization of contracts 
negotiated by sophisticated lead plaintiffs may help dispel the public 
perception that private securities litigation benefits only the attorneys and 
not the investors they purport to represent. Presiding judges employing 
 418. Competition in the market for lead counsel services requires further study. The same 
small group of law firms seems to compete for and win the appointment as lead counsel in securities 
class actions. See Thomas et al., supra note 135, at 194. There also is evidence that “Milberg Weiss 
and other big players in the industry . . . have actually tightened their hold on the litigation since 
1995.” Alison Frankel, Class Warfare, AM. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 76, 81. 
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this approach need not serve as advocates in the litigation nor become 
adversarial to class counsel. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress attempted to reform securities litigation by inserting into 
the lawsuits class representatives, preferably institutional investors, with 
economic incentives to hire and monitor class counsel, much in the way 
that plaintiff-clients in traditional bipolar litigation oversee their lawyers. 
Because institutional involvement in securities class actions has become 
more prevalent only recently, it is still too early to evaluate whether the 
empowered lead plaintiff model actually is fulfilling its theoretical 
promise of reducing agency costs. Although some anecdotal evidence 
exists,419 there is much we do not know about lead plaintiffs’ 
performance in lawsuits.420 More evidence for review will come shortly, 
as megasecurities class actions arising from Enron, WorldCom, and other 
recent corporate frauds wind their way through the federal judicial 
system. 
What is clear is that the objectives of the PSLRA’s empowered lead 
plaintiff model cannot be realized unless the bench allows—indeed 
requires—the most adequate plaintiff to select and retain class counsel. 
 419. For example, the legal press has reported that the University of California Board of 
Regents, appointed as the sole lead plaintiff in the Enron securities fraud litigation, has assigned five 
attorneys in its 40-lawyer in-house legal department to work on the case, that one attorney plans to 
attend every hearing in the case, and that the general counsel believes, “It is [the University’s] 
responsibility to make the choices for the direction the case will go.” Maureen Milford, UC Takes 
Charge of Enron Suit, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 4, 2002, at A15, A18; see also Fisch, supra note 351. 
 420. As more institutions receive appointments as lead plaintiffs, we can make more 
observations based upon actual performance. Do injured investors recover a greater percentage of 
their losses when represented by institutions? Do the settlements contain different terms for the 
benefit of the class? How do lead plaintiffs supervise class counsel? What decisions do lead 
plaintiffs participate in? How do they influence litigation strategies and objectives? What do lead 
plaintiffs do to monitor the lawyers? How much time, effort, and expense do they devote to the 
litigation? What mechanisms do lead plaintiffs use to evaluate the performance of lead counsel? 
The limited empirical work available to date indicates that institutions tend to participate in 
larger cases, and that cases led by institutional investors “are associated with significantly higher 
settlement amounts.” LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, POST-REFORM ACT SECURITIES 
LAWSUITS: SETTLEMENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2002, at 6 (2003), available at 
http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/LES%20Through%201202.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
Another recent study found that “settlements are about 20% higher in cases where the lead plaintiff 
is an institutional investor.” BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 11. Although this settlement data 
may indicate that institutional investors retain higher quality lead counsel and/or supervise lead 
counsel more closely and effectively than other potential class representatives, it also is possible that 
institutions simply do not volunteer to participate as lead plaintiffs unless they determine that the 
investor class can assert strong fraud claims and recover large damages. 
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In exchange for receiving the right to act on behalf of the class and to 
select and retain lead counsel, the empowered lead plaintiffs assume 
fiduciary responsibilities to absent class members. They must act to 
maximize the net litigation recovery for the injured investors they 
represent. By requiring empowered lead plaintiffs to access the market 
for legal services and negotiate legal fees ex ante, courts can remain 
impartial and dispense with much of the cost, guesswork, and 
subjectivity associated with compensating class counsel. Judicial fee 
awards will come closest to duplicating compensation arrangements that 
the market would have produced if absent class members could contract 
with their lawyers directly, thus reducing the agency costs of the 
litigation. By more effectively and efficiently judging the persons who 
do have the fiduciary duty to maximize recoveries for injured investors, 
the courts may make securities class actions more “virtuous” after all.
